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Abstract
Most labour economists today agree on a view of the labour market in which various 
types of imperfections prevent firms with unfilled vacancies and workers who want a 
job to meet readily. This dissertation explores several empirical aspects of the 
behaviour of workers and firms in search for partners to form employment 
relationships.
The first chapter looks at the effect of the interaction between welfare programmes 
on the search behaviour of the unemployed. It suggests that unemployment insurance 
recipients, who are also entitled to some kind of social assistance, are less concerned 
about changes in their unemployment benefits. Empirical evidence from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) shows that the unemployed who are eligible 
for social assistance programmes leave unemployment at a lower rate than similar 
individuals who only receive unemployment compensation.
The second chapter looks at the characteristics of jobs found through formal and 
informal methods. Data from the ECHP show that wage premiums and wage 
penalties to finding jobs through personal contacts are equally frequent and of about 
the same size. This result is rationalised with a simple model in which firms choose 
their optimal recruitment strategies. In labour markets where employers invest 
heavily in formal recruitment, matches created through this channel are of better 
quality than those created through informal networks. The empirical predictions of 
the theory are successfully tested using a combination of the ECHP and industry- 
level data on recruitment costs.
The last chapter uses an original sample of British recruits to investigate the role of 
employers’ recruitment strategies on labour turnover. A simple extension of the 
model presented in the previous chapter shows that firms invest more in recruitment 
for high-productivity jobs, that this leads to better matches and, consequently, to 
lower turnover at the top than at the bottom of the jobs’ distribution.
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Introduction
Most labour economists today agree on a view of the labour market in which various types 
of imperfections make the search for employment partners costly and time-consuming for 
both firms with unfilled vacancies and workers who want a job. These imperfections are 
often called frictions and arise for several reasons. Information is imperfect and it takes time 
to acquire knowledge about the actual location of potential employment partners. Suitable 
vacancies might be far away and geographical distances impose additional costs on the search 
process. In times of rapid technological change the skill composition of the workforce might 
not be adequate to the needs of employers and it might take time and resources to adapt 
to the new environment. These are just few examples of the possible sources of frictions in 
modern labour markets.
In this framework the analysis of the search behaviour of both firms and workers be­
comes crucial to understand the functioning of the labour market. Workers engage in various 
activities to find an employer who is willing to hire them and, symmetrically, firms spend 
considerable resources to advertise their vacancies and screen job applicants. It is the com­
bination of the search activities of firms and workers that allows the market to overcome 
frictions and generate job matches.
The evolution of employment and unemployment over time is, hence, crucially affected 
by changes in the intensity and the quality of the search activities carried out on both sides 
of the labour market. Similarly, the cross-sectional distribution of the risk of unemployment 
and of the quality of employment is heavily influenced by the searching techniques adopted
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by firms and workers with different individual characteristics. For example, one of the reasons 
why skilled workers exit unemployment more quickly is because they are better informed, or 
more able to collect information, about job offers. Moreover, the quality of job matches is 
also affected by the searching technology used by employers and jobseekers.
Parallel to the development of the theoretical literature of search and matching models, 
a large number of empirical papers have analysed the impact of different search activities on 
various labour market outcomes. One of the peculiarities of these empirical studies, however, 
is the almost exclusive focus on jobseekers. The employers’ side of the market has received 
much less attention, primarily because of the difficulties in obtaining data. For example, 
information about workers’ search actions is usually collected in most countries’ labour force 
surveys, thus offering researchers a large set of individual level microdata readily usable for 
research purposes. On the other hand, even aggregate data on unfilled vacancies are difficult 
to obtain, especially from statistical sources that are internationally comparable. Micro-level 
data on firms’ recruitment policies and practices are extremely rare.
This dissertation is a contribution to this empirical literature in two directions: first, it 
provides new internationally comparable evidence on the search activities of workers and 
firms and their effects on various labour market outcomes; second, it produces new results 
on employers’ advertisement and recruitment practices. Moreover, throughout the chapters 
particular attention is paid to the interactions between the two sides of the market and to how 
employers’ recruitment strategies affect jobseekers and vice versa. Although the main focus 
of the analysis presented in the three chapters that follow is essentially empirical, interesting 
theoretical contributions appear in chapters 2 and 3, where the employers’ choice of the 
optimal recruitment strategy and intensity is explicitly modelled, an exercise that has rarely 
been done in the existing literature.
The sequence of the chapters directly follows from the motivation. The first chapter uses 
a recent dataset produced by Eurostat in cooperation with the National Statistical Offices 
of the EU Member Countries, the European Community Household Panel, which contains
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homogenised data on individuals and families in all the Countries of the European Union. 
These data are used to look at the effect of welfare programmes on the search activities of 
unemployed workers in all European Countries.
Most of the existing studies of unemployment duration suggest that, by lowering the level 
or the duration of unemployment compensation, jobseekers should search more intensively 
and accept lower wages, thus increasing their probability of finding a job. In an attempt to 
reduce the high levels of unemployment, most European countries have implemented reforms 
of this type in the past decades but the available evidence seems to indicate that their effect 
on the unemployment rate has been at best limited.
This chapter shows that unemployed workers in Europe have access to many welfare pro­
grammes on top and above unemployment compensation: family benefits, housing benefits, 
child care benefits, etc. As a consequence they will not be particularly worried about their 
unemployment benefits being reduced or expiring. In fact, evidence produced using the Eu­
ropean Community Household Panel indicates that unemployed workers who are eligible for 
social assistance programmes leave unemployment at a lower rate than similar individuals 
who only receive unemployment compensation.
The main contribution of the analysis contained in chapter 1 consists in exploiting the 
cross-country comparability of the data to test the importance of interactions between differ­
ent welfare programmes on the search effort of the unemployed. However, the analysis still 
considers workers’ search in isolation, separately from the recruitment activities carried out 
by firms on the other side of the market. Chapter 2 incorporates employers’ search in the 
analysis to show how it affects the efficiency of workers’ search. It also extends the results of 
chapter 1 by exploring in more details the types of search activities carried out by jobseekers. 
While in the first chapter workers’ search is considered as an undifferentiated set of activities, 
here I look at which search methods workers use, how their intensity varies across workers 
with different characteristics and how each method affects the outcome of the jobseeking 
process.
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In particular, existing studies suggest that using informal personal contacts typically lead 
to a good job that pays a high wage. However, most of the available evidence is produced 
with US data and using the European Community Household Panel it is possible to obtain 
comparable estimates for several countries to test the robustness of this finding. In fact, 
chapter 2 begins by documenting how wage premiums and wage penalties to finding a job 
through informal methods are equally frequent and of about the same size across countries as 
well as within countries across industrial sectors. If personal contacts offer employers costless 
information about job candidates and thus allow to make better hiring decisions, these new 
results indicate that formal methods, although more expensive, are often also more effective.
In order to explain the variation in wage differentials between jobs found through different 
methods, it is crucial to look at employers’ search efforts. In some labour markets and for 
some jobs employers find it optimal to invest heavily in recruitment and screening. In these 
cases formal recruitment methods turn out to be more efficient than informal contacts and 
allow to form better matches which are partly reflected in higher wages. The chapter also 
contains a simple theoretical model that is useful to understand the factors that determine 
employers’ investment in recruitment. According to the implications of the theory, firms 
search more intensively when they are recruiting for high productivity jobs and when the 
labour market is looser.
To test these hypotheses I use data on recruitment expenditure obtained from the Eu­
rostat Labour Cost Survey, which contains labour costs by country and industrial sector, 
broken down by category (wages and salaries, social security contributions, training, etc., 
and recruitment costs). These data are merged into the European Community Household 
Panel to show that, indeed, using personal contacts to find a job is more likely to lead to a 
higher wage in those labour markets where firms invest little in formal recruitment.
The third and last chapter eventually shifts the focus of the analysis to firms’ recruitment 
policies. It begins by documenting an important empirical regularity that has been recog­
nised in several previous studies but that has never been offered a direct and satisfactory
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explanation: labour turnover - i.e. the fraction of workers who experience some type of job 
transition (either to another job or to unemployment or to inactivity) in a given period of 
time (one quarter in our analysis) - is typically much higher for unskilled workers in low 
productivity jobs than for well educated workers in top positions.
The simple model developed in chapter 2 is here revisited and extended to show that firms 
find it optimal to invest little in recruitment and screening for low productivity jobs, thus 
leading to matches of worse overall quality. For this reason, it is more likely in lower (manual 
unskilled jobs) than in top (managerial) occupations that either the firm or the worker will 
find a better employment partner and thus separate from their current one.
The implications of the theory developed in the initial part of the chapter are then tested 
empirically using a unique dataset of British hirings, the 1992 Survey of Employers Recruit­
ment Practices, which contains detailed information about the recruitment process that led 
to the formation of new employment contracts. The data allow to construct various measures 
of recruitment intensity which are used in the empirical analysis to show that firms engage 
in more complex and expensive recruitment practices when hiring for high level jobs. More­
over, the chapter documents that, in all types of jobs, matches created through more careful 
screening processes are characterised by higher quality, measured along several dimensions: 
wages, tenure and satisfaction.
The logic underlying the sequence of the chapters is the following: chapter 1 looks at 
the search behaviour of workers per se, chapter 2 explores this issue in more details and 
acknowledges the importance of the recruitment activities carried out by employers on the 
other side of the market, chapter 3 finally focuses on firms’ recruitment policies to show how 
these influence labour market outcomes. The combination of these three studies will hopefully 
improve our understanding of the labour market and encourage more research on employers’ 
recruitment strategies and their interactions with the jobseeking activities of workers.
C hapter 1
U nem ploym ent D uration and the  
Interactions betw een U nem ploym ent 
C om pensation and Social A ssistance
Introduction1
The effect of unemployment insurance (UI) on unemployment duration is the object of many 
studies in a rather large literature. Two empirical findings are now widely accepted. First, 
as initially showed by Nickell (1979) and Lancaster (1979), higher benefits are associated 
with longer unemployment spells. Later, Moffit (1985) and Meyer (1990), having access to 
information about both the level and the duration of benefit entitlement at the individual 
level, were able to show a second important empirical finding, that the probability of exiting 
unemployment increases around the time of benefit exhaustion.
The literature also provides a comprehensive theoretical framework for interpreting these 
results. Mortensen (1974) develops a simple search model that easily delivers negative corre­
1This chapter has benefited from comments from seminar participants at the CEP-LSE and University 
of Verona. All errors are my own responsibility.
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lation between exit rates and unemployment benefit via search effort and reservation wages 
being respectively negatively and positively affected by income out of work. When UI enti­
tlement expires, income out of work suddenly drops, inducing an instantaneous increase in 
search effort and a decrease in the reservation wage, thus providing an explanation for the 
observed higher exits rates around the time of exhaustion. Cahuc et al. (2000) recently ex­
tended the model by endogenising wages and allowing the unemployment benefit to gradually 
decline over time.
On the basis of these findings, one would expect reforms that reduce either the level or the 
duration of unemployment benefits to have a positive impact on unemployment rates. How­
ever, this prediction does not seem to conform with the recent experience of many European 
countries. Figure 1.1 plots the time series of the unemployment rate for selected European 
countries. The vertical lines indicate the implementation years of reforms that have modified 
either the level or the duration of unemployment benefits. The solid bars refer to changes in 
the amount of the benefits and the dashed lines to changes in their duration. The colours 
indicate the direction of the changes: red for reductions (either in the amount or duration of 
benefits) and green for increases.
The first message of figure 1.1 is that the past 20 years have been constellated by labour 
market reforms in virtually all European countries. Moreover, despite the coexistence in many 
countries of reforms of opposite sign, often implemented close to each other (in Finland and 
France for example), most of the changes (19 out of 29) modified the system towards less 
generous benefits paid for a shorter time. However, already a simple visual inspection of figure
1.1 suggests that the correlation between these reforms and the evolution of unemployment 
is rather weak.
More convincing evidence can be produced for those countries where reforms took place 
during the years covered by the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)2. This is 
possible for seven countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland and the
2Data axe described in section 1.4.
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United Kingdom. Table 1.1 shows the conditional difference in the probability of leaving 
unemployment between individuals who entered unemployment before and after the reform. 
The estimates are produced with a standard hazard model controlling for gender, age, health 
status, education, marital status, family size, presence of children, household income and 
regional unemployment3. Results confirm the visual impression from figure 1.1: reforms that 
reduced the level or the duration of unemployment benefits did not have a significant effect 
on the probability of finding a job. There are marginally significant effects only in Austria 
(where the estimate is actually negative) and Ireland.
This chapter suggests an explanation for the failure of so many reforms of the unem­
ployment compensation system. European countries all have complex welfare states and 
unemployment compensation is only one element of the system that necessarily interacts in 
various ways with all the other programmes. In particular, many unemployed persons receive 
other social assistance benefits together with their unemployment insurance. Most of these 
other benefits are means-tested, therefore a reduction or an anticipated withdrawal of un­
employment insurance is often compensated, at least partly, by higher transfers from other 
programmes. Moreover, even those unemployed who only receive unemployment insurance 
may still expect to become eligible for some social assistance programmes when their benefits 
expire. For these workers, too, reductions or exhaustion of unemployment insurance are less 
of a concern and do not affect much their search effort nor their reservation wages.
These arguments will be tested empirically using data from the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), which allow to reconstruct monthly labour market histories for 
samples of individuals from all EU countries. Contrary to most studies in this literature that 
use data from administrative sources, this chapter exploits survey data which have two main 
advantages. First, the ECHP contains information on numerous types of social transfers 
and thus permits to identify UI recipients who are also entitled to other social assistance 
programmes. Second, by relying on self-reported information about one’s labour market
3A complete description of the econometric model is provided in section 1.4.1.
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status it is possible to reconstruct unemployment spells that end into employment and into 
inactivity separately. Hence, I will be able to estimate the probability of finding a job rather 
than that of leaving unemployment or the UI registry. This is an important innovation: in 
the sample used in this study exits into inactivity represent about 15% of total exits from 
unemployment.
However, using survey rather than administrative sources necessarily lowers the quality 
of the data on UI payments and durations. In particular, the total amount of UI benefits 
received by each individual in the ECHP is only recorded annually (not monthly) and the 
duration of payments is not known. This is solved by imputing benefit entitlements on the 
basis of individual characteristics available from the ECHP and institutional information 
about the functioning of the welfare system in each country.
Results indicate that UI recipients who are also entitled to other social assistance pro­
grammes are less sensitive to changes in the level of their unemployment benefits and show 
much less pronounced spikes in the re-employment probability around the time of benefit 
exhaustion.
The importance of interactions between welfare programmes has lately been recognised 
by both academics and policy makers. Belot and van Ours (2000) provide evidence from 
macro data showing that countries where unemployment has fallen often owe their success to 
comprehensive rather than piecewise reforms of labour market policies. A theoretical justifi­
cation for the importance of these interaction is discussed in Coe et al. (1997) within a search 
and matching framework. Despite the acknowledged importance of potential overlappings 
between welfare programmes, specific evidence from micro data is still lacking. This chap­
ter aims at filling this gap by providing detailed evidence on one specific interaction, that 
between the unemployment benefit system and other social assistance programmes, namely 
family cash benefits, sickness and invalidity benefits, housing benefits and low-income benefits 
(minimum income schemes).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly describes the institutional details
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of unemployment benefits and other social assistance programmes in Europe. Section 1.3 
shows how interactions between welfare programmes can be analysed in a standard search 
model. Section 1.4 describes the data and the empirical strategy used in section 1.5 for the 
analysis of re-employment probabilities. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Unemploym ent Compensation and Social Assistance 
in Europe
1.2.1 Institutional F ra m ew o rk
European countries all have large and well developed welfare states, nevertheless there still 
exists a large variation in institutional details across countries. The comparison of different 
types of welfare states in Europe has been the object of a large number of studies in both the 
economic and the political literature4. This section simply aims at providing a very general 
overview of welfare programmes in the years covered by the empirical analysis that follows.
Excluding old age pensions (which are still the major component of welfare provision in 
many countries, both in terms of expenditure and beneficiaries), welfare benefits are gener­
ally grouped into 5 large categories: unemployment related benefits, family cash benefits, 
invalidity benefits/pensions, housing benefits and general social assistance. In kind benefits 
will not be considered here, even if they might play an important role for some groups of 
beneficiaries (disabled persons, large families, et.).
Unemployment benefits are generally distinguished into unemployment insurance and 
unemployment assistance. Unemployment insurance is usually a standard insurance scheme 
by which workers who have paid sufficient contributions out of their salaries are allowed 
to receive a compensation if they become unemployed. Unemployment insurance is usually 
rather generous but benefits are typically paid only for a limited period of time (with Belgium,
4Bertola et. al (2000), Esping-Andersen (1990), Ferrera (1998).
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where the duration of payments is unlimited, being a notable exception) and various re­
eligibility conditions apply for repeated spells of unemployment. Clearly then, unemployment 
insurance does not cover the whole population of jobseekers: young workers - and anybody 
who has not paid enough contributions - and the long term unemployed - who have exhausted 
their entitlement - cannot claim the benefit. For this reason many countries have introduced 
a parallel unemployment assistance programme that pays a (typically lower) benefit to those 
who, for any reason, are not entitled to unemployment insurance. Along with these general 
characteristics, the details of the unemployment benefit schemes vary widely across countries.
Invalidity benefits are another important component of the welfare system and often take 
the form of pensions. The typical scheme pays a benefit to individuals whose capacity to 
work and earn is substantially reduced by some sort of invalidity. Almost all countries also 
require some kind of contribution conditions. There are few exceptions to this general rule: 
in the Netherlands there is no qualifying conditions while in Finland and Sweden the main 
conditions relate to residence in the country rather than to contribution records. The level 
of the benefit is usually determined on the basis of a measure of ’’normalised” earnings, 
i.e. earnings of a similar person who does not suffer from the invalidity. In some countries 
invalidity benefits also vary with age but payments are always carried over to retirement, at 
which point an invalidity pension is typically converted into an old age pension.
Family cash benefits are the most important welfare programme that is not related to 
employment. In the majority of countries (10 out of 15) family benefits are actually paid 
to any household with children, regardless of their income . These benefits Eire paid until 
the child reaches a certain age and the amount varies according to the child’s age and to 
the number of children in the household. Some countries also offer supplements for single 
parents. Children who undertake higher education or training are often allowed to receive 
benefits for some additional years above the age limit.
The provision of housing benefits is more varied. Some countries offer a generalised 
housing benefit available to everyone whose income is sufficiently low (Germany, France,
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Netherlands, Finland) while others simply provide specific housing supplements for those 
on low-income benefits (Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria and Portugal), Denmark and Sweden 
have both. Some countries do not offer any housing benefit but often social housing is 
available for low income families.
Finally, all countries, with the exception of Greece and Italy5, also provide a general social 
assistance scheme that aims at preventing poverty for those individuals or families who do 
not qualify for any of the other ’’categorical” benefit or that still remain under a variously 
defined income threshold. Qualifying conditions for this type of assistance are usually related 
to nationality, residence and age. All countries also require those who are able to work to 
prove that they axe actually willing to take up job offers and beneficiaries are often required 
to participate in training or other active labour market programmes.
Synthetic tables that summarise the details of welfare programmes in the European coun­
tries can be found in appendix l.B.
1.2.2 Welfare Reforms in Europe
Table 1.2 presents a more complete description of the reforms indicated in figure 1.1, including 
additional details on changes in social assistance programmes as well. In the past two decades 
policy makers have apparently been listening to economists as many reforms have actually 
changed the unemployment compensation system in the direction of lower benefits paid for 
shorter periods. Much less effort has been put in reforming other welfare programmes and 
one of the main claims of this chapter will be that the scarce success of UI reforms is partly 
due to the lack of coordination with other parts of the welfare system.
Looking at table 1.2 some notable facts emerge. First, in the effort to reduce unemploy­
ment in the recession of the early 90s, there has been a clustering of reforms between 1992 
and 1996. Secondly, the large majority of reforms clearly focused on unemployment benefits
5A minimum income scheme was experimented in Italy between 1998 and 2002 (Reddito Minimo 
d ’Inserimento) but was never introduced on a universal basis.
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and have typically taken the form of reducing either the duration or the level of the bene­
fits. Many countries have also tightened eligibility conditions or increased work requirements 
for the unemployed. Only few reforms addressed other welfare programmes and even fewer 
tried to comprehensively change several programmes (Germany in 1998, Ireland in 1993, the 
United Kingdom in 1996).
1.3 A simple theoretical framework
The interaction between unemployment benefits and social assistance can be analysed in the 
framework of a very standard search model. The theory in this section is a mere revised and 
simplified version of that in Mortensen (1977).
In each period £, an unemployed worker needs to invest leisure time (st) to search for job 
offers. These arrive, with per-period probability ast , from an exogenous wage distribution 
F(-) with support (0,H7]. In each period utility is a non-decreasing function of income (yt) 
and leisure (lt), u(yt, lt)6. For simplicity, assume that working time is constant and equal to 
h in all jobs and that the total endowment of leisure is normalised to 1. Then, per-period 
utility while unemployed with benefit bt and searching for a job is u(bt , 1 — sf), while a job 
that pays wt generates a utility flow equal to u(wt, 1 — h). Unemployed workers also need to 
choose a reservation wage w*\ only wage offers above w* are accepted, all others are turned 
down.
Under these assumptions the value of unemployment U at time t can be written as:
(1 +  r)I7t =  u(bt, 1 -  st) +  OLSt [Pr{w < w*t }Ut+i + P r{ w  > w*}E{V(w)\w > w*}] (1.1)
where V(w) is the value of employment at wage w. For simplicity assume that there is
6Per-period utility satisfies the standard assumptions: it is twice differentiable with: du^ y'1^ >  0, > 0
anH du(yJ) < n du(y'1) < o
8 1 1 ( 1  d y d y  —  U ’ dldl  —  U t
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no job destruction: once workers enter employment they stay in the job forever at constant 
wage7. Equation (1.1) can be rewritten as:
w
(1 +  r)Ut =  u(bt, 1 -  st) +  [1 -  as*(l -  F(wJ))] Ut+1 +  otst J  V(w)dF(w) (1.2)
The optimal levels of w* and st are then chosen in order to maximise equation (1.2), according 
to the following first order conditions:
V{w*t )
du(bt, 1 -  st) 
dst
= Utt+i
= a
w
j  V(w)dF(w) -  (1 -  F(wfi)Ut+i
(1.3)
(1.4)
The intuitive interpretation of these two conditions is straightforward. Equation (1.3) 
shows that the optimal reservation wage is set at a level that equalises the value of employ­
ment and unemployment. An unemployed worker can allocate time to two different activities, 
search and leisure, hence optimal search time equalises marginal utility of search and leisure, 
as shown in equation (1.4). Note that both st and w* are time-varying: equations (1.3) and 
(1.4) hold for all t and, for any known sequence of benefits, {^}^°, identify a series of reser­
vation wages, {u;*}^° and optimal search times, {s*}JJ°. The per-period probability of exiting 
unemployment - the hazard rate - is then calculated as:
qt = ast • [1 -  F K ) ] (1.5)
7In this case:
V(fo,h) = T . ^ i
j=t
Introducing exogenous job destruction does not modify the empirical implications of the model.
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These results are useful to analyse the implications of different assumptions about the 
sequence of benefits for the exit rate. Equation (1.5) shows that the exit rate is higher when 
job search is more intense and when the reservation wage is lower, i.e. when unemployed 
workers axe less choosy about wage offers:
Let us now analyse how search time, reservation wages and exit rates look like for different 
time profiles of the benefit.
U nem ploym ent benefit w ithout social assistance Consider the standard case of an 
unemployed worker who receives a constant unemployment benefit (b) for a given number of 
periods, T, and nothing after that (this is the specific case discussed in Mortensen (1977)).
For such worker the value of unemployment decreases over time as periods of positive 
benefit payments run out and expected future income out of work decreases, i.e. Ut+1 < Ut. 
Equation (1.3) implies that the reservation wage also decreases over time. Similarly, the right 
hand side of equation (1.4) increases with time (the value of unemployment enters with a 
negative sign and the derivative with respect to given equation (1.3), is zero8), therefore 
in order for the equality to hold the left hand side must increase as well and this can only be 
achieved with higher s*, i.e. search time also increases with time.
At time T, when unemployment benefit entitlement expires, bt discontinuously drops to 
zero. This requires the reservation wage to jump down and optimal search time to jump 
up. Note incidentally that for these effects to be non-ambiguous leisure and income must be 
complements (i.e. U2i(bt, 1 — st) < 0). These results are represented in figure 1.2.
8The derivative with respect to w* of the right hand side of equation (1.4) is:
dRHS
dwt
which is zero at the optimum.
= a[V(w*t ) - U t+1)
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U nem ploym ent Benefit and  Social A ssistance The previous analysis can be easily 
extended to a worker who receives social assistance together with his/her unemployment 
benefit, or, similarly, to somebody who expects to become eligible for some social assistance 
programmes once his/her unemployment insurance expires. Eventually all changes from one 
scheme to another simply generate jumps in the time profile of the benefit and can be analysed 
within the same framework used for understanding exhaustion of unemployment benefits in 
the previous paragraph.
It may for example be the case that, given the particular rules and household composition 
of applicants, social assistance transfers top up family income once unemployment insurance 
expires, leaving the time profile of benefit payments flat. In this case the model predicts no 
discontinuous jumps in reservation wage, search effort and exit rate, which will all remain 
constant throughout the entire unemployment spell.
In other instances it might happen that payments under social assistance are actually 
higher than under unemployment insurance. This possibility, although rare, can occur in 
some countries where social assistance systems are particularly generous (see OECD (2002)). 
In such an extreme case the value of unemployment increases with time and all the effects 
derived previously are reversed, as shown in figure 1.3.
1.4 The data and the empirical strategy
Most of the existing studies of unemployment insurance and unemployment duration make 
use of administrative data from the institutional body that administers unemployment bene­
fits9. The advantage of these data usually consists in having very detailed information about 
the amount and sequence of payments as well as about individual eligibility and entitlement 
conditions.
However, for the purpose of this chapter the use of administrative data would be prob­
9Boeri and Steiner (1998), Katz and Meyer (1990), Lancaster (1979), Meyer (1990), Moffit (1985), Naren- 
dranathan and Stewart (1993b).
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lematic for at least two reasons. First, in many countries unemployment insurance and 
social assistance programmes are administered by different governmental bodies and, con­
sequently, data available from one body rarely include information about benefits paid by 
others. Therefore, using administrative data would make it very difficult to look at inter­
actions between different programmes. Secondly, and probably more importantly, even if 
comprehensive administrative data were available, in order to explore the interactions be­
tween different programmes one would need to compare similar individuals facing different 
unemployment benefits and social transfers: in other words one would need enough variation 
in the rules and regulations of both unemployment insurance and social assistance. However, 
there is typically little variation in such rules within one country10 and for identification 
purposes it would be helpful to use some cross-country variation as well. Unfortunately, 
cross-country comparable administrative microdata are simply not available. Alternatively 
one would like to use some exogenous time variation induced, for example, by a reform but, 
as already mentioned in section 1.2, there hasn’t been much reforming in social assistance 
programmes over the past years.
In order to overcome these problems, comparable cross-country survey data are utilized in 
this chapter. Data come from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), a panel 
of households and individuals from EU countries produced by Eurostat in cooperation with 
the member states statistical offices. The main advantage of this data source is the high level 
of cross-country comparability. This is guaranteed by standardised sampling procedures, 
defined by Eurostat and implemented by each country’s national statistical office. Moreover, 
identical questions are asked to households sampled in each country, merely translated into 
the local language. However, several discrepancies between countries still exist11.
The dataset is also meant to keep track of changes in the demographic composition of
10This is especially true for unemlpoyment benefit while social assistance is more varied, being often 
admistered at the local level (but this also makes it more difficult to obtain information about the system as 
well as about the beneficiaries).
11 see Peracchi (2002) for a detailed description of the ECHP.
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the population over time, by recording and including in the survey all births occurred within 
sampled households as well as new households created from the split of existing ones. An 
individual questionnaire exists for all persons living in a sampled household. Sample sizes 
differ from country to country, with the highest sample to population ratios for the largest 
and the poorest countries.
The ECHP started in 1994 and 8 waves of data have been released so far, covering the 
period from 1994 to 2001. Not all countries entered the survey at the same time and for three 
of them - Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom - the original sample has been 
replaced after the first three waves with harmonised versions of household panels already 
been produced nationally: the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the Luxembourg’s 
Socio-Economic Panel (PSELL) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). When 
possible data from the existing panels have been provided for the first three years too.
For the purpose of this chapter it is important to note the ECHP includes information 
about unemployment benefit payments and social assistance transfers received both at the 
individual and at the household level. Moreover, it also contains retrospective information 
which allow the reconstruction of employment/unemployment/inactivity monthly spells. In 
fact, individuals are interviewed once per year and at that time they are asked to report their 
monthly labour market status over the previous calendar year. One drawback of these data 
is due to the fact that all the variables are recorded annually and, as we will see later on, 
this will make it difficult to attach the correct numbers to each unemployment spell.
The sample used for the empirical exercise presented in the following paragraphs consists 
of 12,460 monthly unemployment spells experienced by people aged between 18 to 64 in 12 
European countries12 between 1994 and 2001. Unemployment spells end into employment or 
inactivity or are right-censored. Left-censored spells, and unemployment spells experienced 
by new entrants in the labour market have been dropped from the sample to avoid stock-
12Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United 
Kingdom. Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden have been excluded because there information on 
retrospective employment status is lacking for these countries.
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sample bias.
The ECHP is a collection of country samples which have been drawn from the total 
population following common procedures but independently. This means that the sample- 
to-population ratios differ from country to country and observations have to be weighted ac­
cordingly when pooled together across countries. The 12,460 observations represent 3,003,192 
unemployment spells which are distributed across countries as shown in figure 1.4. This dis­
tribution is obviously influenced by both the relative size of each country and the level of 
the unemployment rate experienced in each area (plotted in figure 1.4 along the red line and 
scaled on the right hand side vertical axis).
As mentioned earlier, the information from the ECHP allow to distinguish those unem­
ployed who only receive unemployment benefits from those who also receive some other social 
assistance transfers. Summary statistics for the entire sample and separately for these two 
sub-groups are reported in table 1.3.
1.4.1 The empirical strategy
In order to test the implications derived from the simple theory of section 1.3, it is necessary 
to specify an empirical analog for the theoretical hazard function of equation (1.5). One 
difficulty arises because in the ECHP unemployment durations are recorded in months - i.e. 
in discrete intervals of time - whereas the underlying process of job search occurs essentially 
in continuous time (workers can find a job at any moment within a month). Following the 
custom in the literature, let us assume that the hazard rate, $(t|Aj,/3), of the underlying 
continuous process for individual i, i.e. the instant probability that the spell ends at time t, 
can be written as the product of two parts: a baseline hazard, that depends on duration only, 
h0(i), and a ’’proportional shifter”, e^'Xi, that, according to each individual’s characteristics 
X i , shifts the baseline up or down:
■d{t\Xi,P) =  h0{ t ) -ee'Xi (1.6)
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The discrete time analog of d(t\Xi,p) for spell i that ends between month T{ and T* +  1, is 
usually written as:
h(Ti \ X u l ) =  Pi{Ti < t < T i + l \ t > T i, X i,P } =  (1.7)
e ? x ‘ {Hi  -  Hi+1)
S{Ti\XiJ) -  S{Ti + 1| Xhp)   = 1 — exp
S(Ti\ X u p)
Ti
where Hi — J  ho(u)du.
o
It is useful to apply to equation (1.7) the following transformation:
log( log [1 -  h(Ti | P)]) =  pfXi +  ri (1.8)
Equation (1.8) allows to recover for (a transformation of) the discrete time hazard h(-) the 
separability property of its continuos-time analog $(•). In fact, h(-), just like $(•), can now 
be separated into two parts: one, =  log [H(Ti) — H(Ti 4-1)], that depends on the shape 
of the baseline hazard only, and another one, P'X^ which depends only on individual’s 
characteristics (possibly time-varying).
According to equation (1.8), the discrete time hazard can be rewritten as:
h(Ti | X w7) =  1 -  exp ( —e ^ - +Ti) (1.9)
Then, it is possible to express the likelihood contributions of completed and uncompleted 
spells in terms of the discrete-time hazard and apply the transformation of equation (1.8) for
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the estimation:
T j-l
completed spells : Pr {T* < t < Ti +  1 | Xi, {3} = h(Tj \ Xj,  (3) J J  [1 -  h(k \ X j , (3)]
k=o
uncompleted spells: Pr { t > T i  \ Xi,f3} = n
k=0
In our data, a spell can end either into employment or into inactivity. Assuming that 
the probabilities of ending in any of these two states axe independent, Narendrenathan and 
Stewart (1993) showed that, by making the additional, harmless but greatly simplifying 
assumption, that exits can only occur at the boundaries of the interval (i.e. either at the 
beginning or at the end of each month), the correct hazard for exits into employment can be 
estimated by considering as censored all those spells that end into inactivity. This is also the 
approach taken here and the investigation of the determinants of exits into inactivity is left 
for future research.
T he  im pu ta tion  of m onthly  unem ploym ent benefit paym ents The theory of section
1.3 suggests that unemployment insurance recipients who also receive some social assistance 
will be less sensitive to both the level and the duration of their benefits. This implies that the 
effect of being a social assistance recipient on the probability of finding employment should 
be negative.
Although the ECHP easily allows to identify individuals who receive unemployment ben­
efits only (i.e. we know they don’t receive any other benefit) and individuals who receive 
unemployment benefits and some social assistance during the same unemployment spell, it 
records the amount received in ’’unemployment related benefits” 13 only annually and this 
makes it difficult to identify the monthly sequence of payments satisfactorily. Obviously, the 
hypothesis that social assistance recipients exit unemployment less easily has to be tested
13Thus including both unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance (in those countries where 
both schemes are present).
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conditioning on the level and duration of unemployment insurance. It is then necessary to 
construct a good measure for both the level and the duration of monthly unemployment 
benefits.
The most obvious solution consists in simply dividing the annual amount by the number 
of months spent in unemployment during that particular year. However, this approach would 
generate zero variation in unemployment benefits over time, unless a spell spans over more 
than one year. Moreover, unless both the amount of the benefit and the number of months 
of unemployment are exactly measured, this approach is likely to generate some spurious 
covariance between monthly benefits and unemployment durations. The duration of a spell 
is very highly correlated with the number of months spent in unemployment in one year 
(it is actually exactly equal to that number if the unemployment spell begins and ends in 
the same year). Hazard models can also be seen as regression models where uncompleted 
spells and duration dependence are correctly taken into account. Viewed in this sense, the 
dependent variable (unemployment duration) would appear at the denominator of one of the 
regressors (monthly unemployment benefit), introducing spurious correlation unless variables 
are exactly measured (see Borjas (1979)).
The amount of social assistance transfers is also reported annually. However, social as­
sistance payments are not necessarily related to unemployment, therefore a sensible monthly 
amount can be obtained by simply dividing by 12 the annual amount. No ’’division bias” 
arises in this case.
In order to solve these problems, monthly unemployment benefits have been imputed 
on the basis of country specific rules and regulations. In fact, both the amounts and the 
duration of unemployment benefits in all countries are calculated on the basis of individual 
characteristics, most of which are easily available from the ECHP: previous employment 
records, previous wage, age, family composition, et.. Combining these data with the rules of 
each country’s unemployment benefit system, a rather precise imputation of both the levels 
and the duration of payments can be obtained. In econometric terms, this procedure is
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equivalent to instrumenting the unemployment benefit with country specific regulations.
The imputation routine requires two basic ingredients: a detailed description of the un­
employment compensation system in all countries and years covered by the ECHP, and all 
relevant personal characteristics used by each country’s system to compute benefit entitle­
ment. The institutional features of all welfare programmes in the member countries of the 
European Union are systematically collected in the MISSOC14, a publication of the Euro­
pean Commission that every year reports comparative descriptions of rules and regulations 
of welfare programmes in the member states. Additional complementary information can be 
extracted from institutional databases created by other research institutions, like the Fon- 
dazione Rodolfo Debenedetti (www.frdb.org) and the CESIfo centre (www.cesifo.de). Most 
of the relevant personal characteristics necessary for this imputation are available from the 
ECHP, with few exceptions.
Combining these two sources of information - institutional details from the Missoc and 
other sources and personal characteristics from the ECHP - it has been possible to write 
imputation procedures for each country and year. These procedures consists of computer 
programmes that for each individual in the sample compute entitlement and payment profiles 
of unemployment benefits throughout one’s unemployment spell. The programmes’ outcome 
is a vector of imputed variables including the duration of benefit entitlement in months and 
the monthly sequence of payments15.
In order to test the goodness of these imputations figure 1.5 compares the cumulated 
annual amount of imputed benefits with annual income from unemployment related benefits 
as recorded in the ECHP. The results of figure 1.5 indicate that the imputation procedure 
works relatively well for most countries. Generally, the precision of the imputation is higher 
for low payments while the dispersion increases towards the upper right corner of each panel. 
Computation of unemployment benefits for high wage earners is likely to be more problematic
14Mutual Information System on Social Protection in the Member States of the European Union.
15The programmes are written in Stata8.2 and can be obtained from the author upon request.
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for a number of reasons. First, these workers are more likely to be subject to benefit ceiling, 
thus making imputation more complex. Second, in some countries benefits are computed 
on gross earnings while the ECHP reports only net values. At high earnings levels the 
discrepancy between gross and net amounts is larger.
The imputation procedure also suffers from a number of problems that make it impossible 
to be perfectly consistent with reported data. First of all, the imputed measure of benefits is 
more a measure of entitlement than recipiency. It is a known fact that the degree of benefit 
non-take-up (i.e. the fraction of persons who are entitled to a benefit but don’t claim it) 
varies largely across countries due to differences in the complexity of the system and can 
reach very high levels. The evident clusterings of points along the horizontal axes in all the 
panels of figure 1.1 represents individuals who, according to the imputation, are entitled to 
unemployment benefits but appear not to claim them (for a recent review of the literature 
on benefit take-up see Hernanz et al. (2004)).
A second problem concerns the timing of the reforms. Changes in the unemployment 
compensation system could in principle be applied to the newly unemployed only, i.e. those 
who lose their jobs after the reform, or to all recipients. Information about these details 
of the reforms is very difficult to obtain. For simplicity, the imputation procedures used 
here assume that all changes always affect all recipients, regardless of whether they entered 
unemployment before or after the reform.
Besides, in the ECHP employment histories of individuals are perfectly known since 
the time they joined the survey but little is known about their previous records and some 
assumptions need to be made. Specifically, it has been assumed that individuals have always 
worked and paid contributions since the start of their first job, a piece of information available 
from the data. A final difficulty, that inevitably introduces measurement error in imputed 
benefits, arises from the fact that in many countries benefits are calculated on the basis of 
gross earnings while the ECHP only reports net earnings. Moreover, benefits are also often 
taxed.
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Keeping all these caveats in mind, the results in figure 1.1 are rather satisfactory: im­
puted unemployment benefits are strongly correlated with reported annual data. A notable 
exception is Greece: unemployment benefits in this country, like in many others, are subject 
to a minimum and a maximum level but here the distribution of annual benefits is highly 
concentrated around the minimum. It seems like the large majority of the unemployed in 
Greece receive only the minimum benefit even when our imputation suggests they should be 
entitled to higher transfers. It was not possible to find a good explanation for this fact.
Italy is another anomalous case: in this country the correlation between imputed and 
actual benefits is very low. In particular, there are many individuals who appear to be 
entitled but receive no benefit. This result, however, is more understandable than for Greece. 
In Italy unemployment benefits are highly differentiated by sector of industrial activity and 
firm size. Moreover, access to the most generous programmes (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni 
and Mobilita) is often subject to government approval. This particular institutional setting, 
characterised by a high degree of discretionality, necessarily leads to a poor imputation.
M easuring th e  earning po ten tia l of th e  unem ployed One additional difficulty in 
defining the correct set of explanatory variables comes from the very nature of the data. 
One of the crucial controls that needs to be included in the estimation is a measure of 
the previous wage, as an indicator of the earning potential of individuals: the same benefit 
amount affects differently people who can earn different wages on the job. What really counts 
in determining the incentives/disincentives to work is the actual difference between income 
in work and income out of work. This is why the replacement rate (the ratio between the 
unemployment benefit and the previous wage) will be used instead of the level of the benefit 
itself.
However, in the ECHP unemployed workers do not report their previous wages. Only 
individuals who are working at the time of the interview are asked about their current monthly 
wage. In the estimation, the most recent observed current wage from previous interviews 
has been used as previous wage. Obviously there are many individuals who happen to be
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unemployed at all interviews, even if they report some employment spells between subsequent 
interviews. For these individuals no previous wage is observed. One possibility is to drop 
them from the sample but this would reduce the sample size dramatically and, even more 
worrisome, it would introduce a potentially large sample bias: the probability of having being 
unemployed at all interviews is obviously higher for individuals at high risk of long and/or 
repeated unemployment.
Alternatively, one can use the average wage earned by individuals with similar character­
istics. This is the approach taken in the empirical exercise below: missing previous wages 
are replaced by the average wage of full-time workers with the same level of education, age, 
experience, gender and region of residence16.
1.5 Estim ation results
The brief theoretical discussion in section 1.3 suggests that unemployed who only receive 
unemployment benefits and no social assistance, being on average less likely to receive high 
benefits when their unemployment insurance expires, will exit more quickly as exhaustion 
approaches. SA recipients will be less concerned about exhaustion of unemployment bene­
fit: what really counts to them is the total level of the benefit, i.e. social assistance plus 
unemployment benefit.
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show the empirical hazards17 for the entire sample and for the two 
sub-samples of individuals who only receive unemployment benefit and who receive both 
UB and SA. A person is classified as SA recipient if he/she receives some social assistance 
at least once during the unemployment spell. In the figures the distribution of imputed 
duration of unemployment benefit is reported (scaled on the right-hand vertical axis). The
16This is computed by running a series of year-by-year country-by-country OLS wage regressions including 
education, age, experience and regional dummies and run separately for males and females.
17The empirical hazard at time t is computed as the ratio of individuals who actually exit unemployment 
at time t over the number of all individuals who have been unemployed at least until t, i.e. all individuals 
who could have exited at time t.
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figure for the entire sample (figure 1.6) shows the expected peaks in the hazard around the 
time of UB exhaustion, which has mass points at 12, 15, 24 and, later, at 30 and 43 months. 
Looking at the same picture for the two sub-samples in figure 1.7, it is already evident that 
social assistance recipients tend to have lower exit rates, especially in the first months of 
unemployment.
Evidence from empirical hazards, although already suggestive, is not fully convincing 
because the extent to which these graphs are influenced by personal characteristics and 
duration dependence is not taken into account. Moreover, empirical hazards are less and less 
precise as unemployment duration increases: the size of the sample decreases as individuals 
exit unemployment and the standard errors grow larger. This can be seen in figure 1.6 where 
the confidence intervals clearly grow lager as duration increases. In figure 1.7, confidence 
intervals have not been drawn for readability but they are obviously larger as sample sizes 
are smaller, especially for SA recipients (see table 1.3 for sample sizes).
Table 1.4 reports the results of various specifications of the proportional hazard models 
described earlier. The baseline hazard chosen for these estimates is specified in the most 
flexible form allowed by the data, i.e. only imposing that it can vary in an unspecified way 
every two months. This is obtained by introducing a set of r  dummies for every two months 
of duration (ri =  1 for the first 2 months of unemployment and zero otherwise, T2 =  1 for 
the third and the fourth, and so on).
The results of table 1.4 are obtained without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. 
The role of the unobservables is likely to be particularly important in the sample used here, 
where about 60% of the individuals experience more than one unemployment spell during 
the period of observation. In principle, unobserved heterogeneity could be controlled for in 
at least two different ways. First, as customary in this literature, an arbitrary assumption 
about the distribution of the unobservables is assumed and the likelihood of the model is 
estimated by integrating it out. However, Heckman and Singer (1984) showed that, allowing 
for a flexible baseline hazard, already largely captures the effects of unobserved heterogeneity
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and that often estimates produced imposing an arbitrary distributed random term are less 
robust. For comparison, however, all the estimates are also reproduced assuming the presence 
of a normally distributed random individual term and the results are reported in appendix
l.A (tables l.A .l and 1.A.2). These results are only marginally different from those in the 
main text and, if anything, they are more precisely estimated.
However, this method of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity does not allow for corre­
lation between the random term and the other observable regressors. An alternative solution 
consists in introducing individual effects in the model’s specification. These effects could in 
principle be identified by those individuals who experience more than one spell during the 
period of observation. There are however two serious an related problems with this approach: 
considering only individuals with multiple spells would reduce the sample by almost 50% in­
troducing bias and making identification of all the other effects more difficult. In fact, when 
the estimation of such specification was attempted convergence could not be reached.
Let us now move on to the discussion of the estimates of table 1.4. The set of controls 
includes all the relevant observable personal characteristics, country and region specific con­
trols for labour market conditions and year dummies. Country (or regional) dummies have 
not been included because these would have captured too much variance: in fact, in order 
to identify the effect of different welfare systems on individual search decisions one needs 
to compare similar individuals subject to different benefit schemes and, since the rules and 
regulations upon which benefits are calculated vary very little within each country, one even­
tually needs to exploit some cross country variation. In other words one wants to control 
for all country/region specific characteristics that are not related to the benefit schemes. 
The regional unemployment rate and the rate of long-term unemployment (% of unemployed 
workers who have been unemployed for more than 12 months) are likely to be good controls 
for the specific peculiarities of the local labour markets without washing out the variance due 
to the different benefit schemes.
Results in column 1 of table 1.4 simply replicate previous findings. The disincentive
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effect of the unemployment benefit is confirmed, although it is relatively small in size and 
varies with duration, being less prominent in the first months of unemployment. A 10 point 
increase in the replacement rate reduces the hazard by only 0.3% during the first 3 months 
of unemployment and by 2.6% afterwards.
The coefficients on the ’’months to exhaustion” dummies also confirm that UB recipients 
are more likely to find a job when their unemployment benefit gets closer to exhaustion. This 
effect is strong and already detectable at the beginning of the last year of benefit entitlement 
(for those whose UI lasts more than 12 months) and grows larger. In the last month of 
entitlement the hazard is almost 50% higher than 12 months before. There also seems to be 
some cyclicality in this process, with a dip between 3 to 6 months to exhaustion.
In the second column of table 1.4 this standard specification is augmented by introducing a 
dummy indicator for individuals who, at some point during the unemployment spell, receive 
some social assistance benefits. The coefficient on this variable is negative and strongly 
significant. The hazard for social assistance recipients is on average 34.5% lower than that 
of a similar person who only receive unemployment benefits. This is a very sizeable effect: it 
implies that for the average individual in the sample receiving social assistance throughout 
the spell reduces the probability of finding a job within the first 3 months from 30% to 21%, 
from 54% to 39% within the first 6 months and from 75% to 59% within the first year. The 
third column of table 1.4 explores this fact more thoroughly.
In particular, it is important to understand whether being under social assistance affects 
one’s sensitivity to the unemployment benefit or whether it reduces the incentives to exit 
unemployment during the last periods of entitlement. To this end, the UB replacement 
rate and the exhaustion dummies are interacted with the dummy for SA recipients. Results 
suggest that the two groups mainly differ in how they react to UB exhaustion: the negative 
coefficients on the interaction dummies support the prediction that, relative to those who 
only receive unemployment benefit, SA recipients are less likely to exit unemployment during 
the last months of UB entitlement. The size of these interaction effects indicates that there is
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no significant spike in the hazard rates of social assistance recipients around UB exhaustion.
The following two columns introduce first the replacement rate of social assistance (which 
is obviously zero for those who only receive unemployment insurance) and then (column 5) 
the total replacement rate, i.e. the ratio between total benefits (unemployment insurance 
and social assistance) and previous wages. Both these variables enter significantly and with 
a negative sign. The sizes of their effects are also in line with expectations.
The results presented so far could be biased if social assistance recipients were different 
from their observationally equivalent Ul-only recipients along some unobservable dimensions. 
In this case, the estimated coefficients on the dummy for social assistance recipients and 
its interactions would be simply picking up the effects of these unobservables. Note that 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of the type considered in table l.A .l is not enough. 
In fact, the estimates of table l.A .l are produced under the assumption that the unobserved 
random term is uncorrelated with all the covariates. Moreover, the results of table 1.4 do not 
consider the possibility that unemployed workers who do not receive social assistance transfers 
can nonetheless be influenced in their search decisions by the possibility of becoming eligible 
when their unemployment benefit expires. The theory predicts that workers who are likely 
to receive social assistance in the future will search less intensively as exhaustion of their 
unemployment insurance approaches, just like workers who already receive social assistance.
In order to solve these two sets of problems - potential endogeneity of social assistance 
recipiency and the effect of social assistance on those who are not currently eligible - table 1.5 
reports results obtained by replacing the dummy for social assistance with an estimate of the 
probability of receiving any of the social transfers considered. This procedure is equivalent 
to instrumenting the dummy for social assistance with those variables that are included in 
the estimates of the probability of receiving social transfers and excluded from the main 
hazard model. This probability is estimated with a simple series of country-by-country and 
year-by-year probit regressions where the excluded regressors are the number of children aged 
below 16 in the household, whether the person owns his/her home and the number of rooms
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per household member in the house. Results axe reported in table 1.A.3 in appendix l.A 
and show that these variables are strongly significant and their effect move in the expected 
direction.
table 1.5 reports the results of the hazard model when the dummy for social assistance 
recipients is replaced by the predicted probability of receipt. The standard errors are now 
adjusted by bootstrapping methods. The first and the second columns of table 1.5 replicates 
column 2 and 3 of table 1.4 respectively. Results confirm both the direction and the size of 
the effect estimated in table 1.5.
1.6 Conclusions
This chapter investigates how interactions between unemployment insurance and social as­
sistance affect the job search behaviour of unemployed workers. The theoretical framework 
presented in section 1.3 formalizes the idea that people are eventually interested in total pay­
ments (i.e. unemployment benefit and social assistance) and their time profile: unemployed 
workers will react differently to changes in the rules of the UB system depending on what 
alternative or complementary welfare programmes are available.
The identification of the effects of the unemployment benefit and of social assistance 
on unemployment duration exploits information about monthly labour market histories of 
European unemployed and variation in unemployment insurance programmes across countries 
and over time. Results show that individuals who receive some social assistance transfers 
together with their unemployment benefits are less sensitive to changes in the replacement 
rate as well as in its duration. For the average person in the sample the probability of finding 
a job within the first 12 months of unemployment falls from 75% to 59% if he/she receives 
social assistance and unemployment benefits together.
This large effect is mostly due to the exit rate for social assistance recipients not increasing 
significantly around the time of unemployment benefit exhaustion. In the last month of
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entitlement the hazard rate of unemployment benefit recipients jumps up by almost 50% 
compared to 12 months before. The same figure for an observationally identical person who 
also receives social assistance is 12% and it is hardly significant. Also non-SA recipients, who 
are nonetheless likely to become eligible for social assistance in the future, follow a similar 
behaviour.
The estimates also indicate that reducing the duration of UB payments is likely to be 
a much more effective policy to incentivize the re-employment of recipients than reducing 
the generosity of payments. This chapter also highlights the need to design welfare reforms 
with very careful consideration for the interactions between different programmes in the sys­
tem: reducing the level or the duration of unemployment benefit may not be very effective in 
incentivizing unemployed workers to search harder if they can easily shift into other social as­
sistance programmes. This result is consistent with some recent papers that have underlined 
how wide and comprehensive reforms of labour market policies, even if politically harder to 
implement, are often more effective than piecewise reforms.
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Figure 1.2: Time profiles of benefit, reservation wage, search time and hazard rate -  Case 1
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of spells by country
725,679
522,056
222,978
81,686
61,481
33,182
—h
20
18
16
14
12
10
175,256
- 2
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain United
Kingdom
I 1 weighted obs. •unemployment rate
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
Ol
FranceFinlandAustria Belgium Denmark
24579 49158 73737 98310
reported
0 19694.75 39389.5 59084.25 78779
reported
0 30000 72000 108000 144000
reported
0 20400 52800 79200 105000
reported
LuxembourgGermany Ireland
143000 280000 429000 572000 reported19057.5 25410 0 147000 294000, 441000 588000
Portugal United Kingdom
0 255000 510000 765000 1020000
reported
0 261000 522000 783000 1044000
reported
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Figure 1.6: Empirical Hazard for unemployment-to-job transitions
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Table 1.1: The effect of UI reforms on the probability of leaving unemployment 
Country_________________________ Reform_______________________effect1
Austria reduced duration - 2000 -0.459*(0.252J
Belgium reduced benefit -  1999 -0.292(0.361)
Finland
reduced benefit -  1997 
reduced benefit -  2000
0.156
(0.142)
0.258
(0.253)
Germany reduced duration -  1995 -0.031(0.169)
Greece reduced benefit - 1996 0.035(0.184)
Ireland reduced benefit -  1995 0.486*(0.279)
United Kingdom reduced duration and benefit -  1995
0.291
(0.334)
1. Coefficient of a dummy for unemployment spells that started after the implementation of the reform.
The estimates are obtained from a proportional hazard model with a fully non-parametric baseline and the 
following explanatory variables: sex, age (linear and squared), health status, education, marital status, family 
size, dummy for children in the household, household income, regional unemployment rate and rate of long 
term unemployment, year dummies.
Source: ECHP 1994-2001
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Table 1.2: Welfare reforms in Europe
Co u n tr y R eform s
Austria
• 1995: Unemployment benefits are cut (particularly for those with high incomes)
• 1999-2000: Family Benefits are made more generous
• 2000: Unemployment benefits’ duration is increased for persons with at least 15 years of 
contributions.
• 2002: Unemployment benefits made more generous.
• 2002: Child-care support made more generous.
Belgium
• 1988: Replacement rates for unemployment benefits are reduced
• 1992: Reform of unemployment benefit, access for those on temporary or part-time jobs; 
redefinition of “suitable offer”; new rules for early retirement.
• 1998: Improved incentive for those on Income Support (Minimex) to take up jobs.
• 1999: Unemployment benefits made more generous for single persons
• 2001: Introduction of tax deductibility for child-care costs.
• 2001: Social assistance made more generous for old people.
Danmark
• 1987: Unemployment benefits are increased.
• 1994: Labour Market Reform: unemployment benefits’ duration is reduced and eligibility 
conditions are tightened.
• 1996: Follow-up of Labour Market Reform: unemployment benefits’ duration is shortened 
and eligibility conditions are tightened.
Finland
• 1993: Reform of (flat-rate) Unemployment Assistance, duration is limited and eligibility 
requirements brought in line with those for the eamings-related supplementary benefit.
• 1995: Reform of the unemployment benefits system: stricter conditions for the unemployed 
to re-qualify for unemployment benefits, shortened duration for older workers
• 1997: Reform of the unemployment benefits system: stricter access conditions and lower 
payments.
• 1998: Unemployment benefits are increased.
• 1998: Stricter access conditions for minimum income benefits.
• 2000: Unemployment benefits are decreased.
France
• 1992: Reform of unemployment benefits that introduces a downward sliding scale for 
payments.
• 1993: Unemployment benefits’ duration is reduced.
• 1993: Increased generosity of general social assistance, bousing benefits, family benefits, 
employment accidents and occupational illness benefits are increased and made easier to 
access.
• 1997: Minimum unemployment benefit is increased and duration of benefits is also 
extended.
• 1998: Minimum income benefit increased.
• 1999: Unemployment benefits increased.
• 2000: Generalised increases in both unemployment and minimum income benefits.
• 2001: Generalised increases in both unemployment and minimum income benefits.
Germany
• 1994: Unemployment benefits are reduced.
• 1995: Unemployment benefit duration is reduced.
• 1998: Several changes: stricter rules for access to the minimum income scheme (RMI); lower 
payments for sickness benefits, better incentives for unemployment benefit recipients to 
take up jobs (redefinition of suitable offer; incentive to take part-time jobs, et.).
• 1999: Increased sickness benefits.
Greece • 1990: Unemployment benefits’ duration is increased.
• 1996: Unemployment benefits are reduced.
Ireland
• 1987: Unemployment benefits are reduced.
• 1993: Labour Market Reform: eligibility for unemployment benefits is made stricter; child 
benefits are increased, family benefits are increased; income support is increased.
• 1995: Unemployment benefits are reduced.
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Italy
• 1988: Ordinary unemployment benefits are increased.
• 1991: New unemployment benefit scheme for long-term unemployment is introduced (only 
for certain categories)
• 1994: Unemployment benefits are increased and coverage is extended.
• 1998: Minimum income scheme introduced on an experimental basis.
• 1999: introduced new means-tested family cash benefits.
• 1987: Revision of the Social Security System Act: duration of unemployment benefits is 
reduced; stricter rules for invalidity benefits/pensions, conditions for accessing all benefits 
are tightened.
• 1991: Social Insurance Organisational Act: administration of all benefits delegated to a 
single governmental body.
• 1996: General Social Assistance Act: improved incentives for those on income support to 
take up jobs; privatisation of sickness benefits.
• 1997: A new housing benefit is introduced.
• 2001: Employment bonus paid to people on unemployment benefit who find job.
Portugal
• 1997: Reform of family benefits (completely different structure, cannot say if more/less 
generous overall); easier access to employment injuries/occupational disease benefits, a new 
minimum income scheme is introduced.
• 1998: Introduction of a “partial” unemployment benefit for part-timers.
• 1998: Longer contribution record required for eligibility of unemployment benefits.
• 1999: Extended duration of unemployment benefits.
Spain
• 1992: Reform of the unemployment benefits (reduced duration and payments).
• 1993: Unemployment benefits are reduced.
• 1994: Unemployment benefits Eire subject to taxation.
• 2000: Extended unemployment benefits for older workers with children.
Sweden
• 1986: Participation in training programmes is considered equivalent to work for the purpose 
of eligibility for unemployment benefits
• 1987: Subsidised jobs are offered to those whose unemployment benefit expires (and the job 
must, by law, last at least enough to make the worker eligible for unemployment benefits 
again).
• 1993: Unemployment benefits are reduced.
• 1997: Reform of unemployment benefits, benefits are reduced and re-qualification through 
subsidised jobs no longer available.
• 1998: Increased sickness benefits.
• 1999: Housing benefits made stricter and lower.
• 2002: Child-caxe made more generous.
United Kingdom
• 1988: Unemployment benefits are reduced.
• 1989: Unemployment benefits are reduced.
• 1996: Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) replaces the old unemployment benefit both payments 
and duration of benefits are reduced, income support is replaced by a means-tested 
component of the JSA.
• 1997: Introduction of an employment bonus for older workers.
• 1998: Welfare-to-Work Programme: training for long-term unemployed, hiring subsidies for 
employers, sanctions for refusing job offers, etc.
• 1999: Introduction of new means-tested child-care tax credit.
Sources: European Commission Missoc (1992-2001), Missoc-info (1985-2001); Fondazione RDB “Social Policy Reforms 
Database”-, CESifo “DICE Database”.
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics
All UB recipients UB only recipients UB+SA recipients
Variable___________________________________ l.Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
l=female 0.48 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50)
Age 38.74 (11.12) 39.49 (11.79) 37.32 (9.57)
l=bad health 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.26)
l=primary education 0.48 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.39 (0.49)
l=secondary education 0.38 (0.49) 0.35 (0.48) 0.44 (0.50)
l=tertiary education 0.14 (0.35) 0.13 (0.34) 0.17 (0.38)
Household size 3.72 (1.41) 3.62 (1.40) 3.90 (1.39)
Log Household income (PPP)^ 9.27 (0.96) 9.32 (0.94) 9.17 (0.98)
1=SA recipient 0.35 (0.48) - - - -
UB replacement rate^ 0.68 (0.27) 0.66 (0.22) 0.71 (0.33)
SA replacement rate^ 0.08 (0.30) - - 0.22 (0.48)
SA+UB replacement rate 0.76 (0.46) - - 0.93 (0.69)
Maximum entitlement of UB (in months) ^ 39.13 (39.27) 35.89 (38.25) 52.04 (40.64)
Regional unemployment rate 12.39 (6.39) 13.36 (6.95) 10.56 (4.67)
Country long term unemployment rate^ 45.93 (12.26) 48.49 (11.53) 41.11 (12.15)
Duration of all unemployment spells 7.59 (7.92) 7.27 (7.38) 8.19 (8.82)
Duration of completed unemployment spells 6.79 (6.69) 6.58 (6.34) 7.21 (7.29)
Fraction of completed spells 0.78 0.78 0.77
ending into employment 0.65 0.68 0.60
ending into inactivity 0.13 0.10 0.17
Number o f spells 12460 8146 4314
Numer o f individuals 7917 5225 3116
(1) Income of all other household members
(2) Monthly benefit /  previous monthly wage. UB amount imputed on the basis of country regulations and personal 
characteristics (MISSOC, 1994-2001).
(3) Imputed on the basis of country regulations and personal characteristics (MISSOC, 1994-2001). The numbers refer to 
individuals whose unemployment benefit entitlement is limited. In some countries unemployment assistance schemes are 
available and make unemployment benefit duration unlimited.
(4i % of unemployed workers who have been unemployed for more than 12 months. Source: OECD.___________________
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■ ,   DU_________________[2]_________________[3]______________ _ [ 4 ] _________________ [51
Personal and Family characteristics.. 
l=female -0.325*** -0.298*** -0.298*** -0.293*** -0.292***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
age 0.097*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.110***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
age squared -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
l=bad health
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.508*** -0.481*** -0.480*** -0.481*** -0.481***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
l=primary education 0.043 0.017 0.022 0.022 0.022
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
l=tertiary education 0.126** 0.128** 0.132** 0.131** 0.130**
household size
(0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
-0.020 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008
(log) hh income1
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
0.011 -0.026 -0.025 -0.028* -0.028*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Social Transfers...
UB replacement rate [UBp]2 -0.259*** -0.219*** -0.230** -0.217**
UBp(time<=3)
(0.085)
0.224**
(0.083)
0.212**
(0.106)
0.210**
(0.087)
0.213**
1=SA recipient
(0.096) (0.095)
-0.345***
(0.095)
-0.312***
(0.097)
-0.286*** -0.289***
SA replacement rate3
(0.042) (0.106) (0.046)
-0.189*
(0.044)
Total replacement rate4
(0.106)
-0.227***
Total rep. rate(time<=3) _
(0.069)
0.171**
“Months to UB exhaustion” dummies... 
l=less than 1 months [EX1] 0.476*** 0.471*** 0.584*** 0.588***
(0.078)
0.581***
(0.183) (0.183) (0.216) (0.215) (0.214)
1=1 to 3 months [EX1_3] 0.450*** 0.442*** 0.549*** 0.553*** 0.544***
(0.125) (0.126) (0.138) (0.137) (0.136)
1=3 to 6 months [EX3_6] 0.195* 0.185* 0.112 0.116 0.107
(0.105) (0.105) (0.119) (0.118) (0.117)
1=6 to 12 months [EX6_12] 0.304*** 0.286*** 0.401*** 0.403*** 0.396***
(0.074) (0.073) (0.083) (0.083) (0.082)
Interaction terms.. 
(1=SA rec.) UBp [11] _ _ -0.006 _ _
(1=SA rec.) ( EX1 [12] .
(0.139)
-0.460 -0.465 -0.456
(1=SA rec.) ( EX1_3 [13]
(0.368)
-0.631**
(0.359)
-0.637**
(0.359)
-0.628**
(1=SA rec.) ( EX3_6 [14]
(0.292)
0.234
(0.291)
0.233
(0.291)
0.242
(1=SA rec.) ( EX6 12 [15]
(0.211)
-0.385**
(0.209)
-0.384**
(0.208)
-0.392***
Country/Region specific characteristics... 
Regional unemployment rate 0.004 -0.000
(0.150)
-0.000
(0.149)
-0.000
(0.149)
-0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
National long-term un. rate5 -0.005** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Non-parametric baseline yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 111900 111900 111900 111900 111900
Subjects 12460 12460 12460 12460 12460
Log-likelihood -28839.78 -28748.46 -28734.23 -28731.17 -28731.78
1. Income of all other household members.
2. monthly UB amount /  previous wage. UB amount imputed on the basis of country regulations and personal characteristics (MISSOC, 1993-2001).
3. monthly SA amount /  previous wage
4. UB + SA /  previous wage
5. Source: OECD.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 1.5: Hazard Model estimates with the probability of SA- Exits into Jobs 58
___________________________________________[1]___________________________ [3]___________
Personal and Family characteristics... 
1= female -0.299*** -0.299***
(0.026) (0.026)
age 0.109*** 0.109***
(0.009) (0.007)
age squared -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
l=bad health -0.481*** -0.479***
(0.053) (0.053)
l=primary education 0.017 0.022
(0.027) (0.027)
l=tertiary education 0.127*** 0.132***
(0.034) (0.034)
household size 0.004 0.004
(log) hh income1
(0.010) (0.010)
-0.025* -0.025*
(0.013) (0.013)
Social Transfers ...
UB replacement rate [UBp]2 -0.222*** -0.235***
(0.064) (0.077)
UBp(time<=3) 0.213*** 0.210***
Prob. of receiving SA3 [PrSA]
(0.057) (0.057)
-0.357*** -0.326***
(0.028) (0.083)
“Months to UB exhaustion” dummies... 
l=less than 1 months [EX1] 0.471*** 0.586***
(0.138) (0.166)
1=1 to 3 months [EX1_3] 0.442*** 0.577***
(0.107) (0.120)
1=3 to 6 months [EX3_6] 0.185** 0.103
(0.082) (0.101)
1=6 to 12 months [EX6_12] 0.288*** 0.424***
(0.050) (0.057)
Interaction terms.. 
PrSA • UBp [11] -0.002
PrSA • EX1 [12] .
(0.111)
-0.398
PrSA • EX1_3 [13]
(0.319)
-0.649***
PrSA • EX3_6 [14] .
(0.245)
0.234
PrSA • EX6_12 [15] .
(0.175)
-0.404***
Country/Region specific characteristics... 
Regional unemployment rate -0.000
(0.112)
-0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
National long-term un. rate4 -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001)
Year dummies yes yes
Non-parametric baseline yes yes
Observations 111900 111900
Subjects 12460 12460
Log-likelihood -28750.08 -28736.47
1. Income of all other household members.
2. monthly UB amount /  previous wage. UB amount imputed on the basis of country regulations and personal characteristics 
(MISSOC, 1993-2001).
3. Probit prediction. See appendix for full specification.
5. Source: OECD.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix l.A: 
Additional estimation results
Table l.A.l: Hazard Modelestimates with heterogeneity - Exits into jobs 60
____________  _ _________ [11____________ &____________[3]____________ [4]____________ [5]_
Personal and Family characteristics... 
l=female -0.456*** -0.427*** -0.426*** -0.418*** -0.418***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
age 0.125*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.140***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
age squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
l=bad health -0.484*** -0.459*** -0.459*** -0.459*** -0.459***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
l=primary education 0.046 0.018 0.021 0.020 0.022
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
l=tertiary education 0.216*** 0.219*** 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.215***
household size
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
-0.029** 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.005
(log) hh income1
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
0.018 -0.026 -0.025 -0.029* -0.028*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Social Transfers...
UB replacement rate [UBp]2 -0.258*** -0.214** -0.201* -0.196**
UBp(time<=3)
(0.085)
0.156**
(0.084)
0.146**
(0.107)
0.138**
(0.087)
0.140**
1=SA recipient
(0.063) (0.063)
-0.452***
(0.063)
-0.404***
(0.064)
-0.394*** -0.403***
SA replacement rate3
(0.035) (0.111) (0.040)
-0.252**
(0.038)
Total replacement rate4
(0.104)
-0.241***
Total rep. rate-(time<=3) _ _
(0.065)
0.135**
“Months to UB exhaustion” dummies... 
l=less than 1 months [EX1] 0.493*** 0.491*** 0.591*** 0.592***
(0.054)
0.576***
(0.121) (0.121) (0.137) (0.136) (0.135)
1=1 to 3 months [EX1_3] 0.421*** 0.417*** 0.504*** 0.505*** 0.491***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.101) (0.099) (0.097)
1=3 to 6 months [EX3_6] 0.228*** 0.222*** 0.108 0.110 0.098
(0.084) (0.084) (0.101) (0.100) (0.098)
1=6 to 12 months [EX6_12] 0.380*** 0.365*** 0.459*** 0.459*** 0.451***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071)
Interaction terms.. 
(1=SA rec.)-UBp [11] _ -0.043 _ _
(1=SA rec.) ( EX1 [12] .
(0.159)
-0.408 -0.402 -0.393
(1=SA rec.) ( EX 1_3 [13]
(0.287)
-0.525**
(0.282)
-0.519**
(0.282)
-0.513**
(1=SA rec.) ( EX 3_6 [14]
(0.244)
0.379**
(0.239)
0.388**
(0.239)
0.392**
(1=SA rec.) ( EX6_12 [15]
(0.174)
-0.302**
(0.167)
-0.296**
(0.167)
-0.301**
Country/Region specific characteristics... 
Regional unemployment rate 0.002 -0.003
(0.128)
-0.003
(0.123)
-0.003
(0.123)
-0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
National long-term un. rate5 -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Non-parametric baseline yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 111900 111900 111900 111900 111900
#  of spells 12460 12460 12460 12460 12460
#  of individuals 7917 7917 7917 7917 7917
Distribution of heterogeneity (v) normal normal normal normal normal
variance of V 0.879*** 0.872*** 0.870*** 0.870*** 0.870***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Log-likelihood -28526.61 -28441.04 -28430.64 -28427.29 -28426.88
1. Income of all other household members.
2. monthly UB amount /  previous wage. UB amount imputed on the basis of country regulations and personal characteristics (MISSOC, 1993-2001).
3. monthly SA amount /  previous wage
4. UB 4- SA /  previous wage
5. Source: OECD.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.A.2: Hazard Modelestimates with heterogeneity and the probability of SA - Exits into jobs
^ m _______________________________________________ [3]
Personal and Family characteristics... 
1 = female -0.435*** -0.425***
(0.034) (0.034)
age 0.136*** 0.141***
(0.011) (0.011)
age squared -0.002*** -0.002***
l=b ad  health
(0.000) (0.000)
-0.473*** -0.465***
(0.053) (0.054)
l=primary education 0.030 0.024
(0.035) (0.035)
l=tertiary education 0.224*** 0.222***
(0.046) (0.046)
household size -0.014 -0.005
(log) hh income1
(0.013) (0.013)
-0.010 -0.022
(0.016) (0.016)
Social Transfers...
UB replacement rate [UBp]2 -0.230*** -0.016
(0.084) (0.093)
U B p(tim e<=3) 0.156** 0.142**
Prob. of receiving SA3 [PrSA]
(0.064) (0.064)
-0.393*** -0.116**
(0.038) (0.054)
“Months to UB exhaustion” dummies... v- 
l= less than 1 months [EX1] 0.514*** 0.687***
(0.121) (0.144)
1=1 to 3 months [EX1_3] 0.417*** 0.593***
(0.092) (0.105)
1=3 to 6 months [EX3_6] 0.204** 0.121
(0.085) (0.107)
1=6 to 12 months [EX6_12] 0.373*** 0.517***
(0.062) (0.075)
Interaction terms.. 
PrSA • UBp [11] -0.500***
PrSA • EX1 [12] _
(0.076)
-0.534*
PrSA • EX1_3 [13] .
(0.288)
-0.692***
PrSA • EX 3_6 [14]
(0.247)
0.266
PrSA • EX6_12 [15] .
(0.176)
-0.440***
Country/Region specific characteristics... 
Regional unemployment rate -0.001
(0.128)
-0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
National long-term un. rate4 -0.012*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002)
Year dummies yes yes
Non-parametric baseline yes yes
#  of observations 111900 111900
#  of spells 12460 12460
#  of individuals 7917 7917
Distribution of heterogeneity (v) normal normal
variance of v 0.855*** 0.860***
(0.029) (0.029)
Log-likelihood -27986.50 -27951.19
1. Income of all other household members.
2. m onthly UB amount /  previous wage. UB am ount imputed on the basis o f country regulations and personal characteristics (MISSOC, 1993- 
2001).
3. Probit prediction. See appendix for full specification.
5. Source: OECD.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * * *  significant at 1%
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Table 1.A.3: Probit regressions for the probability of receiving Social Assistance (ECHP 2001) -  continues...
Austria_________ Belgium ________ Denmark________ Finland__________France_________ Germany
1=female 0.168*** 0.744*** 1.185*** 0.588*** -0.548*** -0.273***
(0.039) (0.047) (0.052) (0.039) (0.032) (0.029)
Age -0.000 -0.002 -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
l=primary education -0.241*** -0.256*** -0.217*** -0.265*** 0.030 -0.361***
(0.046) (0.057) (0.063) (0.050) (0.051) (0.037)
l=tertiary education 0.237*** 0.114** 0.007 -0.011 -0.044 0.273***
(0.076) (0.057) (0.062) (0.050) (0.054) (0.037)
l=bad health 0.694*** 0.656*** 0.605*** 0.309*** 0.452*** 0.154***
(0.074) (0.104) (0.109) (0.094) (0.058) (0.040)
Household size 0.058*** 0.176*** 0.253*** 0.435*** 0.142*** 0.297***
(0.021) (0.032) (0.050) (0.033) (0.022) (0.022)
Number of children 0.323*** 0.319*** 0.307*** -0.005 0.535*** 0.355***
(0.027) (0.033) (0.053) (0.036) (0.025) (0.023)
Household total disposable income -0.413*** -0.313*** -0.884*** -0.570*** -0.509*** -0.702***
(0.033) (0.043) (0.052) (0.035) (0.025) (0.030)
l=house owner 0.191*** 0.011 -0.442*** -0.413*** -0.482*** -0.042
(0.048) (0.060) (0.063) (0.055) (0.035) (0.034)
#  of rooms per household member -0.123*** -0.173*** -0.242*** -0.024 -0.084*** -0.050*
(0.031) (0.036) (0.038) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026)
Constant 4.312*** 3.087*** 10.247*** 6.146*** 5.574*** 6.219***
(0.420) (0.593) (0.597) (0.373) (0.286) (0.311)
Observations 5526 4180 3732 5021 9170 10203
Log-likelihood -2878.17 -2024.62 -1676.46 -2761.15 -4278.50 -5085.56
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.A.3: Probit regressions for the probability of receiving Social Assistance (ECHP 2001) - continued
Greece_______ Ireland________Italy_____ Luxembourg_____Portugal_______Spain_____ United Kingdom
l=female 0.333*** 0.972*** -0.227*** -0.871*** -0.410*** -0.017 0.770***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.035) (0.046) (0.029) (0.036) (0.033)
Age 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003* -0.006*** -0.007*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
l=primary education 0.286*** 0.103* 0.008 -0.107** 0.002 0.031 0.032
(0.061) (0.055) (0.043) (0.052) (0.047) (0.053) (0.047)
l=tertiary education 0.029 0.057 -0.201** 0.305*** 0.248*** -0.023 0.084*
(0.093) (0.071) (0.083) (0.069) (0.068) (0.063) (0.045)
l=bad health 0.813*** 0.445*** 0.709*** 0.291*** 0.693*** 0.555***
(0.062) (0.144) (0.051) (0.041) (0.053) (0.056)
Household size 0.212*** 0.041 0.029 0.177*** -0.048*** 0.085*** -0.011
(0.022) (0.026) (0.019) (0.028) (0.015) (0.019) (0.024)
Number of children 0.090*** 0.282*** 0.178*** 0.367*** 0.450*** -0.018 0.570***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.024) (0.034) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028)
Household total disposable income -0.245*** -0.661*** -0.181*** -0.700*** -0.152*** -0.338*** -0.448***
(0.034) (0.043) (0.027) (0.049) (0.022) (0.019) (0.027)
l=house owner -0.304*** -0.153** -0.063 0.136** 0.057* -0.128** -0.426***
(0.059) (0.076) (0.043) (0.057) (0.034) (0.051) (0.042)
#  of rooms per household member 0.131*** -0.202*** -0.097*** -0.132*** -0.229*** -0.143*** -0.114***
(0.042) (0.038) (0.033) (0.034) (0.027) (0.035) (0.023)
Constant 0.796 5.519*** 0.139 9.099*** 2.056*** 3.801*** 3.522***
(0.516) (0.432) (0.283) (0.676) (0.320) (0.297) (0.258)
Observations 9172 3948 13170 4561 10850 11893 8023
Log-likelihood -2044.10 -2005.10 -2982.76 -2114.99 -5070.99 -2849.02 -4080.77
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix B:
Descriptive tables of Welfare programmes 
in the European countries
DO
T a b le  i.B.1. Unem ploym ent B e n e fit  m E uropean C ountries (situation on January 2001)
Country Existing
schemes
Qualifying period1 Duration of payment2 Rate3
Belgium Insurance Variable according to age No limit 60% to 55% initially declining to 44%- 
35% as unemployment continues
Denmark Insurance
(optioned)
52 weeks in the preceding 3 years 1+3 years 90% of reference earnings
Germany Insurance
Assisteince
12 months in the preceding 3 years Depending on age and contribution 
history (between 12 and 64 months)
Insurance: 60%-67% of net earnings 
Assistance: 57%-53% of net earnings
Greece Insurance 125 days of work during the 14 
months preceding job loss or, at least, 
200 days of work during the 2 years 
preceding job loss.
Depending on contribution history 
(between 5 and 12 months)
40%-50% of earnings
Spain Insurance
Assisteince
12 months in the previous 6 years Depending on contribution history Insurance: 70%-60% of reference 
earnings
Assistance: 75% of minimum wage
France Insurance
Assisteince
least 4 months insurance in last 18 
months.
Depending on age and contribution 
history (between 4 and 60 months)
Insurance: 40.4%-57.4% of earnings, 
declining.
Assistance: lump sum
Ireland Insurance
Assistance
39 weeks’ contributions paid 390 days Insurance: 98€ per week 
Assistance: 97-98€ per week
Italy Insurance Varies according to the industry Depending on the industry (180 days 
or 90 days or 36 months)
30%-80% of earnings
Luxembourg Insurance 26 weeks of employment during the 
last year
365+182 days 80% of earnings
Netherlands Insurance
Assistance
26 weeks of employment during the 
last 39 months
6 months+ 9 months to 5 years 
depending on age and employment 
history.
Insurance: 70% of earnings 
Assistance: 70% of minimum wage
Austria Insurance
Assistance
52 weeks during the last 24 months Depending on age and contribution 
history (between 20 to 78 weeks)
Insurance: 55% of earnings +  lump 
sum
Assistance: 92-95% of unemployment 
insurance
Portugal Insurance
Assistance
540 days during the last 24 months Depending on age (between 12 and 30 
months)
Insurance: 65% of earnings 
Assistance: 70%-100% of minimum 
wage
Finland Insurance
Assistance
43 weeks of employment during the 
last 24 months
500 days Insurance: lump sum (2l€ per day) +  
earning related supplement 
Assistance: lump sum (2l€ per day)
Sweden Insurance 6 months of employment Depending on age (between 300 and 
450 days)
Insurance: 80% of earnings
United Kingdom Insurance
Assisteince
Contributions paid in one of the 2 tax 
years on which the claim is based 
amounting to at least 25 times the 
minimum contribution for that year
182 days Insurance: lump sum (65-83€ per 
week)
Assistance: lump sum (99-130€ per 
week for a couple)
(1) Qualifying periods refer to working periods during which contributions are paid unless otherwise specified.
(2) When duration is expressed in days these usually refer to a 5 or 6 day weekly payments. Duration usually refers only to insurance schemes,
unemployment assistance is typically unlimited.
(3) When different rates are specified for the same scheme, the actual rate depends on family characteristics, age, contribution history or duration of 
unemployment. Only basic rates are reported, excluding any supplement (family, old age, etc.)
Source: European Commission M issoc 2001.___________________________________________________________________________________________________
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T a b le  i.B .2. I n v a l id i ty  B e n e f i t s  in  E u r o p e a n  C o u n tr ie s  (situation on January 2001)
Country Type of benefit minimum level of incapacity1 Qualifying conditions Duration Amount of benefit*
Belgium
Denm ark
Germ any
Invalidity benefit 
Invalidity pension 
Invalidity benefit
66.66%
50%
50%
6 months of contributions with 120 days 
worked
3 years of residence
60 months of work with 36 months of 
contributions in the previous 5 years
Until retirement 
Until retirement 
Until retirement
40-65% of last earnings
Depends on incapacity (from 6.855€ 
to 18.012€ per year)
Depends on incapacity
Greece Invalidity pension 50% Between 5 and 15 years of work with 300 to 
1500 contributions’ days (depending on age)
Until retirement Depends on incapacity
Spain Invalidity pension 33% Worked 1/2 of the time between age 20 and 
the claim
Until retirement 50%-100% of reference earnings
France Invalidity pension 66.66% 12 months of work with sufficient 
contributions paid
Until retirement 30%-50% of annual earnings
Ire lan d Invalidity pension Eligible only after 12 months 
of sickness benefit
260 contributions’ weeks Until retirement Depends on age (103-128€ per 
week)
Ita ly •Invalidity pension 
•Incapacity benefit
•66% 
• 100%
5 years of contributions Until retirement Depends on income and 
contribution records
Luxem bourg Invalidity pension Eligible if invalidity prevents 
the beneficiary form doing his 
last job (or a similar one)
12 months in the previous 3 years Until retirement Depends on contribution records
Netherlands Invalidity pension 25% None Until retirement Depends on incapacity
A ustria Invalidity pension 50% 60 contributions’ months in the previous 120 
months
Until retirement Depends on income
P ortugal Invalidity pension 66.66% 5 years Until retirement Depends on contribution records
F in land Invalidity pension 40% 3 years of residence Until retirement Depends on age
Sweden Invalidity pension 25% Residence in Sweden Until retirement 25%-100% of basic pension
U nited Kingdom •Short-term invalidity 
•Long-term invalidity
100% •Enough contributions paid 
•Having exhausted short-term invalidity 
benefit
•364 days 
•Until retirement
Lump sum 
Depends on age.
(1) Reduced capacity of earning or work unless otherwise specified.
(2) When a range is specified this usually varies with age and contribution records. 
Source: European Commission Missoc 2001.
T a b le  i.B.3. F am ily  Cash B e n e f its  in  E u rop ean  C ou n tr ies (situation on January 2001) 
Country Income Test Age Limit1 Calculation of benefit Supplement for single parents
B elgium No 18 to 25 Depends on the age of the child No
D enm ark No 18 Depends on the age of the child Yes
G erm any Yes 18 Depends on the number of children No
Greece Yes 18 to 22 Depends on the number of children Only for widows
Spain Yes 18 Depends on the age of the child No
France No 18 to 20 Depends on the number of children Yes
Ire la n d No 16 to 19 Depends on the number and age of the children Yes
Ita ly Yes 18 Depends on family and number of children Yes
Luxem bourg No 18 to 27 Depends on the number and age of the children No
N etherlands No 17 to 24 Depends on the number and age of the children No
A u stria No 19 to 26 Depends on the number of children No
P o rtu g a l Yes 15 to 24 Depends on the number of children No
F in lan d No 16 Depends on the number of children Yes
Sweden No 16 Depends on the number of children Yes
U n ited  K ingdom No 16 to 19 Depends on the number of children Yes
(1) Benefits are paid until the child reaches this age limit, which is extended for children in training or higher education.
Source: European Commission M issoc 2001.
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T a b le  i.B .4. H o u sin g  B e n e f i t s  in  E u r o p e  (situation in 1999)
Country Type of Benefit Qualifying conditions Calculation of benefit
B elgium No direct benefit but social housing is available - -
D enm ark • General housing benefit (open to everybody)
• Special housing benefit (for those receiving 
income support)
• Means test
• Occurrence of a negative “ social event” that 
affects housing.
Depending on income, family composition and rent
G erm any
Greece
Housing benefit
No direct benefit but a tax allowance for house 
rents is available.
Means test Income related
Spain No general housing benefit but some regions have 
introduced one.
- -
France Housing benefit • Means test
• Children in the household
• Married for less than 5 years
Depending on income, rent and family composition
Ire la n d Housing Supplement for those under Social 
Welfare Allowance
• Means test
• Receiving Social Welfare Allowance
Depending on Income
Ita ly No direct benefit but social housing is available - -
Luxem bourg Housing Supplement for those under RMI • Means test
• Receiving RMI
Depending on Income
N etherlands Housing benefit Means tested Depending on income and rent
A u stria Housing Supplement for those under Social 
Assistance (but it varies across regions)
Varies across regions Varies across regions
P o rtu g a l Housing Supplement for those under RMI Means tested Depending on income
F in lan d • Housing benefit for low income households
• Housing benefit for pensioners
• Housing benefit for students
Means tested Depending on income, family composition and 
town of residence
Sweden • Housing benefit for low income households
• Housing supplement for social assistance 
recipients
• Housing benefit for pensioners
Means tested Depending on income, rent and family composition
U n ited  K ingdom Housing benefit Means tested Depending on income and rent. Special 
supplements for those under Income Support, 
young and old households.
Source: OECD, Benefit System ad Work Incentives (2002).
T a b le  i.B .5. L ow -In com e B e n e f i t s  in  E u r o p e  (situation on January 2001)
Country Denomination Qualifying conditions Duration Willingness to work 
requirement1
B elgium Minimum de Moyens d’Existence 
(MIMEX)
• Nationals and refugees
• Resident in the country
• Aged 18y.o. and above
Unlimited Yes
D enm ark Sozial Bistand All persons Unlimited Yes
G erm any Sozialhilfe • National and refugees
• Resident in the country
Unlimited
Greece - - - -
Spain Renta Minima • Resident in the country
• Aged between 25 and 65y.o.
12 months Yes
France Revenu Minimum d’Insertion 
(RMI)
• Resident in the country
• Aged 25y.o. and above
3 to 12 months Yes
Ire la n d Supplementary Welfare Allowance • Nationals and refugees
• Resident in the country
• Aged 18y.o. and above
Unlimited Yes
Ita ly * Minimo Vitale/Reddito Minimo Vary across towns Varies across towns Varies across towns
Luxem bourg Revenu Minimum Garanti • Resident in the country
• Aged 18y.o. and above
Unlimited Yes
N etherlands Algemene Bijstand • Nationals and refugees
• Resident in the country
• Aged 18y.o. and above
Unlimited Yes
A u stria Sozialhilfe • Resident in the country Unlimited Yes
P o rtu g a l Rendimento Minimo Garantido • Resident in the country
• Aged 18y.o. and above
12 months, extendible Yes
F in lan d Toimeentulotuki None Unlimited Yes
Sweden Social Bidrag None Unlimited Yes
U n ited  K ingdom Income Support • Nationals
• Resident in the country
• Aged 18y.o. and above
Unlimited Yes
(1) For those who axe able to work.
(2) There is no national legal framework for income support. Many towns, however, have introduced a minimum income scheme but rules
vary widely across the nation. In 1998 an experiment was run in 39 towns with the objective of introducing a national minimum income 
scheme by the year 2000. The experiment has been extended to 2002 and then abandoned.
(3) Introduced in 1997.
Source: European Commission M issoc 2001._____________________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 2 
D o Friends ancf R elatives R eally Help  
in G etting a Good Job?
Introduction1
Informal contacts are extensively used by both firms and workers to find jobs and fill va­
cancies. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of job finding methods for employed workers in 
European countries and the United States, and documents that, together with direct applica­
tion and answering/placing advertisement, personal contacts are among the most important 
channels that lead people into jobs.
The importance of informal networks in the labour market is a known fact and has 
motivated a number of studies. Findings suggest that, compared to formal methods, informal 
contacts are a better channel to transmit information between job applicants and potential 
employers and should therefore lead to matches of better quality that pay higher wages. Some 
empirical evidence, mainly for the United States, supports this view and has contributed to
*1 would like to thank all participants to the CEP/LSE PhD Labour Market Workshops for useful 
comments and suggestions. This chapter also greatly benefited from discussions with Tito Boeri, Pietro 
Garibaldi, Jan Van Ours, Samuel Bentolila, Marco Leonardi, Federico Perali and Javier Ortega. All errors 
are my own responsibility.
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make it the common wisdom among economists.
This chapter produces new estimates for EU countries and discovers a large cross-country 
as well as cross-industry variation in the wage premiums paid to jobs found through informal 
networks. The data come from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)2, where 
employed workers are asked to indicate the search channel through which they have found 
their current job. For the sake of comparison, data for the United States are also included 
in the analysis3.
My best estimates indicate that informal search channels lead to significantly better 
paying jobs in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, while the opposite is true in Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom. In the other EU countries - and in the US - 
no significant wage difference is observed. A even larger variation emerges from the cross­
industry analysis. None of the 9 broad sectors considered shows differentials of the same sign 
in all countries. Moreover, only in 5 countries (Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy and United 
Kingdom) out of 15 the effects consistently point towards the existence of either a wage 
premium or a wage penalty to finding a job through personal contacts. In all other countries, 
informal search methods lead to significantly better paying jobs only in some sectors, while 
the opposite is true in others.
This chapter aims at providing an explanation for the variation in wage differentials 
between jobs found through formal and informal channels. In doing this I take a rather 
unconventional approach in this branch of the literature. Most of the existing articles attempt 
to describe either the formation or the characteristics of social networks and, on this ground, 
draw conclusions about the quality of the information that such networks are able to vehicle. 
This chapter argues that a lot of the observed variation in wage differentials can be explained 
by variation in formal recruitment policies. In deciding their investment in recruitment, firms 
trade off the costs of a more intensive screening with the benefits of a more accurately selected
2The same data axe used in chapter 1 and described in section 1.4.
3Although the sample is not fully comparable to the ECHP. See section 2.2.1.
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workforce. This decision is obviously affected by the prevailing labour market conditions and 
is supposedly a very important factor in determining the ability of firms in selecting workers 
through formal recruitment methods relative to informal ones.
Specifically, the model that will be presented later, assumes that employers optimally 
choose their ’’formal recruitment effort”: choose in how many newspapers and for how long 
to post a vacancy, decide how long and tough the interviewing process should be, buy and 
administer aptitudinal tests, choose the interviewers, etc. This allows to control the amount 
and the quality of the information that can be extracted from job applicants. The model 
shows that firms invest more in formal recruitment for high productivity jobs and positions 
that require considerable training. High productivity implies that the cost of hiring an 
unsuitable worker is higher, both in terms of forgone profits and wages, thus employers Eire 
induced to put more effort in selecting an appropriate candidate. High training costs also 
induce more recruitment effort in order to avoid bearing them again in the future, if the hire 
turns out to be unfit for the job. Formal recruitment for these types of positions is therefore 
likely to be more efficient than informal methods. This mechanism generates variation in the 
average quality of matches created through different channels and, in turn, leads to variation 
in wages.
The predictions of the model axe tested using industry-level data on recruitment and 
training costs in selected EU countries4. Results confirm that the wage premium paid to jobs 
found through informal networks is indeed lower in industries in which firms invest more in 
recruitment, in high productivity jobs and positions that require training. Other empirical 
predictions of the model are also supported by the data.
Given their extensive use, informal networks must be an important factor in determining 
the overall efficiency of the matching process and this is already a sufficient motivation for 
studying the characteristics of jobs created through this channel. Moreover, by looking at 
firm’s recruitment strategies, this chapter touches upon a field that has received surprisingly
4See section 2.2.2 for a detailed description of these data.
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little attention by economists. While the search behaviour of both the employed and the 
unemployed has been extensively studied, very little is known about how firms look for 
workers. Finally, a better understanding of the role of informal networks would shed light on 
other unsolved issues like the sources of wage inequality and the functioning of social capital 
at the micro level.
Several papers have already investigated the role of informal networks in the labour 
market, mostly addressing two broad questions. The first one concerns the relative efficiency 
of search methods: are informal networks an efficient channel to find a job? Most microdata 
surveys contain questions about the search methods used by both employed and unemployed 
workers and a few papers (Holzer (1987b, 1988), Lindeboom et al. (1994), Osberg (1993)) 
have exploited this information to look at the relative efficiency of formal versus informal 
search. Findings indicate that those who rely on personal contacts normally receive more 
offers and find employment more quickly, thus suggesting that informal search is indeed a 
very efficient way to get a job.
The second question relates to the type of jobs that are found through informal networks: 
are these good or bad jobs? Do they pay higher or lower wages than similar jobs found via 
formal methods? There seems to be a generalised wisdom in the literature that these should 
actually be better jobs. A number of papers provide convincing explanations to support this 
wisdom. For example, Montgomery (1991) argues that, as people tend to have social ties with 
similar persons, employers can proxy the unobserved characteristics of applicants with those 
of their referees, about whom they have better information because, for instance, they have 
already worked at the firm for some time. Other authors (Kugler (2003), Saloner (1985)) 
suggest that employed contacts of unemployed workers tend to refer only good applicants 
because their reputation is at stake and, consequently, less able workers will find it more 
difficult to get a reference in the first place. For similar reasons, referees should also monitor 
their refereed coworkers once they are hired, thus making them more productive.
However, while individual-level surveys normally contain information about the search
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actions taken by jobseekers, it is less common to know which search method led to the job 
people are holding at the time of an interview. With panel surveys - which follow the same 
individuals over time - it is theoretically possible to retrospectively associate to an employed 
person a set of search methods used when he/she was looking for a new employer (provided 
he/she has been interviewed at that time). Nonetheless, it is rather difficult to know exactly 
which method led to the observed job. As a consequence there still is limited empirical 
evidence to test the theoretical arguments mentioned above. Some findings exist for the 
United States, which, indeed, confirm the idea that jobs found through informal networks 
pay higher wages5. However, many of these papers use very selected samples (Granovetter 
(1974), Marmaros et al. (2002), Simon et al. (1992)) while others fail to properly control 
for the unobserved characteristics of individuals and their personal contacts (Corcoran et al. 
(1980), Datcher (1983), Staiger (1990)). This chapter produces evidence using representative 
samples for each European country and applying fixed-effect estimation techniques.
After a description of the data in section 2.2, the chapter is broadly organised in three 
parts: first (section 2.3), empirical evidence from the ECHP is used to document variation 
in wage differentials between jobs found through different channels; then (section 2.4), these 
results motivate the simple theoretical model which is finally (section 2.5) tested against 
more empirical evidence, section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Data  
2.2.1 ECH P and NLSY
The European Community Household Panel is a panel dataset of households that covers all 
European Countries and it has already been described in section 1.4. The sample used in 
this chapter includes all individuals aged 16-64 who are observed in dependent employment
5Corcoran at al. (1980), Datcher (1983), Granovetter (1974), Marmaros et al. (2002), Kugler (2003), 
Simon et al. (1992), Staiger (1990).
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at least in two interviews during the first 6 years of the survey, between 1994 and 1999. This 
excludes Sweden from the analysis because it only entered the ECHP in 1999. The last two 
waves of the ECHP (2000 and 2001) are not used for the empirical analysis of this chapter 
in order to maintain consistency with information from the Eurostat Labour Cost Survey 
(described in section 2.2.2 below), which is currently available only for 1992 and 1996.
Employed workers in the ECHP are asked to indicate how they have found their current 
job. The exact phrasing of the question reads: ”By what means were you first informed about 
your current job?”. Six possible answers are offered:
• by applying to the employer directly (including approach by an employer);
• by inserting or answering adverts in newspapers, TV, radio;
• through employment or vocational guidance agencies;
• through family, friends or other contacts;
• started own business or joined family business;
• other.
Respondents can choose only one answer. Unfortunately, this question is not asked in the 
PSELL and the BHPS, therefore for these two countries only data from the ECHP original 
sample in the first three years (1994 to 1996) can be used.
Two important variables are problematic in the ECHP. First, firm’s size was initially 
collected only for workers in the private sector and it has then been updated for all workers 
only when they changed job since the previous year. As a consequence, firm’s size is missing 
for most public sector workers. A similar problem exists for temporary jobs. Information 
about the type of contract (temporary vs. permanent) was not collected in the first year and 
then updated in the later waves for all workers. In order to use all available information and 
not to reduce sample sizes, observations with missing values in both of these variables have 
been included in the analysis (with values equal to -1) with a specific dummy to control for 
them.
The upper panel of table 2.1 describes the time and country coverage of the data used
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in the chapter, while summary statistics of the main variables are provided in appendix 2.B 
(table 2.B.1).
Existing estimates of the wage premium paid to jobs found through informal networks are 
produced mostly with US data. For the sake of comparison, US estimates are also reported 
here. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is the American data source most 
comparable to the ECHP, however it does not contain questions about the search methods 
used by employed workers to find their current jobs.
This information is readily available in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths 
(NLSY), a survey of a representative cohort of children aged 14 to 21 in 1979 and inter­
viewed 17 times since then. The cross-sectional sample is supplemented by two additional 
samples: one with overrepresentation of blacks, Hispanics and economically disadvantaged 
persons and a second one meant to be representative of the military forces. Once appro­
priately weighted, all individuals from the three samples have been used to produce the 
estimates presented here.
In the surveys between 1994 and 2000, a set of questions regarding the search methods 
used to find the current job(s) has been included in the NLSY79 questionnaire, resulting in 
4 valid observations over time for each individual (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000). As for European 
countries, the American sample used in the rest of the chapter consists of all individuals who 
are observed in dependent employment at least twice.
Two main differences make the American and European data not fully comparable. First, 
they are produced with very different sampling procedures: the ECHP is meant to be repre­
sentative of the entire population in each EU country while the NLSY is representative only 
of a cohort of US-citizens. Second, the NLSY question about the search method that led to 
the current job is slightly different and reads as follows: ” which of the methods on this card 
led you to your being offered your current job?”. 12 possible answers are shown on the card:
• contacted employer directly/interview;
• contacted public employment agency;
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• contacted private employment agency;
• contacted friends and relatives;
• contacted school/university employment center;
• sent out resumes/filled out applications;
• placed or answered adverts;
• checked union/professional register;
• other (active);
• looked at adverts;
• attended job training programs/courses;
• other (passive).
These 12 alternative answers have been regrouped into the ECHP categories according 
to the following criterion:
NLSY ECHP
contacted employer directly/interview 
sent out resumes/filled out applications
applying to the employer directly
placed or answered adverts 
looked at adverts
inserting or answering adverts in 
newspapers, TV, radio
contacted public employment agency 
contacted private employment agency 
contacted school/university employment center
employment or vocational guidance 
agency
contacted friends and relatives family, friends or other contacts
checked union/professional register 
other (passive) 
other (active)
other
Respondents can indicate more than one method. In the estimation, a job is considered 
as found through personal contacts if this method was used, even if together with others. 
The NLSY also asks the ’’main” method used (and in this case respondents must give only 
one answer) but there is a high number of missing values in this variable and results do not 
change substantially when the previous definition is used.
The wage measure used in the following empirical exercises is the net hourly wage, which 
is directly available in the NLSY and is constructed as the net monthly wage divided by the 
usual number of working hours per week (multiplied by 4.3) in the ECHP.
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2.2.2 Eurostat Labour Cost Surveys
Information about recruitment costs come from the Eurostat Labour Costs Survey, a survey 
of European firms carried out at regular intervals since 19756. The sample is designed to 
represent all firms with 10 or more employees. Total labour costs axe broken down by various 
categories and subcategories, and, although these change from year to year, in 1992 and 1996 
the percentage of total labour costs accounted for by recruitment costs is available for several 
countries.
The exact definition of recruitment costs is as follows: ”...the sums paid to recruitment 
agencies, expenditure on job advertisements in the press, travel expenses paid to candidates 
called for interview, installation allowances paid to newly recruited staff, etc. This does not 
include running administration costs (office expenses, staff wages, e tc .)”.
Unfortunately, for 1996 - the only year that overlaps with the time coverage of the ECHP 
- these figures are only available for 6 countries: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Lux­
embourg, Portugal. For Belgium, Denmark, Greece and the United Kingdom data are only 
available for 1992, while France, Luxembourg and Portugal have reported information for 
both 1992 and 1996. The country and year coverage of the data used in this chapter are 
described in the lower panel of table 2.1.
The data refer to the manufacturing and service sectors. No information is available for 
firms operating in agriculture. The data are distributed in aggregate format, broken down 
by industry classification (2-digit NACE) and firm size.
Table 2.2 shows recruitment costs as a percentage of total labour costs and per employee 
(in ECU) in the industry and service sectors. Austria is a clear outlier with recruitment costs 
5 to 10 times higher than the other countries. Eurostat could not offer any explanations for 
this large discrepancy, however, in the empirical exercises performed later on in the chapter, 
country dummies are always included in the various specifications.
Being the ECHP also produced by Eurostat, the industry classification available here can
6The latest release of data contain surveys for the years 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996.
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be readily merged into the microdata for each country. The Eurostat Labour Costs Survey 
also provides information on training costs.
2.3 Jobs found through personal contacts: evidence 
from the ECHP
2.3.1 W ho finds job through personal contacts?
I start by documenting the characteristics of jobs found through informal contacts. To this 
end, standard probit regressions for having found a job through informal networks have 
been estimated for each country, using the 1996 wave of the ECHP7 and data for the same 
year from the NLSY. The set of controls include a gender dummy, age and age squared, the 
number of adults in the household, two dummies for the highest level of completed education, 
dummies for part-time, first, temporary and public sector jobs and a set of dummies for broad 
occupational, firm size and industry categories. Results are shown in table 2.3. The figures 
represent marginal effects.
There seems to be no notable regularity across countries in terms of gender, age or income. 
Jobs found through informal networks appear to be generally concentrated in the private 
sector. This is probably due to the requirement in many countries to pass a nationwide 
competitive exam in order to enter the public administration.
In most countries the coefficients on the occupational and educational groups are negative 
and significant (the reference groups being the lowest occupations and the least educated). 
These results indicate an interesting cross-country regularity: jobs found through personal 
contacts are systematically concentrated into lower occupational groups and among less ed­
ucated workers. This result conforms with findings in Staiger (1990) on the NLSY.
The use of personal contacts also appears to lead more frequently to jobs in small and
rThe 1996 wave of the ECHP is the one with the widest country coverage (see table 2.1).
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medium sized firms. The distribution across industries looks more varied.
2.3.2 Wage premiums to  jobs found through personal contacts
Given the above finding that jobs found through personal contacts are concentrated into 
lower occupational and educational groups, it is reasonable to expect lower wages paid to 
these jobs compared to jobs found through formal channels. This can be checked by running 
the following OLS wage regression for each country:
ln(wi)t) =  7r P E R SO N  A Lij +  xi,tP +  ui,t (2-1)
where P E R SO N A L iyt is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i used personal contacts to find the 
job he/she is holding at time t, x^t is a set of controls which includes a constant, experience 
and experience squared, tenure and tenure squared, a dummy for job-to-job movers, a dummy 
for first job and a set of year dummies. viyt is a random error.
All regressions axe repeated with and without job’s characteristics (i.e. a dummy for 
part-time, a dummy for temporary and a dummy for public sector jobs), occupational (22), 
industry8 (18) and firm size (7) dummies. The dependent variable is the log of the net hourly 
wage.
The estimates of 7r for each country are shown in the upper panels of figure 2.2 and 
table 2.4. In figure 2.2 the vertical baxs represent 10%-level confidence intervals. In order 
to visually show the differences in the distribution and the size of the estimates across the 
various specifications, in all panels of figure 2.2 countries are ordered according to the ranking 
of the OLS coefficients in the upper left quadrant.
Looking at this first set of results, some important differences across countries already 
emerge: statistically significant coefficients range from -2.4% in Belgium to -11.5% in Luxem­
bourg. In Austria and Denmark point estimates, although not significant, are positive, while
8 No industry dummies axe available for Germany (due to a particular confidentiality agreement with 
Eurostat).
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in Finland and France they are negative (still not significant). Results for the US indicate 
no significant wage differential.
As expected, when job’s characteristics are included in the set of controls (upper right 
panel of figure 2.2), wage differences are more than halved but the ranking of countries 
remains unchanged. The detailed results of these regressions are reported in table 2.B.2 in 
appendix 2.B.
Evidence from OLS estimates, although already suggestive of the considerable cross­
country variation in wage differentials, are still fax from convincing. The group of workers 
who have access to informal networks is probably very selected and the quality of such 
networks is also likely to be individual specific. This implies that OLS estimates are affected 
by a potentially important selection bias. As long as the unobservable characteristics that 
influence access to social networks and their quality are fixed over time, consistent estimates 
can be produced introducing individual fixed-effects (si) in equation (2.1):
In(witt) = 7TPERSONAL^ + x'i t(3 +  s* 4- vift (2.2)
This model is identified thanks to the longitudinal dimension of the ECHP. The estimates 
of 7r are reported in the lower panels of table 2.4 and figure 2.2. Detailed results from these 
regressions can be found in appendix 2.B (table 2.B.3).
The introduction of individual fixed-effects implies that wage differentials are now identi­
fied by the same worker who is observed in different jobs obtained through different channels 
during the sample period9.
Figure 2.2 shows that the cross-country distribution of the estimates is now very different, 
suggesting that individual fixed effects are indeed important and that their correlation with 
the use of personal contacts varies considerably across countries.
In seven out of the 15 countries the effect is significant at the 10% level: in Austria, Bel­
9In table 2.B.1, this is called the ’’identifying sample” and its size varies from 5% to 26% of the entire 
sample.
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gium and the Netherlands jobs obtained through informal networks respectively pay 4.2%, 6% 
and 2.9% more, while in the Greece, Italy, Portugal and the UK the effect is of opposite sign: 
-2.2% in Greece and Italy, -1.3% in Portugal, and -3.5% in the UK. For all other countries 
estimated coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Unlike other authors (Kugler 
(2002), Staiger (1990)), who find a positive and significant wage premium, my estimates for 
the US are positive but non-significant. When job characteristics are included in the set of 
controls, results don’t change dramatically: the impact of these variables is probably largely 
captured by the fixed-effects.
A even larger variation emerges from the cross-sector analysis. Industry-specific wage 
differentials between jobs found through informal and formal methods are produced by in­
teracting the dummy P E R SO N  AL^t with a full set of sector dummies:
In(wi,t) =  ^ 2  Kj [industry(j)itt * P E R SO N A Lift] +  x'i tl3 +  e* +  i/i>t (2.3)
j
where industry(j)i,t is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i is observed working in sector j  at 
time t, and zero otherwise. The other symbols have the usual meaning. The sector-specific 
wage differentials, 71^ ’s, are now identified by those individuals who change either sector or 
search method over time (or both), however the number of identifying individuals in each 
industry can be very small, thus reducing the precision of the estimates. For this reason, 
in order to achieve larger cell sizes, I have re-grouped the 18 industries available from the 
ECHP into 9 broader sectors. The exact definitions of the industry classification is provided 
in table 2.B.6, in appendix 2.B.
Equation (2.3), estimated separately for each country, yields 126 (9 sectors in 14 countries) 
coefficients, of which only those significant at the 10% level axe reported in figure 2.3. As 
expected, because of the smaller cell sizes, these effects axe larger with larger standard errors. 
The main message of figure 2.3, however, is that wage differentials between jobs found through 
informal and formal methods vary considerably across sectors as well as across countries. 
None of the 9 broad sectors considered here shows wage differentials of the same sign in
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all countries. Moreover, only in 5 countries (Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy and United 
Kingdom) out of 15 the effects consistently point towards the existence of either a wage 
premium or a wage penalty to finding a job through personal contacts. In all other countries, 
informal search methods lead to significantly better paying jobs only in some sectors, while 
the opposite is true in others.
There can be at least two alternative explanations for the existence of wage differentials 
between jobs found through formal and informal channels. First, jobs obtained through in­
formal networks might be different along some non monetary dimensions that are difficult to 
observe, like job security or stability, responsibility or effort, etc. In this case, wages would 
simply reflect compensating differentials for some permanent job specific characteristic. Al­
ternatively, differences could be due to actual mismatching, with formal or informal channels 
being better or worse at matching the right worker to the right job.
These two alternative explanations have opposite empirical implications: if the wage 
premiums observed in the data are due to compensating differentials, then they should be 
permanent, i.e. they should not disappear with tenure. On the contrary, if they are due 
to real mismatching, then, as workers and employers move on to better job partners, these 
bad matches are destroyed and, consequently, wage differentials should disappear as tenure 
increases.
Estimates in table 2.5 allow to discriminate between these two hypotheses. The coef­
ficients reported in this table come from fixed-effect wage regressions similar to equation 
(2.2) where the dummy for jobs found through personal contacts has been replaced by its 
interactions with two dummies for tenure higher and lower than 6 months, respectively:
ln(wi|t) =  ir1[PERSONALifL O W .T E N i't] +
+7t2 [PERSONALijt • H IG H .T E N i>t] +
+Xi,tP +  £i +  Vi,t
(2.4)
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If individual i at time t has been in his/her current job for less than 6 months, LOW -TEN^t 
takes value 1 and H IG H JTEN^t is equal to 0, vice versa if individual i at time t has been 
in his/her current job for more than 6 months.
For these regressions the sample has been restricted to jobs created during the sample 
period only, to avoid stock-sampling bias that would affect all tenure effects. Hence, the 
figures reported in table 2.5 are to be interpreted as the average wage differentials in jobs 
with less and more than 6 months of tenure respectively10.
Apart from the anomalous case of Finland, in all other countries wage differences tend to 
disappear with tenure, thus suggesting that they must be due to some sort of mismatching 
rather than to compensating differentials. The model presented in the next section will 
elaborate on this assumption.
I conclude by briefly discussing the possibility that also fixed-effect estimates are biased 
by sample selection. Although all available observations have been included in the regressions 
described so far, it has already been mentioned that fixed-effect wage differences are identified 
by workers who, during the sample period, changed both job and search method (formal vs. 
informal) at least once. Let us call this group the ’’identifying sample” .
Summary statistics in table 2.B.1 indicate that the size of this sub sample of workers 
varies between 5% and 26% of the total. There are various potential reasons to think that 
the composition of the ’’identifying sample” differs from that of the total sample. For example, 
if one search channel systematically leads to well paid and stable jobs, then people who used 
that channel for their first job would be less likely to change employer and search method in 
the future.
In order to check whether this, or other sources of selection, affect the results discussed 
earlier, table 2.B.5 in appendix 2.B reports results from country-by-country probit regressions 
for the probability of being in the ’’identifying sample” (marginal effects shown in the table). 
The estimates somehow replicate some of the results of table 2.3, given that in order to be
10Detailed results axe in table 2.B.4 in appendix 2.B.
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in the identifying sample one must have found at least one job through personal contacts. 
However, there is no new systematic trend along the individual characteristics included in 
the set of controls, suggesting that, conditional on the observables, selection is to a large 
extent random.
2.4 A m odel w ith endogenous recruitment effort
The empirical results discussed in the previous section challenge a generalized belief in the 
literature that informal contacts contribute to improve the quality of job matches (although 
some working papers have already documented contrasting results for some countries. See 
Bentolila et al. (2003), Calvo et al. (2003)). Once comparable data for several countries axe 
available - as in the ECHP - a large cross-country variation in the premiums paid to jobs 
created through informal networks emerges.
This is a new empirical result that clearly points towards the role of some underlying 
country-specific or labour market-specific characteristics that somehow modify the impact of 
informal networks on individual wages. These considerations motivate the attempt conducted 
in this section to construct a simple theory that explains the existence of both negative and 
positive premiums to jobs found through personal contacts.
Previous papers (Montgomery (1991), Mortensen et al. (1994), Simon et al. (1992)) have 
suggested that personal contacts transmit information between job applicants and potential 
employers more effectively than other channels. However, as long as personal contacts are 
assumed to be a better channel for the delivery of information, no explanation for the observed 
wide variation in wage premiums can be provided, especially for those cases in which jobs 
found through informal networks pay lower wages.
The most intuitive way to relax this assumption is to endogenise the amount and quality 
of information delivered by informal contacts relative to other recruitment channels. In other 
words, what matters is not the informational content of references per se, but relative to how
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informative other recruitment strategies are.
Moreover, firms have typically little control over the amount of information they can 
obtain through informal contacts and they are likely to take the value of references as ex­
ogenous. On the other hand, firms do choose their recruitment strategies as far as formal 
channels are concerned: set up a human resource department, decide how long and tough 
the interviewing process should be, buy and administer aptitudinal tests, choose the inter­
viewers, etc. The more the firm invests in formal recruitment the more information about 
the worker’s unobserved characteristics can be extracted.
This is the approach taken in the simple model presented here, where the key ingredient 
is the firm’s endogenous choice of formal ’’recruitment effort” . As the informational content 
of references is assumed to be exogenous (although positive and potentially very relevant), 
it is the effort that the firm decides to put into formal screening that determines which one 
of the two channels (formal vs. informal) is more informative and, consequently, which wage 
is higher.
Specifically, the model shows that firms invest more in formal recruitment for filling 
high productivity jobs and jobs that involve substantial training. Consequently, positions 
with these characteristics are comparatively more likely to be filled with suitable candidates 
through formal channels than informal ones, the first being more productive. As long as 
wages vary with productivity, this mechanism generates variation in the average quality of 
matches created through different channels as well as in wages.
Let us now move on to the equations of the model, which is a simple modification of a 
standard matching model a la Pissarides (2000). All equations are written in discrete time. 
In order to focus attention on the choice of the recruitment strategy, neither the supply 
side of the labour market nor the process of wage negotiation will be modelled here: firms 
always offer wages equal to an exogenous fraction p  of expected or actual productivity and 
workers always accept the offer. Moreover, the analysis is conducted in partial equilibrium, 
i.e. holding the total number of jobs fixed: each firm only has one vacancy and no new firms
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can enter the market.
Productivity is match-specific and for each firm there exist two types of workers, suitable 
and unsuitable. The types are unknown to both the firm and the worker until production 
takes place. A job filled with a suitable worker produces x — p > 0, unsuitable workers 
produce x = 0. This assumption incorporates the idea that recruitment mistakes are more 
costly when filling a high than a low productivity job: hiring a bad cleaner is costly but not 
as disastrous as hiring a bad manager. In order to start operating a job and before knowing 
the worker’s type, a fraction k of productivity p must be spent on training.
Firms meet workers with per-period probability q. Conditional on having met a worker, 
he/she can arrive through the formal or the informal channel with probabilities S and (1—J)11.
Through each channel employers can meet either suitable or unsuitable candidates and, 
by undertaking recruitment activities, they can improve the probability of being matched 
to a suitable one. This is captured in the model by a ’’recruitment function” which
represents the probability of being matched with a suitable candidate (conditional on having 
met one through either of the two channels) and where R f represents formal recruitment 
effort and Ri is its analog for the informal channel.
In other words, in each period 5 events can occur for each unfilled vacancy:
_________________ Event______________________________ Probability_____________
1. the vacancy remains unfilled (1-q)
2. the vacancy is filled with a suitable 
candidate through the formal channel
3. the vacancy is filled with an unsuitable
candidate through the formal channel q8(l-£(Rf))
4. the vacancy is filled with a suitable
candidate through the informal channel q(l"$)C(Ri)
5. the vacancy is filled with an unsuitable /- r-w.. ^
candidate through the informal channel_______________ 41 A ___________
11 This is just a convenient solution to allow firms to hire through both channels simultaneously. Several 
alternative assumptions are possible about the meeting probabilities but none of the empirical implications 
depend crucially on these.
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In this framework, recruitment effort - R fj  - can be interpreted both as extensive and 
intensive recruitment, i.e. employers can improve the probability of finding a suitable worker 
by intensifying their searching activities (e.g. by advertising more and in better selected 
newspapers, by organising events at professional schools and/or colleges, etc.) and/or by 
intensifying their screening activities (e.g. more and more accurate interviews, aptitudinal 
tests, etc.). The £(•) function is a convenient modelling tool to capture the joint effect of 
both sets of activities. In chapter 3, the model will be extended to look at intensive and 
extensive recruitment separately.
Ri is to be interpreted as the informational value of personal contacts: filling a vacancy 
with a suitable candidate through the informal channel is as likely as through formal methods 
with effort equal to Ri. A crucial assumption of the model will be that Ri is exogenous to 
the firm, while R f  is chosen optimally to maximise the value of an unfilled vacancy.
The properties of £(•) are intuitive: in the absence of any screening - £(0) - the probability 
of meeting a suitable candidate is simply equal to the fraction of such workers in the pool of 
job applicants, as R fti —► oo, ((R/,i) —> 1. Hence, C(R/,i) is increasing and concave in R f}i. 
Additionally, the return to Rf^ should tend to zero when the number of suitable workers goes 
either to 1 or to zero: there is no advantage in screening candidates when they are all either 
suitable or unsuitable for the job12.
Firms optimally choose formal recruitment effort - R f  - by trading off the benefits of 
a higher probability of creating a good match with the linear costs of recruitment, cRf. 
Informal contacts provide some exogenous information - Ri - about candidates, which comes 
at no cost to the firm but cannot be adjusted optimally. It must be noted here that also 
applicants contacted via informal methods typically go through a screening process, but this 
is usually shorter and less intense13. For simplicity, the model makes the extreme assumption
12For example, an appropiate functional form for £(•) could be the following:
C(R) =  1 -  (1 -  n)e~nR 
where n is the fraction of suitable workers.
13This, as well as other assumptions made here about the behaviour of firms, have been tested using
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that candidates met through informal contacts do not go through any formal screening.
Given the above assumptions and a per-period discount rate r, the value of a vacancy to 
a representative firm is:
V = -cii/ + r ^ ; M ii/)[^ (p )-M + < 5(l-C (« /))[^ (0 )-M +  (2.5)
+(1 -  5)C(Ri) [Ji(p) -  kp] + (1 -  J)(l -  C(Ri)) [4(0) -  kp]} +
+ 1 ~ ^ V14-r
where and J / , i ( 0 )  are the value of a job filled with a suitable and unsuitable worker,
respectively14. A job filled with a suitable candidate produces x  =  p and is never destroyed. 
An initial wage - w j^ -  equal to expected productivity is paid in the first period and is later 
updated to a fraction of actual productivity for all the subsequent periods. A job filled with 
an unsuitable candidate produces x  =  0, the initial wage - w /j - must be paid for one period 
before the worker is dismissed and the vacancy re-opened. Given the above assumptions, 
J/,i(p) and Jf,i(0) can be written as:
Jf.iip) = P-u>f,i + { l - P ) *  (2.6)
j f , m  = (2-7)
where wf:i =  0 ( ( R fti)p.
Firms choose R f  in order to maximise equation (2.5) according to the following first order
establishment level data for the United Kingdom (Survey of Employers’ Recruitment Practices, 1992). This 
dataset is used more extensively in chapter 3.
14In this specification it is assumed that recruitment costs are paid ex-ante, i.e. before meeting workers. 
This is consistent with empirical evidence from firms’ data. However, the empirical implications of the model 
remain unchanged under the alternative assumption that recruitment costs are only paid if a worker is hired 
through the formal channel.
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condition:
o =  6C(Rf) cRt + - g kp + (1 — /?)(1 +  r  4- q)p1 +  r (2.8)
—c - (1  +  r  +  q) +  SC,{Rf) +  (1 — S)Ct{Ri)
The effects of the parameters on the optimal level of recruitment, Rf,  can be easily 
computed from equation (2.8). The following paragraphs give the intuition of the comparative 
statics, while the detailed proofs are shown in appendix 2.A.
The effect of productivity (p) is rather intuitive: for a highly productive job forgone 
earnings from keeping the vacancy open are higher and, additionally, if an unsuitable worker 
is hired, the firm incurs in a higher loss because of the higher wage. Both effects induce more 
investment in recruitment.
Higher training costs (k) also lead to higher Rf.  For the same level of productivity, higher 
training costs induce firms to invest more in recruitment in order not to have to train several 
workers before finding a suitable one.
R f  also increases with the meeting probability, q. This is analog to the ’’discouraged-job” 
effect described in Pissarides (2000)15: a higher probability of finding a worker increases the 
value of a vacancy and firms respond by recruiting more intensively.
For the same reason also a higher S, the parameter that describes the relative importance 
of the formal relative to the informal channel, has a positive effect on R f  .
Finally, investment in formal recruitment decreases with Ri, the informational value of 
personal contacts.
Turning now to wages, the model readily predicts that continuation wages are identical 
for all matches regardless of the recruitment channel used to create them. This conforms 
with the empirical evidence presented in the previous sections that wage differentials fade
15 Chapter 5, pag. 130.
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away with tenure (see table 2.5). Initial wages, however, differ and their ratio depends on the 
relative efficiency of formal vs. informal screening:
^  ®  (2.9)
w ,  C (Rf )
Clearly, the premium paid to jobs found through personal contacts decreases with pro­
ductivity, with training costs and with the formal meeting probability. It increases with the 
informational value of informal networks - Ri.
2.5 Testing the empirical predictions of the model
The model presented in the previous section contains two main empirically testable implica­
tions. The first is equation (2.8), which suggests that investment in recruitment is positively 
correlated with productivity (p), training costs (k) and the meeting rate (<?), and negatively 
correlated with the informational value of personal contacts (Ri). The second is equation 
(2.9), which implies that the wage premium to finding a job through personal contacts (*j&) 
is correlated negatively with investment in recruitment (Rf )  and positively with the infor­
mational value of personal contacts (Ri).
In this section each of these implications will be tested against the empirical evidence 
using industry-level data. Moreover, a reduced form of the model in which relative wages 
depend negatively on productivity and training, controlling for labour market conditions, 
will also be tested using both industry- and individual-level data.
As discussed in section 2.2.2, the 1992 and 1996 Eurostat Labour Costs Surveys contain 
information on both recruitment and training costs at the industry level, which can be used 
to construct empirical counterparts of R f  and k. Measures of productivity at the industry 
level are also readily available from Eurostat.
Unfortunately, Ri cannot be easily observed and additional identification assumptions are 
needed. In particular, personal contacts will be assumed to be equally informative within
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each country, so that Ri can be controlled for by country dummies. This restriction does not 
come at no cost, specifically it implies that I will be able to explain the variation in wage 
differentials between jobs found through different channels only across sectors and within 
countries.
The measurement of q also requires some discussion. Following the conventional view of 
the matching function, meeting probabilities for firms depend positively on the number of 
jobseekers and negatively on the number of unfilled vacancies. However, workers typically 
search for jobs across industries, hence a measure of labour supply (i.e. the unemployment 
rate) at the industry level is hard to define and construct. Variation in labour demand at 
the industry level (i.e. the number of vacancies) is therefore likely to capture a large fraction 
of the variation in meeting rates across industries.
An internationally comparable measure of labour demand can be constructed from the 
OECD Business Trend Survey, a quarterly survey of businesses’ expectations in the manufac­
turing sector in selected OECD countries. Among other things, employers are asked whether 
they are planning to increase/decrease or maintain constant their workforce in the following 
3 months.
The measure of labour demand that will be used here is computed as the annual average 
of the difference between the fraction of respondents who expect to increase and decrease 
their employment. I will call this variable ’’employment trend”. A positive number indicates 
that throughout the year firms have been posting new vacancies rather than closing down 
jobs. According to the definition of meeting probability, in markets where firms are posting 
more vacancies the probability of meeting a worker is lower. Although this is only an indirect 
and imperfect measure of labour demand, it is, to my knowledge, the only internationally 
comparable source of information about vacancies.
Test 1: th e  determ inan ts of recru itm ent effort. With these data, the effects of the 
level of productivity and training costs on recruitment effort can be identified by estimating 
the following regression at the industry level:
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Rc,s,t — &iPc,s,t +  OL2kCyS,t +  OisempC)Sit +  r]c 4- Vt +  £c,s,t (2.10)
where R c,s,t, Pc,s,t and are annual recruitment costs, annual output and annual train­
ing costs per employee in country c, sector s and year t (all in logs of current ECU), respec­
tively; empCyS)t is the measure of labour demand described above; rjc is a country dummy and 
i/t is a year dummy. ec^ t is the error term, clustered by country-industry cells.
Results are shown in table 2.6. Since employment trend is only available for the manufac­
turing sector, this variable is omitted in the first column, which shows the estimates for both 
the manufacturing and the service sectors. As predicted, firms spend more on recruitment 
in industries in which jobs are more productive and more training is provided. Column 2 
repeats the estimation for the manufacturing sector only and results are confirmed16.
Finally, column 3 includes employment trend as a regressor and, once again, the coeffi­
cients on productivity and training costs are positive and strongly significant17. Employment 
trend is also found to have a significant and negative effect suggesting that firms invest less 
in recruitment in tighter labour markets, the ’’discouraged-job” effect mentioned earlier on.
Test 2: wage differentials and  recru itm ent costs. Turning now to equation (2.9), 
the predicted negative correlation between the wage differential ( ^ )  and recruitment can 
be tested by running a fixed-effect wage regression similar to (2.2), pooling all countries 
together and introducing an interaction term between the dummy for jobs found through 
personal contacts and average recruitment costs in the corresponding industry in 1996, R s$&
=  7  [ P E R S O N A L i j  * -Rs,96] +  ttP E R S O N  A L i j  +  +  £$ -J- i /ij  (2 -11)
16The reason why in column 2 there are more observations than coumn 1 is because, while training and 
recruitment data come at a very detailed industry level (NACE rev.l), productivity at such a disaggregated 
level is only available for the manufacturing sector. If one wants to include the service sector too, many 
manufactory subindustries must be reaggregated at a higher level.
17The number of observations is now much smaller because, in the process of matching data from Eurostat 
(recruitment, training and productivity) with data from the OECD (business trend), some sectors are lost 
and others have to be reaggregated to a higher level.
Chapter 2. Do Friends and Relatives Really Help in Getting a Good Job? 94
Time-variation in the interaction term will only be generated by individuals observed in 
jobs found via different channels. Unfortunately, only 5 countries - Austria, Finland, France, 
Luxembourg and Portugal - provided data on recruitment in 1996.
Results axe shown in the first column of table 2.7 and, indeed, confirm the prediction 
of the model. In this specification, however, the coefficients on all the controls are 
constrained to be the same for all countries. The second column of table 2.7 reports results 
obtained from the same equation, when all the X i/s  axe interacted with a full set of country 
dummies to allow for country-specific coefficients. The estimates are virtually identical.
Test 3: th e  reduced form  m odel. Equations (2.8) and (2.9) can be combined into a 
reduced form model, in which relative wages depend negatively on productivity and training, 
controlling for labour market conditions and country (or individual) fixed-effects.
This model can be tested in two alternative ways. First, industry-level data on produc­
tivity, training and employment trend can be matched into the ECHP to check whether they 
are correlated with the wage differentials ( ^ ) .
This is done in the upper panel (panel A) of table 2.8. In the first two columns, the 
basic model refers to a regression similar to equation (2.11), where the interaction between 
P E R SO N  ALijt and R s,96 is replaced with interactions terms between P E R S O N A L ^  and 
productivity, training costs an employment trend. In the fully interacted model, all controls 
axe interacted with country dummies. Both specifications are estimated for the manufacturing 
and service sectors together, and for manufacturing only. In the latter case, the employment 
trend vaxiable can be included.
Results axe now less cleax. The coefficients axe always very small and never statistically 
significant. The point estimates seem to contradict the prediction of the model.
The lower panel (panel B) of table 2.8 presents an alternative test of the reduced form 
model. The ECHP contains information on occupational categories which can be used to test 
the effect of productivity: as long as jobs in higher level occupations axe more productive, 
one would expect the premium paid to jobs found through informal networks to be lower in
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higher occupations. Information on training is also available in the ECHP. Employed workers 
are asked to indicate whether they have received any training that they are finding useful 
in their current job. Unfortunately, it is not possible to know whether training has been 
provided by the current or a previous employer. The model predicts that, in these jobs, the 
premium to personal contacts should be lower. Note that individual fixed effects are likely 
to be a good control for the informational value of references (Ri), which can now vary at 
the individual level. A set of regional dummies is included to control for local labour market 
conditions.
Eventually, the reduced form model is tested by estimating the following fixed-effect wage 
regression:
ln(iyi>t) =  Y J j [Occup(j)jj * P E R SO N A Lijt\ +  (2.12)
j
+ J [trains * P E R SO N A L<|f] +  x'itfi +  e* +  v^t
where Occup(j)ijt is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i at time t is holding a job in the j th 
occupational group, train^t is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i indicates to have received 
training which is useful in carrying out the job he’s holding at time t and the other symbols 
have the usual meaning. Three standard broad occupational dummies are considered: high, 
intermediate and lower occupations. Estimates now confirm the predictions of the model.
Similarly to equation (2.11), also equation (2.12) can be improved by allowing all coeffi­
cients on the X i/s  to vary by country. This is done in the second column of table 2.8 (panel 
B), where, once again, the estimates suggest that the wage premium paid to jobs found 
through informal networks is lower in higher occupations. The coefficient on the training 
interaction has the expected sign but it is not significant.
A dditional im plications: the incidence o f jobs found through personal contacts
The model also predicts that, in each period, a fraction qS of jobs is created through the
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formal channel and 1 — C(^/) °f these are immediately destroyed. Similarly, the informal 
channel leads a fraction q(l — S) of vacancies to be filled in each period, 1 — C(Ri) of which are 
destroyed. This implies that, at the end of each period, the ratio of vacancies filled through 
the informal channel relative to the formal one is:
p  =  (1 -  S)
5 C ( * / )
Equation (2.13) suggests that the probability of observing a job filled though the formal 
channel is lower when firms invest more in formal recruitment. This is tested in table 2.9 
which reports results from the following probit regression on the pooled sample of individuals 
from all countries:
Pr (yi = 1) =  0  (7 Rs +  x'i/3) (2.14)
where yi is equal to 1 if individual i has found her current job through personal contacts 
and zero otherwise. As above, Rs is the log of average recruitment costs per employee in the 
industry s where individual i is observed. 0 (-) is the cumulative of the normal distribution. 
The estimation is run using data from the 1996 wave of the ECHP, which is the one that 
allows the widest country coverage, and excluding individuals with less than one year of 
tenure. The set of controls is the same as in table 2.3, except that here all countries have 
been pooled together.
The estimate of 7 is shown in the first column of table 2.9 and confirms the prediction 
that less jobs are found through personal contacts when firms invest more in recruitment 
activities. The second column of table 2.9 reports the results obtained from the same model 
when the coefficients of all the controls are allowed to vary by country. The point estimate 
is still negative but not significant.
Similarly to equation (2.9), the reduced form version of equation (2.13) can also be tested 
using either industry-level or individual-level regressors for productivity and training. The
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upper panel (panel A) of table 2.10 exploits the first option and contains estimates of probit 
regressions similar to (2.14) where R s is replaced by productivity, training and employment 
trend corresponding to the industry in which individual i is observed. Once again, the esti­
mation is performed with fixed (basic model) and country-specific (fully interacted model) 
coefficients for the controls as well as for manufacturing and industry together and for man­
ufacturing only.
Results are mixed: in the basic model (column 1 and 2) productivity appears to have the 
predicted negative and significant effect on wage differentials, while the effect of training is 
either non significant or of the wrong sign. These findings are reversed in the fully interacted 
model (column 3 and 4) where productivity shows a positive effect (either significant or not) 
and the coefficient of training has the expected negative sign (significant in one specification).
Alternatively, a test of the reduced form of equation (2.13) using individual level data 
is shown in the lower panel (panel B) of table 2.10. This is done by running the following 
probit regression:
P r(yi = 1) =  © ^  0jOccup(j)i +  STRAINi  +  rrJ/3  ^ (2.15)
where the symbols have the same meaning as in equation (2.12). Regional dummies axe also 
added to the set of controls. Results are now clearly supporting the predictions of the model: 
there are less jobs created through the informal channel in high occupations as well as in 
positions that require more training.
2.6 Conclusions
How does this chapter answer the question of the title? Do friends and relatives really help 
in getting a good job? It depends.
The first part of the chapter documents that, contrary to the common belief, informal 
search channels not always lead to significantly better paid jobs. Across countries and in­
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dustries wage premiums and wage penalties to finding a job through personal contacts axe 
equally frequent. Workers’ and jobs’ observable characteristics are controlled for in com­
puting these wage differentials and individual fixed-effect are also introduced to account for 
the fact that both access to informal networks and the quality of information transmitted 
via personal contacts might be individual specific. Moreover, the fact that wage differentials 
between jobs found through formal vs. informal channels disappear with tenure suggests that 
they probably originate from some kind of mismatch.
The chapter then moves on to presenting a simple model in which firms invest optimally 
in formal recruitment to improve the probability of being matched to a suitable worker. In 
this model, even if informal networks also provide useful information about applicants and 
help forming good matches, jobs created trough formal methods can on average be of better 
quality, if investment in formal recruitment is large enough. This happens more likely when 
employers axe filling high productivity jobs, because the cost of hiring an unsuitable worker 
is higher, both in terms of forgone profits and higher wages paid out. Firms also invest more 
in recruitment when training costs are high, because a new worker will have to be trained 
again if the hire turns out to be unfit for the job.
In the last part of the chapter, industry level data for several European countries axe 
used to show that, indeed, firms spend more on recruitment when both productivity and 
training costs are higher. An interesting ’’discouraged-job” effect is also found: expenditure 
on recruitment activities is lower in tighter labour markets. Finally, the wage premium to 
finding a job through personal contacts is shown to be negatively correlated with expenditure 
in recruitment activities and, consequently, also lower in high productivity occupations and 
in jobs that require training.
Analysing the role of informal networks in the labour market is interesting in itself, given 
the extensive use that both firms and workers make of them. It also allows to shed light on 
some sources of wage dispersion that have not yet been fully explored. Moreover, this chapter 
takes the rather unconventional approach to look at variation in formal recruitment practices
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as a source of wage differentials between jobs found through different search channels. In 
doing this it touches a field that has received surprisingly little attention by economists: while 
the search behaviour of jobseekers has been extensively studied, very little is known about 
how firms look for workers. This chapter is an example of how a deeper understanding of 
firms’ recruitment policies can help answering questions that axe still unresolved.
This work could be extended in several directions. As workers are supposed to react to 
firms recruitment policies, the supply side of the labour market should also be modelled. 
Intuitively, if workers are unaware of their type, i.e. they don’t know ex-ante if they are 
properly qualified for the job, the main results shown here should not change. However, 
if workers have some information about their type, some form of self selection could arise, 
with workers being more likely to apply to vacancies that better fit their characteristics 
when the screening process is stricter. In such framework, the firms’ benefits of investing in 
recruitment should increase: not only does a stricter recruitment policy allow them to select 
good candidates (just like in the model presented here), but it also induces more self selection 
of workers in the first place, thus increasing the average quality of the pool of candidates.
More research is also needed to understand how employers choose their recruitment strate­
gies and how these affect overall labour market performance. To do this more and better 
firm level data are necessary. The next chapter uses an original dataset of filled vacancies in 
more than 5,000 British establishments and looks at the determinants and the implications 
of both the intensity and the types of recruitment practices used by employers.
BIBLIOG RAPHY
1. Barron J. M., Bishop J., Dunkelberg C. (1985), ’’Employer Search: the Interviewing 
and Hiring of New Employees”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(1), 43-52.
2. Barron J. M., Berger M. C., Black D. A. (1997), ’’Employer Search, Training and 
Vacancy Duration” , Economic Inquiry, 35, 167-192.
Chapter 2. Do Friends and Relatives Really Help in Getting a Good Job? 100
3. Bentolila S., Michelacci C., Suarez J. (2003), ’’Social Networks and Occupational 
Choice” , CEMFI, mimeo.
4. Breaugh J. A., Mann R. B. (1984), ’’Recruiting Source Effects: a Test of Two Alterna­
tive Explanations”, Journal of Occupational Psychology, 57, 261-267.
5. Bull C., Ornati O., Tedeschi P. (1987), ’’Search, Hiring Strategies, and Labor Market 
Intermediaries” , Journal of Labor Economics, 5(4), S1-S17.
6. Cahuc P., Fontaine F. (2002), ”On the Efficiency of Job-Search with Social Networks” . 
CEPR Discussion Paper n. 3511.
7. Calvo-Armengol A., Zenou Y. (2001), ’’Job Matching, Social Networks and Word-of- 
Mouth Communication”, CEPR Discussion Paper Series 2797.
8. Calvo-Armengol A. (2002), ’’Job Contact Networks”, Journal of Economic Theory, 
forthcoming.
9. Calvo-Armengol A., Jackson M. O. (2002), ’’The Effect of Social Networks on Employ­
ment and Inequality” , American Economic Review, forthcoming.
10. Corcoran M., Datcher L., Duncan G. (1980), “Information and Influence Networks in 
Labor Markets” , in Five Thousand American Families - Patterns of Economic Progress, 
8, edited by G. Duncan and J.N. Morgan. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Social 
Research.
11. Fernandez R. M., Castilla E. J., Moore P. (2000), ’’Social Capital at Work: Networks 
and Employment at a Phone Center”, American Journal of Sociology, 105, 1288-1356.
12. Gautier P. A. (2002), ”Non-sequential Search, Screening Externalities and the Public 
Good Role of Recruitment Offices”, Economic Modelling, 179-196.
Chapter 2. Do Friends and Relatives Really Help in Getting a Good Job? 101
13. Gorter C., Nijkamp R, Rietveld R (1996), ’’Employers’ Recruitment Behavior and 
Vacancy Duration: an Empirical Analysis for the Dutch Labour Market”, Applied 
Economics, 28, 1463-1474.
14. Gorter C., Russo G., Shettkat R. (2001), ’’Searching, Hiring and Labour Market Con­
ditions”, Labour Economics, 553-571.
15. Gorter C., Van Ommeren J. (1999), ’’Sequencing, Timing and Filling Rates of Recruit­
ment Channels” , Applied Economics, 31, 1149-1160.
16. Granovetter M. (1974), ’’Getting A Job”, University of Chicago Press.
17. Holzer J. (1987a), ’’Hiring Procedures in the Firm: Their Economic Determinants and 
Outcomes” , NBER Working Paper n. 2185.
18. Holzer H. (1987b), ’’Informal Job Search and Back Youth Unemployment”, American 
Economics Review, 77, 446-452.
19. Holzer H. (1988), ’’Search Method Use of Unemployed Youth” Journal of Labor Eco­
nomics, 6 ,1-20.
20. Kugler A. (2003), ’’Employee Referrals and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure”, Uni- 
versitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics, Working Paper 252.
21. Kugler A. (2003), ’’Employee Referrals and Efficiency Wages”, Labour Economics, 
10(5), 531-556.
22. Lindeboom M., Van Ours J., Renes G. (1994), ’’Matching Employers and Workers: an 
Empirical Analysis on the Effectiveness of Search”, Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 45-67.
23. Manning A. (2000), ’’Pretty vacant: recruitment in Low-Wage Labour Markets”, Ox­
ford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 62, 747-770.
Chapter 2. Do Friends and Relatives Really Help in Getting a Good Job? 102
24. Margolis D. N., Simonnet V. (2003), ’’Educational Track, Networks and Labour Market 
Outcomes” , IZA Discussion Paper n.699.
25. Marmaros D., Sacerdote B. (2002), ’’Peer and Social Networks in Job Search”, Euro­
pean Economic Review, 46, 870-879.
26. Montgomery, J. (1991), ’’Social Networks and Labor Market Outcomes” , American 
Economic Review, 81, 1408-1418.
27. Mortensen D., Vishwanath T. (1994), ’’Personal Contacts and Earnings. It is who you 
know!” , Labour Economics, 1, 187-201.
28. Mouw T. (2002), ’’Social Capital and Job Search: Do Contacts Matter?”, University 
of North Carolina, mimeo.
29. Osberg L. (1993), ’’Fishing in different pools: Job-Search Strategies and Job-Finding 
Success in Canada in Early 1980s”, Journal of Labor Economics, 11, 348-386.
30. Peracchi F. (2002), ’’The European Community Household Panel: A review”, Empirical 
Economics, 27, 63-90.
31. Petersen T., Saporta I., Seidel M. L. (2000), ’’Offering a Job: Meritocracy and Social 
Networks” , American Journal of Sociology, vol 106(3), 763-816.
32. Pissarides C. (2000), ’’Equilibrium Unemployment Theory”, MIT Press.
33. Pistaferri L. (1999), ’’Informal Networks in the Italian Labor Market”, Giornale degli 
Economisti e Annali di Economia, 58(3-4), 355-375.
34. Rees, A. (1966), ’’Information Networks in Labor Markets”, American Economics Re­
view, 56, 559-566.
35. Roper S. (1988), ’’Recruitment Methods and Vacancy Duration”, Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, 35(1), 51-64.
Chapter 2. Do Friends and Relatives Really Help in Getting a Good Job? 103
36. Saloner G. (1985), ’’Old Boy Networks as Screening Mechanisms” , Journal of Labor 
Economics, 3, 255-267.
37. Simon J.C., Warner T. (1992), ’’Matchmaker, Matchmaker: the Effect of Old Boy 
Networks on Job Match Quality, Earnings and Tenure”, Journal of Labor Economics, 
10, 306-330.
38. Staiger D. (1990), ’’The Effect of Connections on the Wages and Mobility of Young 
Workers” , PhD Thesis, Department of Economics, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
39. Wahba J., Zenou Y. (2002), ’’Does Density Affect Social Networks? Theory and Ap­
plication to Egypt”, University of Southampton, Economics Department.
Figures and Tables
* ~ - 
Austria
personal 
contacts
direct j S S B S  
application  Lis
adverts 9.9 
agency f l |  6.4 
other H  4.8
tAvyvAO uuv/vi. k s j  vva  »? x /a a x v a u  w
Belgium Denmark Finland
l
France
127.1 personal L _ _ |  25.9 personal ^  ? personal ^ personal T*"—tv*",':.contacts contacts contacts contacts 34.4
51.9 directapplication
a d v e r t s
■ !
36.9 directapplication
adverts
33.6
31.3
agency H  5.7
d i l  ei !
application
adverts
other
direct 
application IHI
adverts 9.6 
agency | H | j  10.6 
o th e r  18.1
27.4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Germany
personal ■ 
contacts I
direct |  
application |
Greece
32.2
11.5
adverls ■  H
agency 10.2
other 28.4
personal
co n ta c ts
direct
application
adverts 7.11
agency I  1.6
!.1' * m i :
41.0
36.0
Ireland
personal 
contacts I
direct 
application I
Italy
26.4
39.7
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Netherlands
personal
contacts
direct
application
adverts
17.3
17.4
adverts U | J |  17.9 
agency 10.6
other |  5.4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Portugal Spain
45.038.5
personal
contacts
direct
application
a d v e rts  ■  5.1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Luxembourg
^ r a n 37.2personal j contacts !
37.1 directapplication
adverts
31.1
21.4
other
agency 7.9
other I  2.4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
29.6
a c n e y  Is. l l
n in  on on Af\ so an
personal
ro il ta c ts
direct
application
■H '
agency  ■  3.1
40.8
personal
contacts
direct
application 1I ' . H  30.1
adverts j^ 5 . 9
agency |
other 1 ■  12.7
United Kingdom
personal
25.8
n in  on on Af\ cn  cn n  i n  o n  o n  /in
< 1 ii • •( t
application
adverts
o th e r  ■  :*.G
United States
personal 
contacts
31.7 direct [—— — :---- — . -application I
adverts 22.5
agency j^ jj 8.0
other ■  5.1
.
49.6
1UO
1 0 6
Figure 2.2: Wage differentials between jobs found through informal vs. formal methods
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Figure 2.3: Wage premiums to jobs found through personal contacts by sectors
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Only the effects that are significant at the 10% level are shown in this graph. 
Industry classification in table A6, appendix II.
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Table 2.1: Sample composition by country and year
A: European Community Household Panel
Country sample size 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
_____________________ (#  o f individuals)_______________________________________________________________
Austria 2364 • ■ . ■::; ; : : :
Belgium 1555
Denmark 2387
•  •  ■ • a  m.m, rn.rn.rn. m m m  mm mfL m m mm m mm m mm m f. mm m m m mm m m m m ^  » m m m m m m.. m m m m m m m mm mm m mm
! ! ! ! !
Finland 1913 ; l______ ■______ ;______ •______
---------------------------------
France 2658 M
Germany 3573 :
Greece 2364
Ireland 2627 H  :
Italy 3240 f e r r u j p ;
Luxembourg 596
Netherlands 3715 S j S i u  i i ! i .. i
Portugal 3785
Spain 4277
United Kingdom 2223
United States 1574 1  (2) |  ^  (2) .■§ ‘f ;  (2) g (2)
data available data unavailable
(1) German Socio-Economic Panel
(2) National Longitudinal Survey of Youths (NLSY79)____________________________________________
B: Eurostat Labour Costs Survey
Country 19961992
Austria
Belgium
Germany
Denmark
Finland
France
Greece
Luxembourg
Portugal
United Kingdom
data unavailabledata available
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Table 2.2. Recruitment costs in European countries
Country Sector
% of total annual labour 
costs
1992 1996
spending per employee in 
current ECU
1992 1996
Austria industry - 0.50 - 204.45
services - 1.05 - 471.66
Belgium industry 0.07 - 22.60 -
services 0.24 - 78.85 -
Germany industry - 0.06 - 24.99
services - 0.13 - 45.66
Denmark industry 0.08 - 24.83 -
services 0.11 - 32.39 -
Finland industry - 0.11 - 35.72
services - 0.17 - 48.88
France industry 0.09 0.05 27.52 18.20
services 0.14 0.06 42.62 20.36
Greece industry 0.01 - 1.32 -
services 0.01 - 1.27 -
Luxembourg industry 0.02 0.04 5.74 13.25
services 0.07 0.21 22.85 77.93
Portugal industry 0.03 0.02 2.96 2.14
services 0.06 0.08 8.24 11.19
United Kingdom industry 0.30 - 74.81 -
services 0.42 - 81.62 -
Note: only establishments with 10 employees or more were included in the Eurostat Labour Costs Surveys
Source: Eurostat
I l l /
Table 2.3: Probit estimates for jobs found through personal contacts
AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER(I) GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP UK® USA®
Mean of dependent 
variable 0.268 0.264 0.174 0.135 0.345 0.323 0.417 0.275 0.253 0.385 0.180 0.387 0.454 0.226
Individual and household characteristics
0.130
l=female -0.030 -0.004 -0.031 -0.015 -0.002 -0.001 0.042 -0.034 -0.013 -0.133** -0.007 0.005 -0.044* -0.010 -0.018
(0.024) (0.030) (0.020) (0.018) (0.024) (0.022) (0.028) (0.026) (0.018) (0.054) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
Age 0.012 0.009 -0.008 -0.011 -0.003 -0.007 0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.051** 0.010 0.001 -0.014* 0.008 -0.148
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.021) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.154)
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
#  adults in the HH 0.000 -0.004 -0.016 0.002 -0.008 0.009 -0.000 0.010 -0.011 0.018 -0.010 0.013 -0.001 0.014 -0.009
(0.010) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.033) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.007)
HH income (log) 0.004 -0.016 -0.031 -0.024 0.029 -0.051** 0.027 -0.047 0.008 -0.133** -0.002 0.037* -0.000 0.008 0.009
(0.025) (0.034) (0.028) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.018) (0.064) (0.015) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026) (0.013)
l=tertiary edu. -0.035 -0.075* -0.016 -0.026 -0.150*** -0.025 -0.063 -0.030 -0.121*** -0.207*** -0.035 -0.126** -0.103*** -0.108***
(0.047) (0.041) (0.030) (0.028) (0.032) (0.035) (0.043) (0.039) (0.029) (0.063) (0.025) (0.053) (0.030) (0.030) -0.006
l=second. edu. -0.021 -0.038 0.012 -0.020 -0.065*** -0.056** 0.033 -0.009 -0.035* -0.079 -0.028 -0.067** -0.040 -0.071*** (0.006)
(0.028) (0.035) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.035) (0.027) (0.020) (0.055) (0.019) (0.030) (0.027) (0.024)
Job’s characteristics
1=temporary -0.044 0.023 0.014 0.000 -0.030 0.023 0.038 0.066* -0.047* -0.100 -0.067** 0.004 -0.054*** -0.089 -0.019
(0.034) (0.036) (0.027) (0.022) (0.033) (0.029) (0.045) (0.035) (0.025) (0.115) (0.033) (0.028) (0.020) (0.057) (0.084)
1= part time 0.084** 0.048 0.087** 0.001 0.005 0.040 0.018 0.001 0.070* 0.028 -0.004 0.005 0.114*** 0.093*** -0.006
(0.038) (0.043) (0.041) (0.034) (0.038) (0.039) (0.062) (0.035) (0.036) (0.079) (0.022) (0.062) (0.041) (0.035) (0.036)
l=first job -0.066** 0.042 -0.018 -0.040 -0.061 0.010 0.008 -0.099*** 0.034* 0.008 -0.010 0.032 0.003 0.008 -
(0.027) (0.033) (0.034) (0.024) (0.049) (0.038) (0.030) (0.028) (0.019) (0.062) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.041)
1= public sector -0.063** 0.030 -0.095*** -0.045** -0.136*** -0.102*** -0.314*** -0.214*** -0.155*** -0.350*** -0.065** -0.152*** -0.313*** -0.047 0.065
(0.025) (0.049) (0.026) (0.018) (0.030) (0.032) (0.047) (0.034) (0.031) (0.096) (0.026) (0.033) (0.032) (0.046) (0.047)
Occupation
1= higher, occup. -0.067** -0.138*** -0.036 -0.016 -0.067** -0.143*** -0.149*** -0.072** -0.040 -0.058 -0.120*** -0.059 -0.073** -0.097*** -0.050*
(0.029) (0.040) (0.027) (0.025) (0.032) (0.025) (0.043) (0.036) (0.029) (0.075) (0.022) (0.043) (0.034) (0.030) (0.029)
1= interm, occup. -0.047* -0.030 -0.036 0.014 -0.052* -0.151*** -0.072* 0.009 -0.004 0.016 -0.078*** 0.061** -0.017 -0.087*** -0.002
(0.028) (0.037) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.023) (0.037) (0.033) (0.023) (0.064) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031)
Firm’s size®
l=small 0.014 0.095** -0.045** 0.082*** 0.143*** 0.080** 0.032 0.079** 0.123*** 0.069 0.041* 0.008 0.116*** 0.057* 0.009
(0.026) (0.039) (0.022) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.062) (0.034) (0.026) (0.065) (0.022) (0.031) (0.028) (0.034) (0.027)
l=medium 0.015 0.077* -0.034 0.074*** 0.050 0.033 0.052 0.056 0.050* 0.013 0.021 -0.027 0.054* 0.007 0.028
(0.027) (0.040) (0.022) (0.026) (0.034) (0.029) (0.069) (0.034) (0.029) (0.064) (0.021) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029)
Industries
1= manufacturing -0.198** 0.150 0.052 0.192** -0.121 - -0.020 0.038 0.141*** -0.195 -0.155*** -0.029 -0.057 0.012 -0.136***
(0.077) (0.163) (0.069) (0.098) (0.084) (0.117) (0.081) (0.054) (0.153) (0.034) (0.044) (0.051) (0.118) (0.041)
l=services -0.220** 0.176 0.057 0.130*** -0.070 - 0.044 0.053 0.137*** -0.249 -0.173*** -0.017 -0.035 -0.011 -0.256**
(0.092) (0.123) (0.058) (0.049) (0.091) (0.115) (0.076) (0.047) (0.176) (0.063) (0.043) (0.051) (0.118) (0.102)
Observations 1959 1201 1837 1710 2181 2587 1625 1580 2610 529 2618 2611 2746 1593 907
(1) Industry dummies not available for confidentiality reasons
(2) Size of organisation rather than local unit. Different classification: small= less than 20 employees; medium= bet ween 20 and 2000 employees; large (reference group)=more than 2000 employees.
(3) Education measured in years of schooling; household size instead of number of adults; non-standard contract instead of temporary contracts.
(4) Occupational group: higher =  legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals; intermediate =  clerks, service workers and shop and market sales workers, skilled agriculture and 
fishery workers; lower (reference group) =  craft and related trades workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers, other elementary occupations.
(5) Firms’ size: small=less than 20 employees; medium=between 20 and 100 employees; large (reference group)=more than 100 employees.
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: ECHP 1994-1999 for European countries. NLSY 1996-2000 for the USA.__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 2.4: The wage premium to finding a job through personal contacts.
Dependent variable = 
log hourly wage_____
AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER(1) GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP UK USA
PANEL A: OLS REGRESSIONS
Sample size 8943 6042 8877 4437 11096 14632 9441 9631 13508 1687 15610 15817 16138 5889 3507
Without job characteristics
l=personal 0.007 -0.024* 
contacts (0.014) (0.014)
0.012
(0.012)
-0.007
(0.016)
-0.015
(0.013)
-0.092***
(0.014)
-0.086***
(0.011)
-0.067***
(0.014)
-0.060***
(0.010)
-0.115***
(0.029)
-0.051***
(0.012)
-0.040***
(0.010)
-0.079***
(0.010)
-0.070***
(0.016)
-0.021
(0.025)
With job characteristics^
Impersonal 0.017 -0.007 
contacts (0.012) (0.012)
-0.005
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.014)
0.007
(0.011)
-0.051***
(0.013)
-0.028***
(0.010)
-0.014
(0.012)
-0.018**
(0.009)
-0.032
(0.022)
-0.020*
(0.010)
-0.018**
(0.008)
-0.010
(0.008)
-0.027*
(0.014)
-0.007
(0.023)
PANEL B: FIXED-EFFECT REGRESSIONS
Sample size 8943 6042 
Individuals 2364 1555
8877
2387
4437
1913
11096
2658
14632
3573
9441
2364
9631
2627
13508
3240
1687
596
15610
3715
15817
3785
16138
4277
5889
2223
3507
1574
Without job characteristics
l=personal 0.042*** 0.060*** 
contacts (0.014) (0.016)
0.005
(0.012)
-0.025
(0.024)
-0.013
(0.022)
0.006
(0.010)
-0.022*
(0.011)
-0.008
(0.011)
-0.022**
(0.011)
-0.033
(0.024)
0.029**
(0.014)
-0.013*
(0.008)
0.002
(0.008)
-0.035*
(0.020)
0.022
(0.022)
With job characteristics*2)
l=personal 0.025* 0.054*** 
contacts (0.013) (0.016)
-0.015
(0.012)
-0.038
(0.024)
-0.011
(0.022)
-0.006
(0.010)
-0.017
(0.011)
-0.000
(0.011)
-0.027***
(0.011)
-0.029
(0.026)
0.030**
(0.014)
-0.014*
(0.008)
0.001
(0.008)
-0.041**
(0.021)
0.019
(0.022)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(1) Industry dummies not available for confidentially reasons
(2) Occupational (22) and industry (18) dummies, contract types (permanent vs. temporary 
The set of controls includes: experience and experience squared, tenure and tenure squared, 
dummies (tertiary and secondary).
Source: ECHP 1994-1999 for all European countries. NLSY 1996-2000 for the USA.
, full-time vs. part-time), public sector, 7 dummies for firm’s size.
a dummy for first job, a dummy for job-to-job movers. OLS regressions also have a gender dummy and education
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Table 2.5: The tenure profile of the premium to finding a job through personal contacts
Dependent variable
= log hourly wage AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER(1) GRC IRL ITA LUX NLP PRT ESP UK USA
FDCED-EFFECT REGRESSIONS
Sample size 1758 689 1935 916 1352 2186 1488 3002 1901 271 2810 3961 6010 888 542
Individuals 754 288 803 414 612 960 651 1204 828 129 1135 1579 2317 423 255
coefficients on the interaction of the dummy for “jobs found through personal contacts” and the following tenure dummies:
Without job characteristics
tenure<=6 months 0.062* 0.085* 0.060** -0.010 -0.008 -0.013 -0.037 -0.002 -0.054** -0.098** 0.011 -0.003 -0.006 -0.059 -0.046
(0.032) (0.051) (0.026) (0.056) (0.050) (0.029) (0.030) (0.020) (0.026) (0.048) (0.035) (0.016) (0.014) (0.039) (0.107)
tenure>6 months 0.022 0.045 0.027 -0.112** -0.003 0.030 -0.020 -0.020 -0.037 0.016 0.012 0.007 0.004 -0.037 -0.039
(0.028) (0.049) (0.027) (0.057) (0.051) (0.029) (0.028) (0.020) (0.027) (0.049) (0.033) (0.015) (0.015) (0.040) (0.080)
With job characteristics^
tenure<=6 months 0.048 0.069 0.029 -0.012 0.012 -0.037 -0.033 0.015 -0.060** -0.068 0.016 -0.011 -0.004 -0.054 -0.020
(0.032) (0.052) (0.025) (0.058) (0.052) (0.028) (0.030) (0.019) (0.026) (0.051) (0.035) (0.016) (0.013) (0.042) (0.109)
tenure>6 months 0.005 0.007 0.001 -0.111* 0.023 0.012 -0.018 -0.020 -0.033 0.019 0.022 0.015 0.007 -0.027 -0.020
(0.027) (0.051) (0.026) (0.058) (0.053) (0.028) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.053) (0.033) (0.014) (0.014) (0.042) (0.082)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(1) Industry dummies not available for confidentially reasons
(2) occupational and industry dummies, contract types, public sector
The set of controls includes: experience and experience squared, a dummy for first job, a dummy for job-to-job movers, 2 dummies for tenure<=6months and for tenure>6 months. 
Source: ECHP 1994-1999 for all European countries. NLSY 1996-2000 for the USA.___________ _________________________________________________________________________

Table 2.6: The determinants of recruitment costs
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Dependent variable: 
(log) recruitment costs 
per employee
industry and services 
[1]
manufacturing only 
[2]
manufacturing only
[3] predicted
sign
(log) productivity^ 0.432***
(0.099)
0.365**
(0.173)
0.371**
(0.165)
(+)
(log) training costs per 0.482*** 0.372*** 0.629***
(+)
(-)
employee
employment trend(2)
(0 .112) (0.061) (0.143)
-0.015**
(0.007)
Country dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 175 474 114
R-squared 0.81 0.41 0.88
(1) productivity is measured as output per employee (in ECU at current prices) -  annual values. Source: Eurostat.
(2) difference between % of firms expecting to increase and decrease employment in the following 3 months. Annual averages. 
See text for details. Source: OECD.
Countries included: Austria, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, United Kingdom 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%______________________________________________
Table 2.7: Wage differentials and recruitment costs
Dependent variable: 
(log) hourly wage
Basic model1) 
[11
Fully interacted modef2) 
[2]
predicted
sign
...interaction with [l=personal contacts]
(log) recruitment costs per employee -0.009* -0.008* (-)
(0.005) (0.005)
Observations 19474 19474
Individuals 5477 5477
R-squared 0.20 0.21
(1) Estimates come from fixed-effect (log) wage regressions on all individuals in all countries. The reported coefficients are the 
estimates for the interaction terms between the dummy for jobs found through personal contacts and average recruitment costs 
observed in the industry in which the single individual is currently working (in 1996). The set of controls includes experience 
and experience squared, tenure and tenure squared, a dummy for job-to-job movers, a dummy for first job, 18 industry 
dummies, year dummies and individual fixed effects. Wages are PPP-adjusted.
(2) As in model [1] with all controls interacted with country dummies.
Countries included: Austria, Finland, France, Luxembourg and Portugal 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%________________________________________________________
rable 2.8: Reduced form model for the wage differentials 
’anel A: industry-level regressors
Basic modeP* 
[1]
Fully interacted modeP^ 
[2]
dependent variable: industry and manufacturing industry and manufacturing predictei
log) hourly wage services only services only sign
..interactions with [l=personal contacts]
log) productivity^ 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.010 (-)
(0.009) (0 .020) (0.009) (0.020)
log) training costs per -0.001 0.009 0.002 0.002 ( \
mployee (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008)
mployment trend^ 0.014 0.011
(0.017) (0.016) (+)
)bservations 55941 13824 55941 13824
ndividuals 15169 3885 15169 3885
l-squared 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.26
1) Estimates come from fixed-effect (log) wage regressions on all individuals in all countries. The reported coefficients are the 
stimates for the interaction terms between the dummy for jobs found through personal contacts and the variable of interest 
productivity, training costs, business trend in 1996) associated to the industry in which each individual is currently working. The 
3t of controls includes experience and experience squared, tenure and tenure squared, a dummy for job-to-job movers, a dummy 
)r first job, a dummy for part-time jobs, a dummy for jobs in the public sector, 22 occupational dummies, 18 industry dummies, 
ear dummies and a constant. Wages are PPP-adjusted.
2) As in model [1] with all controls interacted with country dummies
3) productivity is measured as output per employee (in ECU at current prices) -  annual values. Source: Eurostat.
1) difference between % of firms expecting to increase and decrease employment in the following 3 months. Annual averages. See 
jxt for details. Source: OECD.
Countries included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain._________________
’anel B: individual-level regressors
Basic model(1) 
[1]
Fully interacted model^ 
[2]
predicted
sign
.interactions with [l=personal contacts]
igher occupations -0.023*** -0.022*** (-)
(0.008) (0.008)
itermediate occupations -0.010 -0.003 (-)
(0.006) (0.006)
raining -0.012*** -0.004 (-)
(0.004) (0.004)
)bservations 117147 117147
lumber of id 30511 30511
l-squared 0.19 0.21
1) The set of controls includes experience and experience squared, tenure and tenure squared, a dummy for job-to-job movers, a 
nmmy for first job, a dummy for part-time jobs, a dummy for jobs in the public sector, 22 occupational dummies, 18 industry 
ummies (9 in model [2]), regional and year dummies and individual fixed-effects. Wages are PPP-adjusted.
2) As in model [1] with all controls interacted with country dummies.
)ccupational groups
higher =  legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals, 
intermediate =  clerks, service workers and shop and market sales workers, skilled agriculture and fishery workers.
>wer (reference group) =  craft and related trades workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers, other elementary 
ccupations.
tandard errors in parentheses
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
11 countries included.
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Table 2.9: Incidence of jobs found through informal networks and recruitment costs
Dependent variable
=1 i f  Job found through personal contacts 
(0 otherwise)
basic model fully interacted 
model(1)
predicted
sign
(log) recruitment costs per employee -0.032*** -0.002 (-)
(0 .012) (0.055)
Country dummies yes yes
Observations 3734 3695
Log Likelihood -2264.86 -2181.55
(1) In the fully interacted model all controls are interacted with country dummies.
Both specifications include a set of controls with the following variables: a gender dummy, age, age squared, #  of 
adults in the household, (log) household income, a dummy for first job, a dummy for temporary jobs, a dummy for 
part-time jobs, a dummy for public sector jobs, 22 occupational dummies and 18 industry dummies.
Robust standard errors (clustered by country and industry) in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Countries included: Austria, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Portugal.________________________________________
Pable 2.10: Reduced form for the incidence of jobs found through personal contacts
*anel A: industry-level regressors
dependent variable
-1 i f  job found through 
)ersonal contacts 
0 otherwise)
Basic model
industry and manufacturing 
services only
Fully interacted m odef ^
industry and manufacturing 
services only
predict*
sign
log) productivity(2) -0.048*** -0.042** 0.037 1.086*** ( \
(0.018) (0.019) (0.029) (0.112)
log) training costs per 0.035*** 0.017 -0.013 -0.327* ( \
mployee (0.012) (0.024) (0.061) (0.188)
mployment trend(3) -0.001 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes
)bservations 9605 2611 9537 2521
;0g Likelihood -5879.53 -1534.18 -5661.29 -1384.68
Countries included all EU A-B-D all EU A-B-D-FI-GR-I-L-
-FI-GR-I-L-P-ES P-ES
1) In the fully interacted model all controls are interacted with country dummies.
2) productivity is measured as output per employee (in ECU at current prices) -  annual values. Source: Eurostat.
3) difference between % of firms expecting to increase and decrease employment in the following 3 months. Annual averages. See 
sxt for details. Source: OECD.
’he set of controls includes: a gender dummy, age, age squared, #  of adults in the household, (log) household income, a dummy f< 
rst job, a dummy for temporary jobs, a dummy for part-time jobs, a dummy for public sector jobs, 22 occupational dummies, 18 
idustry dummies and regional dummies, 
i lountry abbreviations:
>.=Austria; B=Belgium; D=Germany; FI=Finland; GR=Greece; I=Italy; L=Luxembourg; P=Portugal; ES=Spain
’anel B: individual-level regressors
Basic model Fully interacted m odef^ predictt
sign
=higher occupations -0.053*** -0.052*** (-)
(0.016) (0.015)
^intermediate occupations -0.021 -0.022 (-)
(0 .020) (0.019)
^received training -0.060*** -0.082*** (-)
(0.009) (0.025)
)bservations 19385 19373
iOg Likelihood -10909.20 -10619.81
l) In the fully interacted model all controls are interacted with country dummies.
'he set of controls includes: a gender dummy, age, age squared, #  of adults in the household, (log) household income, a dummy f< 
rst job, a dummy for temporary jobs, a dummy for part-time jobs, a dummy for public sector jobs, 22 occupational dummies, 18 
idustry dummies and regional dummies.
)ccupational groups:
higher =  legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals, 
intermediate =  clerks, service workers and shop and market sales workers, skilled agriculture and fishery workers, 
lower (reference group) =  craft and related trades workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers, other elementary 
occupations, 
i Lobust standard errors in parentheses
: significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
11 countries included.
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A P P E N D IX  2.A: Comparative Statics
This section provides detailed proofs of the comparative statics effects described in the main 
text in section 2.4.
P roposition  1 ^  > 0
/ s
P roof. The first partial differential of equation (2.8) with respect to R f andp yields:
o =  C(Rf)
+ C ( R f )
cRt +    kp +  (1 -  0)(1 + r + q)p1 + r dRf+
1 +  r k + ( 1 -  j3)(l + r  + q) dp
which, given the properties o/C(-), proves the proposition. ■
dR ,P roposition  2 > 0
P roof. The first partial differential of equation (2.8) with respect to R f and k yields:
cRf  + —j — kp + (1 -  /?)(1 +  r + q)p dR , + C,'(R,)-^— p 
1 +  r  l +  r
dk
which, given the properties of £(•), proves the proposition. ■
dR ,P roposition  3 > 0
Proof. The first partial differential of equation (2.8) with respect to R f and qf yields:
0 = 8C'(Rf) cR,  + ^ k p + { l - m  + r + q)p
(i -  /% +  p ( l  +  r ) |  dq
dRf+
+
which, given the properties of £(•), proves the proposition.
dRfP roposition  4 < 0
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Proof. The first partial differential of equation (2.8) with respect to R f and Ri yields:
cRf  4-   kp +  (1 -  f3){ 1 +  r +  q)p
1 4- r
dRf — 1 - 6 cC'(Ri) dRi
which, given the properties of £(•), proves the proposition.
dR,Proposition  5 > 0
Proof. The first partial differential of equation (2.8) with respect to R f and Ri yields:
0 = c "(Rf) cRf  +   kp +  (1 -  (3)(l +  r  +  q)p1 +  r dR f ~b
cr
— (1 +  r  +  q) +  (1 — < 5 )((R i) d5
which, given the properties of £(•), proves the proposition.
Appendix 2.B: Detailed tables
Table 2.B.1: Summary statistics
Country
Sample size 
observations 
individuals
Austria 8943
2364
Belgium 6042
1555
Denmark 8877
2387
Finland 4437
1913
France 11096
2658
Germany 14632
3573
Greece 9441
2364
Ireland 9631
2627
Italy 13508
3240
Luxembourg 1687
596
Netherlands 15610
3715
Portugal 15817
3785
Spain 16138
4277
United Kingdom 5889
2223
United States 3507
1574
fem ale age experience  
( in  y ears)
0.44 32.36 15.38
(0.50) (10.11) (10.40)
0.48 34.39 13.64
(0.50) (7.42) (8.43)
0.47 37.28 18.96
(0.50) (10.05) (10.85)
0.50 37.60 17.89
(0.50) (9.05) (9.76)
0.45 37.13 18.45
(0.50) (9.04) (10.43)
0.44 36.75 17.34
(0.50) (9.74) (10.21)
0.41 34.92 13.32
(0.49) (9.48) (10.26)
0.46 33.08 14.90
(0.50) (10.54) (11.35)
0.42 33.95 13.11
(0.49) (8.78) (9.45)
0.45 33.48 14.69
(0.50) (8.38) (9.34)
0.45 36.17 16.40
(0.50) (9.04) (10.25)
0.43 33.08 15.29
(0.50) (10.72) (11.90)
0.37 33.82 15.13
(0.48) (9.56) (11.01)
0.52 37.36 20.06
(0.50) (10.88) (11.59)
0.46 35.34 17.94
(0.50) (3.08) (2.88)
#  adults in the 
tenure household
(in years)
5.06 2.89
(4.34) (1.34)
6.06 2.21
(4.54) (0.79)
5.02 2.05
(4.49) (0.71)
5.30 2.18
(4.30) (0.76)
6.30 2.23
(4.49) (0.85)
4.03 2.31
(3.41) (0.89)
5.08 2.78
(4.71) (1.10)
4.49 3.11
(4.47) (1.45)
6.12 2.84
(4.61) (1.21)
5.42 2.34
(4.02) (0.95)
5.61 2.16
(4.47) (0.75)
5.02 3.10
(4.43) (1.32)
4.33 2.98
(4.51) (1.31)
5.06 2.27
(3.84) (0.83)
2.30 n.a.
(3.33)
J L Z U
useho ld  size househ o ld  incom e 
(in  US$)
h o u rly  w age 
(in  US$)
te r t ia ry
e d u ca tio n
secondary
e d u ca tio n firs t jo b
3.66 36347.37 6.54 0.08 0.70 0.27
(1.58) (17929.37) (2.94) (0.27) (0.46) (0.44)
3.26 35463.67 7.66 0.47 0.33 0.26
(1.23) (17311.94) (3.08) (0.50) (0.47) (0.44)
2.94 32556.05 8.17 0.37 0.45 0.07
(1.29) (13272.80) (2.63) (0.48) (0.50) (0.26)
3.19 31143.52 6.88 0.44 0.40 0.09
(1.36) (17892.32) (2.40) (0.50) (0.49) (0.29)
3.18 30122.36 7.83 0.26 0.41 0.05
(1.30) (21620.44) (4.90) (0.44) (0.49) (0.22)
3.06 30105.64 6.91 0.24 0.60 0.08
(1.28) (13039.20) (3.16) (0.43) (0.49) (0.27)
3.57 7725.05 1.82 0.29 0.37 0.32
(1.23) (4416.63) (0.95) (0.46) (0.48) (0.47)
4.17 34515.05 7.75 0.22 0.47 0.21
(1.83) (19209.92) (4.06) (0.42) (0.50) (0.41)
3.53 28317.44 6.59 0.10 0.48 0.38
(1.27) (14344.17) (2.75) (0.30) (0.50) (0.49)
3.24 45377.11 10.76 0.22 0.29 0.27
(1.38) (24835.44) (5.63) (0.41) (0.45) (0.44)
2.94 29804.09 8.58 0.18 0.37 0.18
(1.27) (17364.76) (6.38) (0.38) (0.48) (0.38)
3.97 21177.84 3.98 0.07 0.15 0.31
(1.62) (12822.95) (2.53) (0.26) (0.35) (0.46)
3.70 25885.20 6.49 0.30 0.21 0.22
(1.41) (15866.34) (3.60) (0.46) (0.41) (0.41)
3.06 31854.20 7.50 0.29 0.39 0.11
(1.24) (19907.26) (3.73) (0.45) (0.49) (0.31)
3.03 44226.15 12.38 0.67 0.23 0.01
(1.59) (69398.09) (14.12) (0.47) (0.42) (0.07)
1 Z 1
Table 2.B.1: Summary statistics (continued)
Country job-to-job movers part time 
job
temporary 
job®
public sector 
job
higher 
occupation W
intermediate
occupation®
small working
unit (3)
medium working 
unit®
manufacturing
sector
service sector job changers (4) identifying
sample®
Austria 0.74 0.11 0.06 0.24 0.25 0.35 0.39 0.29 0.37 0.62 0.80 0.14
(0.44) (0.32) (0.23) (0.42) (0.43) (0.48) (0.49) (0.45) (0.48) (0.48) (0.40) (0.34)
Belgium 0.62 0.13 0.12 0.31 0.39 0.33 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.70 0.86 0.11
(0.49) (0.34) (0.32) (0.46) (0.49) (0.47) (0.43) (0.42) (0.46) (0.46) (0.35) (0.31)
Denmark 0.69 0.08 0.06 0.40 0.42 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.28 0.70 0.80 0.11
(0.46) (0.27) (0.24) (0.49) (0.49) (0.45) (0.44) (0.42) (0.45) (0.46) (0.40) (0.31)
Finland 0.73 0.06 0.16 0.38 0.49 0.24 0.41 0.31 0.28 0.69 0.85 0.07
(0.44) (0.24) (0.37) (0.49) (0.50) (0.43) (0.49) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.36) (0.26)
France 0.61 0.10 0.08 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.17 0.13 0.31 0.67 0.78 0.05
(0.49) (0.29) (0.27) (0.44) (0.46) (0.47) (0.38) (0.33) (0.46) (0.47) (0.41) (0.21)
Germany 0.70 0.07 0.08 0.26 0.34 0.27 0.25 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.12
(0.46) (0.26) (0.27) (0.44) (0.47) (0.44) (0.43) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (0.45) (0.33)
Greece 0.64 0.05 0.08 0.33 0.24 0.34 0.58 0.19 0.32 0.67 0.80 0.19
(0.48) (0.22) (0.27) (0.47) (0.43) (0.47) (0.49) (0.39) (0.46) (0.47) (0.40) (0.39)
Ireland 0.67 0.15 0.06 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.36 0.26 0.35 0.63 0.80 0.19
(0.47) (0.35) (0.24) (0.43) (0.45) (0.47) (0.48) (0.44) (0.48) (0.48) (0.40) (0.39)
Italy 0.45 0.07 0.08 0.30 0.21 0.36 0.43 0.23 0.37 0.60 0.81 0.08
(0.50) (0.25) (0.27) (0.46) (0.41) (0.48) (0.50) (0.42) (0.48) (0.49) (0.39) (0.28)
Luxembourg 0.91 0.12 0.04 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.72 0.82 0.08
(0.29) (0.32) (0.20) (0.44) (0.45) (0.47) (0.45) (0.40) (0.44) (0.45) (0.39) (0.27)
Netherlands 0.77 0.21 0.04 0.28 0.51 0.27 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.75 0.85 0.10
(0.42) (0.41) (0.19) (0.45) (0.50) (0.44) (0.39) (0.41) (0.42) (0.43) (0.35) (0.31)
Portugal 0.70 0.03 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.32 0.53 0.23 0.38 0.56 0.81 0.16
(0.46) (0.17) (0.34) (0.40) (0.34) (0.47) (0.50) (0.42) (0.49) (0.50) (0.39) (0.37)
Spain 0.44 0.07 0.39 0.22 0.23 0.29 0.44 0.25 0.34 0.62 0.86 0.25
(0.50) (0.25) (0.49) (0.41) (0.42) (0.45) (0.50) (0.43) (0.47) (0.49) (0.35) (0.43)
United Kingdom 0.80 0.18 0.05 0.32 0.37 0.36 0.14 0.16 0.26 0.73 0.81 0.06
(0.40) (0.38) (0.21) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.35) (0.37) (0.44) (0.44) (0.39) (0.23)
United States 0.48 0.12 1.02 0.10 0.29 0.22 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.73 0.87 0.26
(0.50) (0.32) (0.14) (0.29) (0.45) (0.41) (0.47) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.34) (0.44)
Notes:
summary statistics refer average values for each individual during the sample period. Standard errors in parentheses.
(1) Non-standard job contracts in the US
(2) Occupational groups:
lower =  craft and related trades workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers, other elementary occupations, 
intermediate =  clerks, service workers and shop and market sales workers, skilled agriculture and fishery workers, 
higher =  legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals.
(3) Firm s size (in all countries but Germany this refers to the size of the local working unit. In Germany it is the size of the organisation): 
small =  less than 20 employees
medium =  between 20 and 100 employees (between 20 and 2000 in Germany) 
big =  more than 100 employees (more then 2000 in Germany)
(4) individuals who are observed in at least two different jobs during the sample period
(5) individual who are observed in at least two different jobs found through different channels (personal contacts vs. others) during the sample period. 
Source: ECHP, 1994-1999 for EU countries. NLSY, 1994-2000 for the United States.________________________________________________________________
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Table 2.B.2: OLS wage regressions 
Panel A: without job’s characteristics
Dependent variable =
log hourly wage__________AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER(1) GRC IRL ITA LUX NLP PRT ESP_______ UK USA
Personal C haracteristics 
l=Female -0.154*** -0.060*** -0.094*** -0.171*** -0.175*** -0.209*** -0.125*** -0.169*** -0.092*** -0.125*** -0.098*** -0.170*** -0.129*** -0.171*** -0.159***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.029) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.022)
Age 0.081*** 0.035*** 0.055*** 0.043*** 0.035*** 0.099*** 0.058*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.124*** 0.052*** 0.024*** 0.053*** 0.040*** 0.028
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.027) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.056)
Age squared -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Experience -0.011* 0.010** 0.001 -0.005 0.008** -0.019*** 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.014*** -0.008 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.013*** -0.001 -0.030*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.017)
Experience sq. -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000*** 0.000* -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
l=second. edu. 0.212*** 0.074*** 0.133*** 0.060*** 0.127*** 0.048*** 0.173*** 0.160*** 0.174*** 0.215*** 0.062*** 0.372*** 0.182*** 0.133*** 0.140***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.034) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.033)
l=tertiary edu. 0.367*** 0.269*** 0.243*** 0.235*** 0.499*** 0.178*** 0.447*** 0.492*** 0.469*** 0.496*** 0.261*** 0.986*** 0.492*** 0.382*** 0.625***
(0.039) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.024) (0.022) (0.051) (0.013) (0.024) (0.016) (0.024) (0.041)
l=job-to-job mover 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.089*** 0.095*** 0.159*** 0.070*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.112*** 0.082*** 0.071*** 0.090*** 0.103*** 0.155***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.042) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.019)
l=first job -0.055*** 0.016 -0.018 -0.007 0.011 -0.133*** 0.027* 0.027 0.018 0.024 0.004 -0.008 0.040*** -0.009 0.151*
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.014) (0.017) (0.011) (0.031) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.024) (0.078)
C u rren t jo b  found throu gh ...
l=personal contacts 0.007 -0.024* 0.012 -0.007 -0.015 -0.092*** -0.086*** -0.067*** -0.060*** -0.115*** -0.051*** -0.040*** -0.079*** -0.070*** -0.021
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.029) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.025)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of contract(2) No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Firm size dummies(7) No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Occup. dummies (22) No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Industry dummies (18) No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8943 6042 8877 4437 11096 14632 9441 9631 13508 1687 15610 15817 16138 5889 3507
R-squared 0.34 0.27 0.40 0.31 0.35 0.22 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.30 0.47 0.40 0.36 0.22
± i£ 0
Table 2.B.2: continued
Panel A: with job’s characteristics
Dependent variable =  
log hourly wage AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER(1) GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP UK USA
P ersonal C haracteristics  
l=Female -0.141*** -0.068*** -0.079*** -0.117*** -0.129*** -0.217*** -0.123*** -0.179*** -0.115*** -0.076** -0.110*** -0.122*** -0.129*** -0.142*** -0.138***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.034) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.023)
Age 0.024*** 0.020* 0.031*** 0.025*** 0.018** 0.047*** 0.034*** 0.022** 0.024*** 0.088*** 0.044*** 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.023** 0.080
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.025) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.050)
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Experience 0.004 0.011*** 0.006 0.001 0.008*** -0.005 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.013*** -0.001 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.004 -0.028*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.016)
Experience sq. -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
l=second. edu. 0.074*** 0.041*** 0.082*** 0.027* 0.067*** -0.030** 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.061*** 0.073*** 0.024** 0.154*** 0.078*** 0.069*** 0.098***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.026) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.027)
l=tertiary edu. 0.156*** 0.158*** 0.127*** 0.086*** 0.225*** -0.011 0.169*** 0.212*** 0.235*** 0.200*** 0.112*** 0.453*** 0.164*** 0.217*** 0.419***
(0.036) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.042) (0.012) (0.032) (0.014) (0.027) (0.037)
l=job-to-job mover 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.024*** 0.034*** 0.072*** 0.093*** 0.063*** 0.025** 0.048*** 0.067* 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.068*** 0.113***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.035) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017)
l=first job -0.037** 0.000 -0.024 -0.017 -0.050* -0.081*** 0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.032 -0.015 -0.013 0.000 -0.020 0.119*
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.026) (0.021) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.025) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.070)
C u rren t jo b  found throu gh ...
Impersonal contacts 0.017 -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 0.007 -0.051*** -0.028*** -0.014 -0.018** -0.032 -0.020* -0.018** -0.010 -0.027* -0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.022) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.023)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of contract(2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size dummies(7) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occup. dummies (22) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies 
(18)
Year dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8943 6042 8877 4437 11096 14632 9441 9631 13508 1687 15610 15817 16138 5889 3507
R-squared 0.47 0.37 0.51 0.43 0.47 0.40 0.56 0.53 0.50 0.60 0.39 0.59 0.57 0.49 0.36
(1) Industry dummies not available for confidentially reasons.
(2) Dummies for part-time, temporary and public sector jobs.
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: ECHP 1994-1999 for all European countries. NLSY 1996-2000 for the USA.
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Table 2.B.3: Fixed-effect wage regressions 
Panel A: without job’s characteristics 
Dependent variable
=  log monthly wage AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER(1) GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP UK USA
P ersonal C haracteristics  
Experience 0.032*** -0.259 0.008** 0.012** 0.000 0.070*** 0.006 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.018** 0.017*** 0.014* 0.014*** 0.070*** -0.034
(0.006) (0.264) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.075)
Experience sq. -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Tenure 0.016*** 0.006* 0.006*** 0.013** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.003 0.007** 0.001 0.001 0.013*** -0.001 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.033***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009)
Tenure squared -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
l=job-to-job mover 0.010 0.022 -0.007 0.075*** 0.007 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.016 0.025*** 0.023 0.032** 0.007 0.017** 0.064*** 0.061***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.020) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.046) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.017)
1=first job -0.137*** -0.104*** -0.108*** -0.152*** -0.054 -0.154*** -0.016 -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.160*** -0.113*** -0.034*** -0.089*** -0.045 0.052
(0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.038) (0.041) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.037) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.038) (0.169)
C u rren t jo b  found throu gh ... 
l=personal contacts 0.042*** 0.060*** 0.005 -0.025 -0.013 0.006 -0.022* -0.008 -0.022** -0.033 0.029** -0.013* 0.002 -0.035* 0.022
(0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.024) (0.022) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.024) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.022)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of contract(2) No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Firm size dummies (7) No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Occup. dummies (22) No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Industry dummies (18) No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8943 6042 8877 4437 11096 14632 9441 9631 13508 1687 15610 15817 16138 5889 3507
Subjects 2364 1555 2387 1913 2658 3573 2364 2627 3240 596 3715 3785 4277 2223 1574
R-squared 0.17 0.13 0.36 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.30 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.28 0.20 0.08 0.08
Table 2.B.3: continued...
Panel B: with job’s characteristics
Dependent variable 
=  log monthly wage AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER(1) GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP UK USA
Personal C haracteristics  
Experience 0.024*** -0.344 0.001 0.016*** -0.001 -0.015*** 0.010** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.011 0.015*** 0.014* 0.013*** 0.023 -0.055
(0.005) (0.267) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.038) (0.074)
Experience sq. -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Tenure 0.016*** 0.008** 0.006*** 0.006 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.010 0.013*** -0.000 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.027***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009)
Tenure squared -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
l=job-to-job mover 0.008 0.030* -0.005 0.073*** 0.032* 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.017 0.026*** 0.106** 0.035*** 0.008 0.020*** 0.041* 0.052***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.020) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.053) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.022) (0.017)
l=first job -0.062*** -0.096*** -0.107*** -0.119*** -0.062 -0.096*** -0.013 -0.074*** -0.066*** -0.165*** -0.113*** -0.032*** -0.088*** -0.031 0.066
(0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.038) (0.040) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.043) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.039) (0.167)
C u rren t jo b  foun through.,
1=personal contacts 0.025* 0.054*** -0.015 -0.038 -0.011 -0.006 -0.017 -0.000 -0.027*** -0.029 0.030** -0.014* 0.001 -0.041** 0.019
(0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.024) (0.022) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.022)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of contract(2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size dummies (7) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occup. dummies (22) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies (18) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8943 6042 8877 4437 11096 14632 9441 9631 13508 1687 15610 15817 16138 5889 3507
Subjects 2364 1555 2387 1913 2658 3573 2364 2627 3240 596 3715 3785 4277 2223 1574
R-squared 0.25 0.19 0.41 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.34 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.30 0.24 0.11 0.11
(1) Industry dummies not available for confidentially reasons;
(2) Dummies for part-time, temporary and public sector jobs.
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: ECHP 1994-1998 for all European countries. NLSY 1996-2000 for the USA.
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Table 2.B.4: The tenure profile of the premium to finding a job through personal contacts 
Panel A: without job’s characteristics
Dependent variable 
=  log monthly wage AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER(1> GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP UK USA
Personal C haracteristics  
Experience 0.018 0.038** 0.022*** 0.018 -0.007 0.107*** -0.028* 0.026*** 0.019** 0.085*** 0.026*** 0.009 0.028*** 0.142*** 0.240
(0.013) (0.016) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.032) (0.008) (0.015) (0.006) (0.024) (0.218)
Experience sq. -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
Tenure < =  6months -0.024 -0.036 0.000 -0.048* -0.040 0.000 0.033 0.000 -0.003 0.062* 0.000 -0.011 -0.016 0.000 -0.010
[TEN_L] (0.019) (0.028) (0.000) (0.028) (0.029) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.017) (0.037) (0.000) (0.011) (0.012) (0.000) (0.045)
Tenure >6 months 0.000 0.000 -0.027** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.013 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 -0.029 0.000
[TEN_H] (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000)
l=job-to-job mover 0.037 -0.006 -0.006 0.049 0.007 0.025 0.062*** -0.012 0.044** 0.038 0.023 -0.011 0.019 0.043 0.064
(0.023) (0.036) (0.018) (0.037) (0.040) (0.028) (0.023) (0.015) (0.022) (0.080) (0.023) (0.013) (0.012) (0.036) (0.044)
l=first job -0.126*** -0.186*** -0.043 -0.157** -0.077 -0.060 0.029 -0.101*** -0.056* -0.170** -0.069** -0.055*** -0.076*** -0.041 0.000
(0.045) (0.055) (0.038) (0.074) (0.098) (0.054) (0.032) (0.024) (0.029) (0.067) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018) (0.069) (0.000)
C u rren t jo b  found through..
[l=CONT] * [TEN _L] 0.062* 0.085* 0.060** -0.010 -0.008 -0.013 -0.037 -0.002 -0.054** -0.098** 0.011 -0.003 -0.006 -0.059 -0.046
(0.032) (0.051) (0.026) (0.056) (0.050) (0.029) (0.030) (0.020) (0.026) (0.048) (0.035) (0.016) (0.014) (0.039) (0.107)
[l=CONT]*[TEN_H] 0.022 0.045 0.027 -0.112** -0.003 0.030 -0.020 -0.020 -0.037 0.016 0.012 0.007 0.004 -0.037 -0.039
(0.028) (0.049) (0.027) (0.057) (0.051) (0.029) (0.028) (0.020) (0.027) (0.049) (0.033) (0.015) (0.015) (0.040) (0.080)
Individual fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of contract*2* No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Firm size dummies(7) No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Occup. dummies (22) No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Industry dummies(18) No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1758 689 1935 916 1352 2186 1488 3002 1901 271 2810 3961 6010 888 542
Subjects 754 288 803 414 612 960 651 1204 828 129 1135 1579 2317 423 255
R-squared 0.21 0.09 0.27 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.27 0.22 0.10 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.10 0.06
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Table 2.B.4: continued...
Panel B: with job’s characteristics
Dependent variable
=  log monthly wage AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER(,) GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP UK USA
Personal C haracteristics  
Experience 0.022* -0.014 0.014* 0.034** -0.013 0.003 -0.018 0.021*** 0.018** 0.017 0.023*** 0.000 0.022*** 0.020 0.181
(0.012) (0.022) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.064) (0.008) (0.015) (0.006) (0.097) (0.217)
Experience sq. -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
Tenure<= 6months -0.044** 0.000 0.000 -0.036 -0.029 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 -0.004 -0.018 0.029 -0.012
[TEN_L] (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.030) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.011) (0.012) (0.027) (0.046)
Tenure>6 months 0.000 0.036 -0.021 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 -0.005 0.002 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[TEN_H] (0.000) (0.029) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.013) (0.017) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
l=job-to-job mover 0.043* -0.007 -0.015 0.072* 0.023 0.026 0.060*** -0.009 0.039* 0.006 0.022 -0.010 0.020* 0.027 0.027
(0.023) (0.038) (0.018) (0.038) (0.042) (0.026) (0.023) (0.015) (0.022) (0.099) (0.023) (0.012) (0.011) (0.040) (0.045)
l=first job -0.036 -0.181*** -0.083** -0.135* -0.082 -0.064 0.046 -0.107*** -0.049* -0.134* -0.080*** -0.045** -0.081*** -0.025 0.000
(0.046) (0.058) (0.037) (0.076) (0.100) (0.051) (0.031) (0.023) (0.029) (0.077) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018) (0.074) (0.000)
C u rren t jo b  & un  through.,
[l=CONT]*[TEN_L] 0.048 0.069 0.029 -0.012 0.012 -0.037 -0.033 0.015 -0.060** -0.068 0.016 -0.011 -0.004 -0.054 -0.020
(0.032) (0.052) (0.025) (0.058) (0.052) (0.028) (0.030) (0.019) (0.026) (0.051) (0.035) (0.016) (0.013) (0.042) (0.109)
[l=CONT] * [TEN_H] 0.005 0.007 0.001 -0.111* 0.023 0.012 -0.018 -0.020 -0.033 0.019 0.022 0.015 0.007 -0.027 -0.020
(0.027) (0.051) (0.026) (0.058) (0.053) (0.028) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.053) (0.033) (0.014) (0.014) (0.042) (0.082)
Individual fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of contract(2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size dummies(7) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occup. dummies (22) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dunjmies(18) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1758 689 1935 916 1352 2186 1488 3002 1901 271 2810 3961 6010 888 542
Subjects 754 288 803 414 612 960 651 1204 828 129 1135 1579 2317 423 255
R-squared 0.31 0.26 0.38 0.28 0.17 0.25 0.36 0.31 0.19 0.54 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.21 0.17
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(1) Industry dummies not available for confidentially reasons; (2) Dummies for part-time, temporary and public sector jobs 
Source: ECHP 1994-1998 for all European countries. NLSY 1996-2000 for the USA._________________________________
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*”(1)
Mean of dependent 
variable
1=female 
Age
Age squared 
#  adults in the HH 
HH income (log) 
=tertiary edu. 
=second. edu.
=temporary 
=  part time 
= first job 
=  public sector
=  higher, occup.
=  interm, occup.
=small 
= medium
= manufacturing 
=services
Year dummies
Observations 
Pseudo R2
AUT BEL DEN FIN FRA GER(2) GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP UK® USA(4)
0.14 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.25 0.06 0.26
-0.010 -0.011 -0.019 -0.021** 0.000 -0.010 -0.009 -0.004 -0.011 -0.033** -0.019* -0.013 -0.000 0.000 0.006
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.027)
-0.010* -0.010 -0.005 -0.005 -0.012*** 0.003 -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.010*** -0.011** -0.008* -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.006** -0.128
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.110)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
0.005 0.004 0.026** 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.020** 0.009 0.004 -0.001 -0.009 0.005 0.014** 0.007 -0.002
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
-0.039*** -0.015 -0.034* -0.033*** -0.008 -0.019* -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.014* 0.003 0.001 -0.019* -0.029*** -0.001 0.017
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016)
0.027 -0.012 -0.009 0.003 -0.007 0.009 0.032 0.023 0.014 0.030 0.009 -0.004 -0.015 -0.008
(0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.021) (0.018) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.010) -0.010
0.015 -0.003 0.005 0.018 -0.025** 0.024 0.054* 0.020 -0.005 0.015 0.001 -0.015 -0.033 0.001 (0.006)
(0.039) (0.023) (0.020) (0.017) (0.010) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.017) (0.036) (0.021) (0.014)
0.029 0.078** -0.003 0.031** 0.056*** 0.077*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.033 -0.028 -0.008 -0.006 0.099*** 0.051 -0.024
(0.026) (0.033) (0.044) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.038) (0.036) (0.021) (0.065) (0.025) (0.020) (0.023) (0.056) (0.101)
0.011 -0.042** 0.012 0.023 0.029* 0.006 0.021 0.055** 0.009 0.024 0.067*** 0.034 0.077*** 0.031** -0.035
(0.026) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.031) (0.024) (0.018) (0.031) (0.016) (0.033) (0.026) (0.016) (0.037)
-0.038** 0.009 -0.049*** -0.026** 0.002 0.008 -0.031* -0.040** -0.043*** -0.010 -0.018 -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.026** -0.095
(0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.129)
-0.078*** -0.013 -0.097*** -0.026** -0.036*** -0.008 -0.140*** -0.122*** -0.027 -0.056** -0.037** -0.076*** -0.155*** -0.056*** -0.074*
(0.015) (0.030) (0.028) (0.011) (0.009) (0.018) (0.029) (0.025) (0.020) (0.026) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.040)
-0.022 -0.035 -0.027 -0.017 0.030** 0.001 -0.036 -0.058** -0.037*** -0.052*** -0.028** -0.046** -0.051** -0.046*** -0.077**
(0.020) (0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.027) (0.023) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) (0.011) (0.032)
-0.040** 0.014 -0.034** -0.009 -0.000 -0.001 -0.019 -0.043** -0.030*** -0.008 -0.028** -0.024* -0.048*** -0.026** -0.017
(0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.022) (0.020) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.033)
0.012 0.107*** -0.003 0.019 0.028** 0.075*** -0.007 0.066*** 0.035** 0.019 0.057*** 0.041** 0.054*** 0.033* 0.065**
(0.018) (0.028) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.041) (0.022) (0.015) (0.023) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.030)
-0.010 0.029 0.008 -0.002 0.015 0.028 0.030 0.026 0.016 0.063* 0.037** 0.031 0.067*** 0.040** 0.005
(0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.048) (0.023) (0.017) (0.033) (0.015) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017) (0.031)
-0.067 -0.049 0.002 0.003 0.027 . 0.100 -0.029 -0.016 0.984*** -0.034 -0.054** -0.097*** 0.017 -0.183**
(0.055) (0.048) (0.043) (0.031) (0.050) (0.096) (0.046) (0.022) (0.064) (0.030) (0.023) (0.030) (0.046) (0.078)
-0.046 -0.089 0.033 0.027 0.027 - 0.062 -0.018 -0.005 0.414* -0.016 -0.008 -0.128*** 0.026 -0.270**
(0.063) (0.072) (0.037) (0.024) (0.033) (0.078) (0.048) (0.023) (0.217) (0.036) (0.023) (0.034) (0.033) (0.125)
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
2353 1555 2334 1913 2611 3572 2348 2624 3128 596 3703 3775 4251 2223 1258
0.04 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.03
(1) individual who are observed in at least two different jobs found through different channels (personal contacts vs. others) during the sample period.
(2) Industry dummies not available for confidentiality reasons
(3) Size of organisation rather than local unit. Different classification: small=  less than 20 employees; medium=between 20 and 2000 employees; large (reference group)=more them 2000 employees.
(4) Education measured in years of schooling; household size instead of number of adults; non-standard contract instead of temporary contracts.
(5) Occupational group: higher =  legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals; intermediate =  clerks, service workers and shop and market sales workers, skilled agriculture and 
fishery workers; lower (reference group) =  craft and related trades workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers, other elementary occupations.
(6) Firms’ size: small=less than 20 employees; medium=between 20 and 100 employees; large (reference group)=more than 100 employees.
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: ECHP 1994-1999 for European countries. NLSY 1996-2000 for the USA.__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 2.B.6: Industry classification
Statistical Classification o f  Products by A ctivity  in the European Economic Community, CPA 
Code________ Description________________________________________________________________________
A+B Agriculture, hunting and forestry +  Fishing
C+E Mining and quarrying +  Electricity, gas and water supply
DA Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco
DB+DC Manufacture of textiles, clothing and leather products
DD+DE Manufacture off wood and paper products; publishing and printing
DF-DI Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum/chemicals/rubber & plastic/products etc
DJ+DK Manufacture of metal products, machinery and equipment n.e.c.
DL-DN Other manufacturing
F Construction
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal/household goods
H Hotels and restaurants
I Transport, storage and communication
J Financial intermediation
K Real estate, renting and business activities
L Public administration and defense; compulsory social security
M Education
N Health and social work
0-Q Other community, social and personal service activities; private households with employed persons; extra­
territorial organizations and bodies
C hapter 3
Em ployers’ Search and the Efficiency 
of M atching
Introduction1
High levels of workers’ mobility characterise the labour markets of virtually all industrialised 
economies. Large numbers of workers constantly flow across labour market states. This issue 
has been the focus of a huge literature that has identified at least two sources of labour 
mobility. The first is reallocation of workers due to changes in preferences and technology, 
which make some sectors grow and other shrink (Farber (1999), Jovanovic(1979a)). The 
second is labour mismatch, that is the search of both workers and employers for the best 
possible partner in an employment relation (Jovanovic 1979a and 1979b, Flinn 1986). Due to 
information asymmetries, a labour relationship terminates whenever a better partner becomes 
available for either of the two parties. The existing evidence (Jovanovic et al. 1990) suggests 
that, of these two sources, mismatch is likely to be the most important factor in explaining 
the observed large labour market flows, especially since they mostly occur within rather than
XI would like to thank Jon Hales who kindly provided some additional data and clarified to me several 
data issues. All errors are my own responsibility.
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across industrial sectors.
Despite this important result, relatively little attention has been paid to the analysis of 
the enormous efforts both workers and employers put into looking for a good partner. This 
chapter contributes to the literature on labour mobility by developing and empirically testing 
a simple model that describes how employers choose the level of investment in advertisement 
and screening activities and how this investment affects the quality of matches.
Understanding the determinants of match quality is important for explaining the overall 
level of labour turnover as well as differences across jobs and workers. In fact, another well 
documented, but less analysed, finding is that labour turnover is usually higher in lower 
occupations compared to more productive jobs. For example, table 3.1 shows the fraction 
of employed workers who experienced a job change (i.e. moved to a different job or to 
unemployment or to inactivity) between two adjacent quarters in the United Kingdom for 
the years 1992 and 2003 by occupation in the starting job2. As it is evident from the figures 
in the first two columns, labour turnover is constantly higher at the bottom than at the top 
of the jobs’ distribution. About 8% to 9% of workers in elementary occupations change job 
or move into non-employment between two adjacent quarters, while this fraction is about 
3-4% for managers.
Few explanations have been explicitly put forward for this empirical regularity. A popular 
one suggests that people try to climb up the jobs’ ladder, moving from lower level, lower 
paying jobs up to better ones. Workers who already hold good jobs tend to move less and 
this leads to the observed patterns. Alternatively, it has also been argued that young workers, 
who normally occupy jobs at a lower occupational level, change employment frequently during 
their first years in the labour market in an attempt to explore their capabilities and to find 
jobs that meet their tastes (Topel et al. 1992).
However, these explanations don’t seem to satisfactorily conform with some additional
22003 is the most recent year for which this exercise is possible and 1993 is the closest one to the period 
covered by the data used in the rest of the chapter.
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evidence. In fact, if workers at the bottom of the occupations’ distribution would leave 
their jobs more often to look for better ones, we should observe more job-to-job than job- 
to-unemployment transitions at the bottom than at the top. As columns 3 and 4 in table 
3.1 illustrate, this is not at all clear in the data. Although the numbers show some variation 
across occupations, it is hard to argue that there exists a clear trend towards a lower incidence 
of job-to-unemployment transitions at the bottom than at the top of the jobs’ distribution.
Moreover, the same explanations would also suggest that workers from the lowest occupa­
tional groups would move more frequently to another, possibly higher, group. Unfortunately, 
the data (column 5 and 6) don’t show any particular trend in the fraction of job-to-job movers 
who also change occupational group. This figure ranges between 50% and 80% with unclear 
patterns across occupations. Oi (1962) and McCall (1990) find similar results for the US 
during the early 30s and early 80s respectively.
Other explanations can be indirectly extrapolated from the work of the many authors 
that contributed to the literature on labour turnover. For example, Moscarini (2001) argues 
that the wedge of productivity over the opportunity cost of labour is larger for skilled than 
unskilled workers, thus reducing their incentive to change job. Also, the observed negative 
correlation between tenure and mobility is often explained by match-specific training: with 
tenure one acquires a knowledge (of the environment, familiarity with co-workers, with the 
procedures, etc.) which makes that specific match more valuable to both the worker and the 
firm than the average alternative (Mortensen (1978)). As a consequence, longer tenure is 
associated with a lower probability of job ending (Farber 1999). This result, together with 
the suggestion (Parsons (1972)) that the incidence of match-specific training is higher in top, 
managerial jobs, would be sufficient to generate higher turnover in lower occupations.
This idea is also supported by the recent work of Hayes et al. (2004), who look at the 
implications for labour turnover of the introduction of team-work. When people work in 
teams, their complementarities make the departure of one team member a plausible reason 
for the others to leave as well, thus generating higher turnover. Since the practice of team­
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work appears to be more common in managerial jobs, this would also lead to the observed 
pattern in turnover across jobs. Furthermore, women are more prone to change labour market 
status due to family reasons. Hence, female dominated occupations are likely to show higher 
levels of turnover.
However, figure 3.1 shows that, even when one controls for all these effects (age, education, 
tenure, gender), labour turnover still differs substantially across occupations. The bars in 
figure 3.1, in fact, represent the coefficients on the occupational dummies obtained from a 
probit model for the probability of experiencing a job change between two adjacent quarters in 
the United Kingdom in 1993 and 2003. The visual inspection of figure 3.1 already indicates 
that the probability of a job separation, conditional on individual characteristics, is still 
higher in lower occupations and the tests reported at the bottom of each panel confirm that 
the hypothesis of all identical coefficients is rejected.
These results have been presented to show that the existing research on the sources of 
labour mobility is unable to satisfactorily explain the patterns of turnover across occupa­
tions. This chapter contributes to the literature in this direction. It takes the suggestion 
in Jovanovic et al. (1990) that mismatch is likely to be the main cause of labour turnover 
and shows that the matching process is less efficient for low productivity jobs, which will 
consequently be more prone to separation (both voluntary and involuntary). The focus of 
the analysis is primarily on the employers’ side of the labour market.
The theoretical section of the chapter shows that firms find it optimal to invest relatively 
little in recruitment and screening activities for low productivity jobs, while they are much 
more careful in the hiring of top level workers. Hence, matches of unskilled workers in low 
productivity jobs are more likely to be ’’bad”, in the sense that the same worker (job) can 
be paired with another job (worker) into a more productive match. This leads to more 
separations and more job instability for unskilled workers in lower level occupations.
The empirical implementation of the theory is carried out exploiting a unique dataset 
of recruiting establishments in Britain. Using these data it is possible to construct several
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measures of recruitment intensity, distinguishing between advertisement and screening ac­
tivities. Various econometric estimates will then show that employers invest more in both 
types of recruitment for top level jobs and relatively little at the bottom of the occupations’ 
distribution. Finally, these measures of recruitment intensity will be correlated with various 
indicators of the quality of the match, such as satisfaction of the employer with the recruit, 
initial wages and tenure. Results support the motivating idea of this chapter: matches cre­
ated through more intensive screening last longer, pay higher wages and make employers 
more satisfied with the person taken on.
From the normative viewpoint, this chapter documents that the allocation of unskilled 
workers in low-productivity jobs might be subject to more serious mismatch than other 
workers and jobs. As a consequence, these workers are likely to experience greater job and 
income instability. Although this chapter does not attempt to conduct a general equilibrium 
analysis, policy intervention aimed at improving the quality of matching at the bottom end 
of the jobs’ distribution might lead to overall efficiency and equity gains.
I have already discussed how this chapter takes the move from the existing literature 
on labour turnover. However, it also contributes to another, small but growing, strand of 
the literature: the analysis of employers’ search. The widely accepted search and matching 
approach to the study of the labour market has fostered an enormous amount of empirical 
work on the search behaviour of workers. Mainly due to the scarcity of data, however, very 
little is known about the corresponding behaviour of employers. In fact, individual level data 
on recruitment activities are extremely rare. A few exceptions are Brown et al. (1999) and 
Manning (2000) on British data, Barron et al. (1987) and Holzer (1994) using US data, van 
Ours et al. (1991 and 1992) and Gorter et al. (1999 and 2003) using Dutch data. These 
papers address important issues, like the cyclical behaviour of the vacancy rate, the shape of 
the hazard of vacancy filling and the optimal recruitment strategies of employers, all issues 
that can only be explored with detailed data at the vacancy level. This chapter is another 
example of how a better knowledge of the firm’s side of the labour market can contribute to
Chapter 3. Employers’ Search and the Efficiency of Matching 135
our understanding of many phenomena.
The chapter is organised as follows: section 2 presents a simple model of optimal employers 
search, section 3 describes the data which will be used in section 4 to test empirically the 
implications of the model. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Employer’s search: a theoretical framework
The model in this section is both a simplification and an extension of the theory in section 2.4 
in the previous chapter. The starting point is a simple matching model in which firms with 
unfilled vacancies and workers who need a job (or want to change job) look for each other. 
The existence of frictions in the labour market prevents them from meeting instantaneously 
and leads to positive rents associated with formed matches. For simplicity and clarity, the 
model is partial equilibrium and formalised in discrete time.
The first departure from the standard matching model consists in the introduction of 
heterogeneity in the market, a crucial ingredient to make recruitment and screening activities 
play a meaningful role. Jobs differ in the technology employed and, consequently, in the 
skill requirements. Each job j  in the model should be seen as an occupation in its empirical 
implementation. Vacancies are unfilled jobs. For each vacancy of type j  there exists two types 
of workers, suitable and unsuitable. This implies that a given worker might be unsuitable for 
one job but suitable for another. A suitable worker in job j  produces a positive amount of 
output, pj, while an unsuitable worker is totally unproductive. As already noted in section 
2.4, this assumption captures the idea that recruiting the wrong person for a top job is more 
costly than for low productivity job. The type of the match is unknown to both the worker 
and the firm until production takes place and output can be observed.
In each period, a firm with an unfilled vacancy j  meets a jobseeker with probability 
q(9j), where Oj represents labour market tightness, i.e. the ratio between vacancies and 
unemployment, 6j = According to the standard matching literature, q(Qj) is assumed to
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be decreasing in Of 9qq^  <  0. The subscript j  on 6 indicates that labour market tightness 
can vary by occupation with Vj representing vacancies of the same type (occupation) and Uj 
jobseekers with the skills required by the job.
In order to focus on the choice of the recruitment strategy by the employer, the supply 
side of the market - the search behaviour of workers - and the wage negotiation process 
are taken as exogenous and modelled as follows: firms offer wages equal to a fraction f3 of 
expected productivity in the first period of work. If the worker then turns out to be suitable 
for the job, wages are updated to the same fraction (3 of actual productivity 5 otherwise the 
match is destroyed (by either of the two parties) and the vacancy re-opened. If the match is 
continued, a separation will only occur due to exogenous shocks with per-period probability 
A. For tractability, the parameters f3 and A are assumed to be constant across all jobs.
There exist two types of recruitment activities. Extensive recruitment (Ej) concerns all 
the actions taken by the employer to improve the probability of meeting a candidate (or to 
increase the number of applications received). These activities include mostly advertisement 
but also asking employees, holding career events at colleges and professional schools, use 
of public or private employment agencies, etc. Formally, extensive recruitment requires a 
linear cost cEj and improves the probability of meeting a job candidate. Hence, we need to 
rewrite q(0j) as q(Ej\0j),  where Ej  is a control variable for the firm and 0j is an exogenous 
parameter. For an internal solution, we also need to assume dq^ i)6^  > 0 and dQ ^.g^  < 0. 
Extensive recruitment and labour market tightness can be either substitutes (^ f^ jf^  > 0) 
or complements < 0). This is left as an empirical issue.
Intensive recruitment (Ij) has to do with all the actions taken by the employer to improve 
her knowledge about the worker’s unobservable type. These actions include interviewing and 
screening candidates and take place once contact has been established and before deciding 
whether to hire or reject a candidate. Formally, intensive recruitment is modelled as follows: 
upon meeting a candidate the employer receives a signal about the type of the worker. The 
signal can take two values, ” suitable” or ”unsuitable”, and it is correct with probability £(/j).
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In other words, if the signal is ”suitable” the candidate is suitable with probability ((Ij)  and 
unsuitable with probability 1 — ((Ij).  Similarly if the signal is ’’unsuitable”. The function 
((Ij)  needs to be increasing and concave in Iji > 0 and < 0. Moreover, when
Ij = 0 the signal is totally uninformative and £(0) =  1/ 2. For simplicity, let us assume that 
the cost functions of E  and I  are identical - i.e. they are both linear with marginal cost c - 
however the cost of I  is only paid if a candidate is actually met in a given period while E  
has to be financed ex-ante.
Let us also assume that, for any vacancy j ,  there exists an exogenous fraction TTj of suitable 
jobseekers in the economy. Under these assumptions, only two hiring strategies are possible: 
hiring when the signal is ’’suitable” and rejecting otherwise or hiring anyone regardless of 
the signal received. The latter strategy obviously leads to a corner solution with Ij = 0 and 
becomes optimal only in uninteresting cases, such as when ttj = 1: when all candidates are 
equally good for the job investing in screening is useless and employers simply hire the first 
available candidate. In all other cases, employers find it optimal to hire only candidates who 
are signalled to be ’’suitable” for the job. We will then focus on this hiring strategy only, even 
if this restricts the range of parameter values within which the following analysis is valid.
Given the above assumptions, the value of an unfilled vacancy of type j  for a representative 
firm can be written as follows:
Vi —cEj H- 1 +  r ■eh+ Jipj)+ (i -«-,)(! -  awno)+ (i -
+nj(l  -  a i m )  + Vi (3-1)
where J(pj)  and J(0) are the value of a vacancy j  filled with a suitable (who produces pj)
Chapter 3. Employers’ Search and the Efficiency of Matching 138
and an unsuitable (who produces 0) candidate and can be written as:
J(Pi) =  P j - Wj + (3-2)
7(0) =  - W° + J - Vj (3.3)
where w? is the initial wage, paid as a fraction of expected productivity given that the signal 
is ”suitable’®:
wi =  t t T w f a  (3'4)3 (-fj) +  (i — KjiO- — €(ij))
and Jj is the continuation value of a job j  filled with a suitable candidate:
( i t ; ) 7; =  t1 -  f i n  +  xv’ (3-5)
Substituting (3.5) and (3.4) into (3.2) and (3.3) and then everything into (3.1), one obtains:
Vi r+«(£#,) - - Qimw - * j )1+1 + r i) - w&mi - tm
= - c ( l  +  r)Ej -  cq(Ej\6j)Ij + tt/  Aq(gi |tfJ)g(Jj )(l -  P)Pj (3.6)
The optimal choice of Ej  and Ij by the firm is described by the first order conditions of
equation (3.6) with respect to these two control variables. The algebra is greatly simplified
by imposing the usual free-entry equilibrium condition Vj = 0:
^ 1 t + A Ag' (^ ' |e,')^ )(1 ~ '9)ft =  c [1 + r + l ' (Ej \ej )Ij \ (3.7)
^ r  +  A =  c (3'8)
3 Only in this case the match would be actually formed.
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where q'E{Ej\9j) = dq^ 6^  and ('(Ij) =  Combining equation (3.7) and (3.8) yields:
where rj^Ij) is the elasticity of the precision of the signal ({Ij): V^(Ij) =
Let us now describe intuitively the comparative statics effects of the parameters of the 
model. Appendix 3.A contains the formal derivation of these effects.
Equation (3.9) contains the first important result of the model. It shows that there is a 
positive (non negative) correlation between Ej  and Ij. In other words, employers invest more 
in extensive recruitment when they also invest more in intensive screening. The intuition for 
this result is rather simple: as intensive recruitment increases the probability of eventually 
hiring a suitable candidate also increases, thus improving the marginal benefit of extensive 
recruitment.
From equation (3.9) it is also immediate to show that the effect of labour market tightness 
on Ej  depends on whether Ej and 9j are substitutes or complements in the matching process. 
If they are substitutes ( ^ ^ ^ ' > 0), an increase in 0j leads to a lower probability of meeting 
a candidate and induces lower effort in Ej. The opposite happens if < 0. Tod fcjj o8j
anticipate here the empirical results of the next section, the evidence suggests that Ej  and 
9j are substitutes.
Note incidentally, that investment in intensive recruitment, being incurred on only if a 
candidate is actually met, is not influenced by labour market conditions. This is evident 
from equation (3.8).
Inspection of equation (3.8) allows to derive the effects of two other interesting parame­
ters: productivity, pj, and the proportion of suitable workers, 7Tj. They are both positively 
correlated with Ij. Intuitively, the effect of productivity is relatively simple: employers invest 
more in screening when recruiting for highly productive jobs. In this case, in fact, failing
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to hire the right worker is very costly: not only does it require paying a high wage without 
getting any output in return, but it also means re-opening the vacancy later on with high 
losses in terms of forgone output. As for the fraction of suitable workers, an increase in this 
parameter also increases the marginal benefit of intensive recruitment and therefore leads to 
more expenditure in screening activities. Note, however, that this argument holds only for 
values of 7Tj that are consistent with the optimal hiring strategy assumed so far, i.e. hiring 
when the signal is good and rejecting otherwise.
So far we have discussed the implications of the model regarding the determinants of 
extensive and intensive recruitment and their correlation. However, the simple theory de­
veloped in this section also allows to draw empirically testable implications about various 
measures of match quality as well. For example, equation (3.4) shows that more intensive 
recruitment and a higher fraction of suitable workers both have a positive impact on initial 
wages, Wj.
More interesting for the initial motivation of this chapter is the effect on the separation 
rate. The model contains two separation processes, one endogenous and one exogenous. The 
latter one (exogenous) hits ’’good” matches (i.e. jobs filled with suitable workers) with exoge­
nous probability A every period and it is unaffected by the endogenous variables of the model. 
This process can be seen as the effect of exogenous changes in consumers’ preferences and 
firms’ technologies. The endogenous separation process refers to ’’bad” matches (jobs filled 
with unsuitable candidates) being immediately destroyed as soon as production is observed. 
The probability that a newly created match is endogenously destroyed corresponds to the 
probability of its being a ’’bad” match:
Pr {endogenous separation of job j }  = -£ — _ — (3.10)
Empirically, equation (3.10) suggests that the probability of a separation occurring close to 
the engagement decreases with intensive screening.
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Extensive recruitment, on the other hand, has a direct effect on q(Ej\0j), the probability 
of meeting a candidate and therefore on vacancy duration.
To summarise, the model delivers three sets of empirical implications. First, it predicts 
that extensive and intensive recruitment are positively correlated. Second, it allows to iden­
tify the determinants of intensive recruitment effort (implication (3.8)), which should be 
positively correlated with productivity, the availability of good candidates and should be un­
affected by labour market tightness. Third, it indicates that recruitment effort, in the form 
of both extensive and intensive recruitment, is correlated with various outcome measures. In 
particular, extensive recruitment positively affects the meeting probability and, consequently, 
vacancy duration. Intensive recruitment directly affects initial wages and the overall quality 
of the match, reducing the probability of a separation (equation (3.10)).
In the remaining of the chapter, after describing the data in the next section, these 
implications will be tested empirically.
3.3 The 1992 Survey o f Employers’ Recruitm ent Prac­
tices (SERP)
The data used for the empirical implementation of the model come from an original survey 
conducted in the United Kingdom in 1992, the Survey of Employers’ Recruitment Practices 
(SERP). This study was carried out by the British Social and Community Planning Research 
(SCPR) on behalf of the Employment Service. It was mainly aimed at investigating the use 
of public employment services by private employers compared to alternative recruitment 
methods4.
To this end, one would ideally like to have information about a representative sample of 
engagements occurred in a determined time window. However, since the total population 
of all engagements is not easily recorded anywhere, it is rather difficult to extract such a
4An earlier survey was conducted in 1978 but the study as not been replicated after 1992.
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sample. The approach taken by researchers at SCPR consisted in drawing a sample of 10,000 
establishments from the 1989 Census of Employment, where an establishment is defined as 
’’the activities of a single employer at a single set of premises”. The 1989 Census covered 
all existing establishments with 25 or more employees and was supplemented by a random 
sample of smaller establishments.
The subsample of 10,000 establishments extracted from the Census was designed to con­
tain enough observations to conduct statistical analyses by region and establishment size. A 
purely random sample would have led to too many establishments located in London and the 
South East and too few establishments of small size (below 20-25 employees). For this reason, 
small firms and firms outside London and the South East were oversampled. Moreover, since 
the purpose of the study was the analysis of recruitment practices, which are usually similar 
across establishments belonging to the same organisation, another sampling adjustment was 
made in order to limit the number of units belonging to the same large firm (e.g. large food 
stores, etc.).
These 10,000 establishments were first contacted in Autumn 1991 via a brief preliminary 
telephone interview to collect the information necessary to categorize them along two di­
mensions: in-scope versus out-of-scope and recruiting versus non-recruiting establishments. 
Out-of-scope establishments were firms that had closed down or moved between the census 
in 1989 and the date of the telephone interview. They were excluded from the study. Re­
cruiting establishments were defined as establishments that either had recruited one or more 
employees in the previous 12 months or had unfilled vacancies at the time of the interview. 
A recruit or engagement was defined as ’’recruiting an employee, where a new contract of 
employment is involved”.
All in-scope recruiting establishments were then contacted for a longer face-to-face in­
terview, which formed the main source of information for the final survey. For budgetary 
reasons, only about half of the non-recruiting firms were contacted for a second short tele­
phone interview. Eventually, the final survey contains information about 5,635 recruiting and
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614 non-recruiting establishments. The interviews took place between May and November 
1992. Within each establishment, the respondents were selected to be the main person re­
sponsible for the recruitment process. They were either personnel specialists (16%), general 
managers (27%), branch-depot managers (20%) or professional staff (9%).
Only the sample of recruiting establishments is needed for the purpose of this chapter. 
Few observations have been dropped due to missing or incorrect values, leading to 5,343 
valid establishments, which, corrected for the weights provided by the SCPR to recover the 
representativeness for the entire population, represent 6083 firms. The questions regarding 
the establishments were grouped into 3 sections of the questionnaire. The first one contains 
general enquires about the type of firm and activity as well as questions about the role of 
the respondent. The second section asks about the characteristics of the workforce, including 
information about current vacancies and recruits that were taken on in the previous 12 
months. The third section includes detailed questions about the recruitment practices usually 
adopted by the firm. The descriptive statistics for the sample of establishments are reported 
in table 3.2.
A sample of engagements was then constructed from the 5,635 recruiting establishments 
according to the following rules. The total number of engagements that took place in the 
12 months prior to the interview was recorded and divided into the 9 major groups of the 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). If there had been engagements in more than 5 
occupational groups, the most recent one in each of the 5 groups in which the largest number 
of engagements had been made were selected. Otherwise, if recruitment only occurred in 
fewer than 5 occupational groups but in total more then 5 new recruits were taken on, 
the most recent in each group was selected, then, the second most recent starting with the 
most numerous group and so on until 5 engagements were selected. Finally, if fewer than 5 
engagements were made in the previous 12 months, all of them were selected, regardless of 
the occupational group. This led to a sample of 22,707 engagements.
A set of detailed questions for each of the selected engagements was asked, including
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the characteristics of the job that was offered, those of the successful applicant, accurate 
information about the duration of the vacancy, the recruitment methods activated and their 
sequence, whether the recruit was still employed at the firm and how satisfied the employer 
was with him/her. However, in order to limit the length of the interview and not to discourage 
employers’ participation in the survey, not all questions were asked for all engagements. The 
most complete set of information was collected for the most recent engagement in each 
establishment.
For this chapter some observations had to be dropped from the original sample due to 
missing or incorrect values, resulting in a valid sample of 14,609 engagements, which, rescaled 
using the weights provided by SCPR to recover the representativeness of all engagements, 
represent 10,980 new employment contracts. The descriptive statistics for the sample of 
engagements used in this chapter are reported in table 3.3.
3.4 Testing the empirical implications o f the m odel
Before moving on to the empirical test of the model, it is worth checking the level of labour 
turnover by occupation in our sample. Respondents to the SERP report the composition of 
employment at their establishment by occupation, also indicating the fraction of employees 
in each group that have been continuously employed at the firm for more than 12 months. 
The responses are coded in intervals and are shown in table 3.4. The last line of the table 
gives an overall estimate of labour turnover by taking the mid point in each interval. These 
numbers are also plotted in figure 3.2.
Results from table 3.4 and figure 3.2 broadly confirm the discussion over table 3.1: there 
seems to be a general trend towards more unstable employment relationships in lower occupa­
tions. Apart from managers, craft/skilled service workers and operatives/assembly workers, 
higher occupations typically display a higher incidence of long-lasting employment contracts.
Once confirmed that data from the SERP support the basic empirical fact that motivates
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this chapter, we can move on to the test of the various empirical implications of the theory 
presented in section 3.2. For clarity, let us classify these implications into three groups.
First, the relationship between extensive and intensive recruitment: equation (3.9) shows 
that extensive recruitment is fully determined by labour market tightness and intensive re­
cruitment. Employers search more when they also screen more, while the effect of labour 
market tightness depends on whether Ej and Qj are complements or substitutes in the match­
ing process, an issue that was left as an empirical question.
The second set of implications concerns the determinants of intensive recruitment effort 
(equations (3.8)): employers invest more in intensive screening when recruiting for highly 
productive jobs, i.e. when pj is higher.
Finally, the third set of implications addresses the initial question of the chapter and 
relates the quality of the match to the effort exerted in recruiting: the probability of a 
separation soon after hiring is lower when intensive screening is stronger (equation (3.10)) 
and vacancy duration is shorter when extensive recruitment is stronger.
Given the difficulty in observing 7Tj, the composition of workers’ types in the economy, this 
parameter is assumed to be constant within regions. Regional dummies will be introduced in 
the estimation to control for different levels of 7Tj, as well as for other region specific factors.
Before testing these implications, it is crucial to find empirically measurable indicators of 
extensive and intensive recruitment. Respondents to the SERP survey are shown a list of 17 
possible recruitment channels and they are asked to indicate how many of them were activated 
for each specific engagement, which channel was the first one used and which of them led 
to contact with the successful applicant. Using this wealth of information, I construct two 
measures for Ej  and three for Ij. The distributions of these measures are shown in figures 
3.3 and 3.4 respectively. Below is a description of how they are constructed.
The first indicator of extensive recruitment is the number of search channels activated 
for a single vacancy (figure 3.3, upper panel). For intensive recruitment we use the length of 
the screening process, measured as the number of days between contact with the successful
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applicant is first made and his/her first day of work (figure 3.4, upper panel). This measure, 
however, could be affected by a number of factors, others than mere screening time, like 
the need for the selected applicant to give notice to a previous employer or to complete 
an educational course. In order to avoid these problems, when the length of the screening 
process is used as a measure of intensive recruitment, additional controls will be introduced 
for the employment status of the successful applicant (employed, unemployed, in full-time 
education) and the situation of the vacancy (whether the previous person was still working 
in the post, whether it was a new position, etc.) at the time of recruitment.
A second measure of intensive recruitment can be constructed as the number of screen­
ing procedures normally applied at the firm. However, this measure is only available at the 
establishment level (i.e. it is identical for all engagements taking place at the same estab­
lishment). The establishment section of the questionnaire, in fact, contains questions about 
how recruitment normally takes place. In this occasion, the respondents indicate whether 
formal screening procedures are used and, if the answer is positive, what they cover from 
the following list: definition of job requirements, requirement to use particular recruitment 
channels, use of application forms, short-listing procedures, interview procedures, selection 
procedures (tests, medical checks, etc.), other procedures. The number of these procedures 
normally used at each establishment is used as a second measure of intensive recruitment 
(figure 3.4, middle panel).
Additional indicators of both E  and I  can be constructed using a set of questions regarding 
the importance of various factors in the choice of the recruitment methods used. These 
questions are asked only for one engagement in each establishment, however the available 
answers will be used to compute a ’’grade” for each method and then associate it to each 
engagement according to either the first or the successful method used for that hiring. In 
this way, the measures described below are available for all engagements in the sample.
For extensive recruitment, the following question gives an indication of the cost effective­
ness of the channels activated for a particular vacancy: ”...how important a factor in your
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use of the recruitment method(s) was keeping down the cost of announcing/advertising the 
vacancy?”. The answers axe ordered on a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (very im­
portant). Each method can then be ranked by its advertisement cost effectiveness measured 
as the average answer to this question given by respondents who activated it first. Formally, 
the measure of extensive recruitment as cost effectiveness (Ej )  for engagement j  in which 
method m  was the first channel to be activated, can be defined as follows:
y ;  (cost effectiveness)f • u j
j p c  /e^m
E >  m
where Fm is the set of all hirings where method m  was activated first and where a valid 
answer to the cost effectiveness question is available. (cost effectiveness)/  is the importance 
of ” keeping down the cost of announcing/advertising the vacancy” (on a scale 1 to 7) in 
engagement / .  |Fm| is the size of Fm. u j  is the sample weight of engagement / .  The higher 
Ej  the lower investment in extensive recruitment.
This is our second measure of extensive recruitment and its distribution by method is 
described in the lower panel of figure 3.3. Not surprisingly, posting notices on the streets, 
using Jobcentre (i.e. the British public employment service), receiving a direct application 
from the candidate and re-employing a former employee axe among the cheapest recruitment 
channels, while the most expensive methods axe fee-charging agencies, keeping on a par­
ticipant to a youth/employment training programme and approaching a candidate directly. 
However, some results axe surprising. For example, advertising on local free sheets and rec­
ommendation axe not chosen particularly for their low cost. This result could be due to the 
fact that often these methods axe used in combination with others and respondents give an 
evaluation of the overall combination of channels used.
A similar indicator is constructed for intensive screening using the following question: 
”...how important a factor in your use of the recruitment method(s) was attracting only the 
most suitable candidates?”. In this case, however, the ranking is made using the successful
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method instead of the first one used. Formally and analogously to Ej, a measure of intensive 
recruitment as accuracy in attracting good candidates ( /“) in engagement j ,  where contact 
with the successful applicant was obtained through method m, can be defined as follows:
(accuracy)s • u 3
where Sm is the set of all hirings where method m  led to contact with the successful applicant 
and where a valid answer to the accuracy question is available, (accuracy)s is the importance 
of ”attracting only the most suitable candidates” (on a scale 1 to 7) in engagement s. |5m| is 
the size of Sm. ws is the sample weight of engagement s. The higher / “ the higher investment 
in intensive recruitment.
This is our third measure of intensive recruitment and its distribution by method is 
described in the lower panel of figure 3.4. Advertising on specialised trade press, fee-charging 
agencies, approaching a candidate directly and reemploying a previous employee are among 
the most ’’accurate” recruitment methods, while advertising on local free sheets, posting 
notices on the streets and using the Jobcentres rank very poorly.
To summarise and fix ideas, for each engagement there will be two measures of extensive 
recruitment - the number of channels activated and the ’’cost effectiveness” of the first method 
used. Both these measures are available for all engagements. Intensive recruitment will be 
measured by three indicators - the length of the screening process, the number of formal 
screening procedures normally applied at the establishment and the accuracy of the method 
that led to contact with the successful applicant. The first indicator is only available for the 
most recent engagement in each establishment, the second one is available for all engagements 
but it only varies at the establishment level, the third is available for all engagements and 
varies both by establishment and by engagement within the same establishment.
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Test 1: th e  correlation  betw een extensive and  intensive recru itm en t The empirical 
counterpart of equation (3.9) is a regression of extensive recruitment on intensive screening, 
controlling for labour market tightness. In table 3.5 this correlation is tested using our two 
measures of E  and three measures of I.
The first four columns of table 3.5 use the number of activated channels as a measure 
of extensive recruitment. The estimates are obtained from an ordered probit regression, 
alternating the three measures of intensive recruitment as explanatory variables. Labour 
market tightness is measured, here as well as in all the other regressions reported below, as 
the ratio between the number of unfilled vacancies and the number of unemployment benefit 
claimants in the region where the establishment is located and in the month during which 
the engagement took place. Additionally, regional dummies are also introduced to control 
for variation in the availability of qualified applicants in the area (7tj).
The estimates of columns 1 and 2 confirm the prediction of equation (3.9): employers use 
more methods to advertise a vacancy when they also take more time to screen applicants and 
when they use more formal screening procedures. However, in contrast with the predictions, 
results in column 3 show that the number of activated channels is negatively correlated with 
the accuracy of the successful method. This contradicting result is robust to the introduction 
of establishments’ fixed-effects.
Remember that these could not be introduced in column 1 and 2 because the length of 
the screening process is only available for one observation in each establishment while the 
number of screening procedures is constant within establishments. However, our indicator of 
’’accuracy” of recruitment does vary by both establishment and engagement, hence its effect 
on extensive recruitment can be identified even with the introduction of establishment’s fixed- 
effects. Nevertheless, ordered probit models do not easily allow to control for unobserved 
fixed-effects, thus, in order to facilitate the estimation, the results in column 4 of table 3.5 
are obtained with a simple linear regression with fixed-effects.
The last 4 columns of table 3.5 repeat the same estimation using our measure of ’’cost
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effectiveness” as a dependent variable. Remember that now higher investment in extensive 
recruitment is associated with a lower value of the dependent variable. Moreover, given the 
nature of the dependent variable, the estimation can now be carried out with a simple linear 
model. In this case, results confirm the predicted positive correlation between E  and I  when 
the length of the screening process and the accuracy of recruitment are used as measures of
I. Opposite results emerge using the number of formal screening procedures.
The theory of section 3.2 leaves the effect of labour market tightness as an empirical issue 
as it all depends on the complementarity or substitutability of E  and 9 in the matching 
process. Ideally, one would like to use a measure of 9 that varies by region, occupational 
groups as well as over time. Unfortunately, reliable data on vacancies and unemployment 
during the years covered by the SERP exist only by region and month. A change in the 
occupational classification that occurred in the middle of 1992 makes it difficult to reconstruct 
data on vacancies by occupation for this period. This implies that our measure of 9 only varies 
by region and month. Moreover, due to the presence of regional dummies in all the equations, 
the effect of 9 is eventually identified only by the time-variation across months. Given the 
short time span of our analysis, this variation is often limited and the effect of labour market 
tightness is rarely significant. However, the coefficient on 9 is significant in 3 out of the 4 last 
columns of table 3.5, where extensive recruitment is measured as cost effectiveness, and the 
point estimate is consistently positive. This implies that in tighter labour markets employers 
spend less on announcing and advertising their vacancies, suggesting that E  and 9 might be 
complements in the matching process5.
Overall, most of the results in table 3.5 seem to support the predicted positive correlation 
between extensive and intensive recruitment, however, the difficulties in measuring these two 
variables lead to contrasting conclusions for some indicators.
5This result is consistent with the ”discouraged job” effect, described in Pissarides (2000) and discussed 
in chapter 2.
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Test 2: th e  determ inan ts of intensive recru itm ent Equation (3.8) describes the de­
terminants of investment in intensive recruitment, in particular it predicts that I  should be 
positively correlated with productivity (p). This implication is tested in table 3.6, where our 
three measures of intensive recruitment are regressed on regional labour market tightness 
and a set of indicators of the productivity of the match, such as the occupational group, the 
type of contract and whether the job requires supervising other workers. A set of additional 
controls is also introduced in the regressions, including regional dummies and all observable 
characteristics of the establishment and of the successful applicant. The estimation method 
is linear in all columns but column 2, where the dependent variable is the number of formal 
screening procedures applied at the establishment and an ordered probit is used. Moreover, 
in this case the dependent variable only varies across firms and the estimation is performed 
on the sample of establishments rather than engagements. Here the occupational dummies 
are replaced by the fraction of employees in each occupational groups over total employment 
at the firm.
In the last two columns the ’’accuracy” of recruitment is used as a measure of I  and, as 
already noted above, this allows to introduce establishment’s fixed-effects in the estimation. 
Hence, column 3 reports results without fixed-effects (but with standard errors corrected to 
account for correlation between observations within the same establishment) while these are 
included in column 4.
Results strongly confirm the implication that intensive recruitment effort is stronger when 
employers are filling high-productivity jobs. This is clearly indicated by the coefficients on 
the occupational dummies, which grow in size and significance moving from low to high 
occupations. These coefficients axe also shown in figure 3.5, where they visually confirm 
the presence of a statistically significant trend towards more intensive recruitment in top 
occupations. Additionally, jobs that require supervising co-workers axe typically associated 
with higher recruitment effort while the effect of non-permanent contracts is more ambiguous.
Finally, results seem to confirm the prediction that labour market tightness does not affect
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investment in intensive recruitment. Only in one of the columns of table 3.6 its coefficient 
is marginally significant and the signs of the various point estimates differ. However and 
as already noted above, we cannot rule out the possibility that this result is merely due to 
the limited time-variation in our measure of 9. It also interesting to note the effect of the 
establishment’s size: larger firms tend to exert more recruitment effort.
Test 3: recru itm en t effort and  th e  quality  of m atches The final set of empirical 
implications relates recruitment effort to various outcomes. Let us start with the effects of 
extensive recruitment. In the model E  is assumed to be positively correlated with the meeting 
probability. Empirically, this implies that when more recruitment channels are activated for 
the same vacancy, more applications are received and vacancy duration is shorter.
Unfortunately, data from the SERP only allow to test the effect on the number of ap­
plications received. In fact, although data about vacancy duration axe available, they are 
collected in such a way that the resulting sample is inevitably biased towards short durations. 
The SERP is a sample of engagements, i.e. of all completed durations. A random sample 
of vacancy durations would ideally include all vacancies posted on a given date and would 
follow them over time. Suppose that from this ideal sample we keep only vacancies that 
have been filled by a later date. The resulting sample would necessarily over-represent short 
durations. This is precisely the problem with the SERP: there certainly are vacancies that 
were posted together with those present in our data and which were still open at the time of 
the survey. This problem is similar in nature, but of opposite direction, to the more common 
”stock sampling”, which leads to oversampling of long durations instead. As a consequence, 
any estimation of vacancy duration made using the SERP data is doomed to be incorrect. 
For this reason, the estimations in table 3.7 only look at the correlation between extensive 
recruitment and the number of applications received6.
6The number of applications per vacancy in this dataset is much higher than similar statistics from other 
studies (Brown et al. (1999), Holzer et al. (1991), Manning (2000 and 2003), van Ours et al. (1992)). This 
is probably due to the overrepresentation of large establishments in the SERP which often have multiple 
vacancy openings.
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To account for the discrete nature of the dependent variable, these equations Eire estimated 
using a Poisson regression. The set of explanatory variables alternates our measures of 
extensive recruitment and always includes additional controls: all observable characteristics 
of the vacancy and of the establishment, occupational and regional dummies. Unfortunately, 
information about the number of applications received is only available for the most recent 
engagement and only for those cases when contact with the successful applicant is made 
through a formal method (i.e. newspaper advertisement, internal and/or external notices, 
agencies). This reduces the sample to 1863 unweighted engagements and makes it impossible 
to control for unobservable fixed-effects at the firm level.
In the first 2 columns of table 3.7 extensive recruitment is measured with the number of 
activated recruitment channels and it is introduced linearly in column 1 and with a separate 
dummy for each cumulative number of activated methods in column 2. In both cases the 
results are uncontroversial: activating more recruitment channels leads to more applications 
being received for the same vacancy. The dummies in column 2, however, indicate the 
presence of some non-linearities: using more than 4 methods does not increase the application 
rate any more.
In the third column, the number of activated methods is replaced by our indicator of cost 
effectiveness as a measure of extensive recruitment. The estimated coefficient is not signifi­
cant but the point estimate confirms the previous results: when using cheaper recruitment 
channels, employers receive less applications.
Finally, it is interesting to note two more results from table 3.7. First, large firms sys­
tematically receive more applications. This is consistent with findings from various previous 
papers (Holzer at al. (1991)). Second, vacancies for supervisory jobs and jobs in the top 
occupational groups receive significantly less applications. This is consistent with the theory 
in Moscarini (2001) where it is argued that "...workers with specialized skills search selectively 
and contact few vacancies where they have very high chances of beating competing applicants. 
The other workers search more randomly and apply to any vacancy they hear of...” (pag.
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594).
Let us now move on to the empirical analysis of the effects of intensive recruitment. The 
results, reported in table 3.8, strongly support the motivating idea of this chapter: more 
intensive recruitment effort leads to matches of higher quality. The estimations reported 
in table 3.8 apply our three measures of intensive recruitment to three measures of match 
quality: satisfaction of the employer with the recruit, the initial wage and tenure.
In the SERP employers are asked whether they are satisfied with the person hired. This 
information is available for all engagements, even for those that are already terminated at 
the time of the interview. However, in several cases (12%) the respondent could not answer 
the question because the recruit had been at the firm for a too short period. These observa­
tions have been dropped from the sample. The first three columns of table 3.8 explore the 
correlation between intensive recruitment and satisfaction of the employer with the recruit. 
This is done by estimating a logit model for the probability of being ’’very satisfied” on in­
tensive recruitment, controlling for all other observables characteristics of the vacancy and of 
the recruit. When possible, unobservable firm fixed-effect are also included7. The estimates 
indicate that two measures of intensive recruitment - the number of formal screening proce­
dures and the ” accuracy” of the recruitment method - are strongly and positively correlated 
with employer’s satisfaction. This result is robust to the introduction of firm fixed-effects 
in column 3, where the accuracy of the successful recruitment method is used as a measure 
of I. The length of the screening process, used in column 1, appears to have no effect on 
satisfaction.
In the following three columns of table 3.8 - columns 4, 5 and 6 - the same exercise is 
repeated using the initial wage paid to the recruit as a measure of match quality. In this 
case a simple linear model is estimated including the same set of controls and introducing 
firm fixed-effects in column 6, when intensive recruitment is measured with the accuracy of
7Here, the logit specification is preferred to the probit, because it easily allows the introduction of unob­
servable fixed-effects.
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the successful method, an indicator that varies across both establishments and engagements. 
Results unambiguously point towards higher wages paid to recruits that have been screened 
more accurately.
Finally, the last three columns of table 3.8 explore the effect of intensive recruitment on 
tenure, i.e. on the probability of a separation occurring shortly after the creation of the 
match. This is the correct empirical counterpart of equation (3.10): separations occurring 
soon after hiring are more likely than later separations to be due to inefficient matching. As 
already described in section 3, the SERP collects information about a set of engagements 
that took place within 12 months before the interview. Some of these matches, namely 7% 
of the total, had already been destroyed by the time of the survey. One can use the variation 
in job tenure generated by these matches to identify the effect of recruitment practices on 
the probability of a job separation occurring soon after hiring. Variation in the duration of 
matches that are still active also helps the identification of the parameters.
This is done using a proportional hazard model in discrete time, which will need to be 
adjusted for the peculiar way data on tenure are collected in the SERP. Uncompleted dura­
tions, i.e. tenure for continuing matches, can be computed in days using information about 
the date of the interview and the date when the recruit started his/her job. Uncompleted 
durations, however, are recorded in intervals: when the person has already left the firm the 
responded is only asked to indicate whether he/she had been employed less than a week, 
between a week and a month, between 1 and 3 months, etc.
For simplicity, we take a week as the basic time unit and the duration of uncompleted 
spells is reaggregated from days to weeks. Then, adopting a standard proportional hazard 
model, the likelihood contribution of a continuing match, j ,  lasting for Tj weeks is defined 
by the following survivor function:
P r{ t > 3} | X j}  =  5(3}| X j , i )  = exp \-H (T j) ■ zi x ‘
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where X j  is a set of controls, including all observable characteristics of the firm and the
worker, and 7  is the corresponding set of parameters. H(Tj)  is the so-called ’’integrated
Ti
hazard”, i.e. H(Tj) = Jho(u)du,  where ho(u) is the baseline hazard at time u. Using this
0
definition, it is customary to derive a discrete time hazard as follows:
h(Tj | Xj)  = Pr {Tj -  1 > t > Tj \ t > T j , X j , 7 } =
-  - 1 m T > - 11 -  « « > ' }
Rearranging this equation one can derive the following useful expression:
log[l -  h(Tj I X,-,7)] = [H{Tj -  1) -  H ^ ) }
and:
log( log [1 -  KTj  | X* 7 )]) =  ey *  + log [H(Tj -  1) -  H(T,)\
Notice that now H(Tj — 1) — H(Tj)  is a function of the baseline hazard only:
log [H(Tj -  1) -  H(Tj)} = log
a3J  ho(u)du
T i - 1
=  Ti
which allows to rewrite the previous expression as:
log(- log [1 -  h{Tj | X j , 7 )]) = e*x * +  Tj
hence:
h(Tj | X j, 7 ) =  1 — exp — exp \e1>Xj +  Tj
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which is usually called complementary log-log transformation of the hazard. Writing the 
hazard in this form is useful for our purposes because it easily allows to account for differences 
in the coding of tenure by simply defining different t / s .
For destroyed matches that lasted between, say, 7] and Tu the corresponding Tj can be 
written as:
T j  =  log
t uJ  ho(u)du
L Tz
This means that introducing a set of dummies for each coding of tenure (i.e. a dummy for 
matches that lasted less than a week, another for those lasting between a week and a month, 
and so on) allows to control for differences in time intervals.
Results are reported in the last three columns of table 3.8. While the length of the 
recruitment process appears to have no effect on the probability of a job separation and the 
number of screening procedures is only mildly and positively correlated with it, the strongest 
result is in column 9, where the accuracy of the successful method is used as a measure of 
intensive recruitment. The estimated coefficient points towards a strong and significant effect 
of intensive recruitment in the direction of lowering the probability of a job separation.
Theoretically, it would be possible to introduce firm unobservable heterogeneity in this 
estimation. However, this is not done here for two reasons. First, when the baseline hazard 
is fully non-parametric the role of unobserved heterogeneity is minimal (Heckman at al. 
(1984)). Second, given the small fraction of completed spells in our sample, imposing further 
restrictions on the likelihood function makes it difficult to identify all the parameters8.
Overall, the results of table 3.8 support the basic idea of this chapter: more intensive 
recruitment leads to matches of better quality that pay higher wages, last longer and make 
employers more satisfied with the person taken on.
8In fact, the maximum likelihood estimation of the model with unobserved heterogeneity does not converge 
easily.
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3.5 Conclusions
The available evidence for various countries and time periods indicates that employment 
relationships are far less stable in low- than in high-productivity jobs. This regularity remains 
true after controlling for a number of personal and job characteristics, making it an interesting 
theoretical and empirical puzzle. This chapter offers an explanation for this finding based 
on the idea that employers find it less profitable to invest in search and screening activities 
when recruiting for low-productivity jobs. As a consequence, matches at the lower end of 
the jobs’ distribution are more likely to be of poor quality, in the sense that the same worker 
(job) can be paired with another job (worker) into a more productive match, hence they are 
destroyed more frequently.
This idea is formalised in a simple model in which employers optimally choose their 
investment in extensive (search and advertisement) and intensive (screening) recruitment, and 
the effects of such investment on match quality can be analysed. A unique dataset of hirings 
that took place in the United Kingdom in 1992 is used to test the model empirically. Results 
show that (i) investment in extensive and intensive recruitment are positively correlated, 
(ii) employers screen more intensively when recruiting for jobs in higher occupational groups 
and (iii) matches created through more intensive screening last longer, pay higher wages and 
make employers more satisfied with the person taken on.
Understanding the causes of differentials in labour turnover is important in itself, to 
improve our knowledge of the functioning of the labour market, but it is also interesting from 
a policy perspective. Unstable employment relationships for certain categories of workers 
and jobs can generate large inequalities both in income levels and in its variability. Most 
people spend their entire working life in the same occupation and industry and if the quality of 
matches in these jobs is constantly low they will experience higher job and earnings instability, 
leading to higher inequality and possibly higher poverty. Policies aimed at improving the 
quality of matching axe, thus, likely to have positive effects on both equity and efficiency, 
particularly if they are focused on unskilled workers and elementary occupations.
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Table 3.1: Labour turnover by occupation
Turnover | % of movers into unemployment S % of industry stayers |
j j among the emp.-to-emp. movers j
Occupation 1993 2003 1993 2003 1993 2003
1 managers and senior officials 3.05 3.83 26.77 25.44 63.73 59.12
2 professional occupations 2.91 3.40 19.38 13.85 83.82 76.46
3 associate professional and technical 3.51 4.62 23.77 16.86 80.60 64.03
4 administrative and secretarial 4.71 5.52 22.34 15.47 68.64 63.06
5 skilled trades occupations 4.80 6.26 44.10 24.09 74.08 73.43
6 personal service occupations 7.01 5.30 19.19 14.48 73.06 64.51
7 sales and customer service occupations 8.38 9.73 21.51 15.81 55.97 51.12
8 process, plant and machine operatives 5.47 6.49 37.06 21.77 76.78 49.53
9 elementary occupations 7.56 9.01 29.08 22.26 61.47 55.19
Total 5.09 5.84 26.84 19.11 69.29 60.56
Note: turnover is computed as the fraction of dependent employees in the first quarter of the year who experienced a job change (to another job, to unemployment or to 
inactivity) by the time they were re-interviewed 3 moths later in the second quarter. The sample excludes transitions to retirement.
The %  of occupation stayers is computed as the fraction of dependent employees in the first quarter of the year who are observed in another job but in the same occupation 
Source: Q u a rte rly  L ab o u r Force S u rvey
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for the sample of establishments
unweighted weighted
Sample size 5343 6083
Variable Mean Mean
employment 314.83 (778.56) 40.53 (0.96)
m an u a l w orkers1 0.30 (0.30) 0.21 (0.01)
professionals2 0.26 (0.24) 0.28 (0.01)
Labour intensity (labour costs as % of total costs)
less than  25% 0.22 (0.41) 0.23 (0.01)
25%  to  50% 0.29 (0.45) 0.31 (0.01)
50%  to  75% 0.19 (0.39) 0.17 (0.01)
m ore than  75% 0.30 (0.46) 0.29 (0.01)
Industry
energy, w ater, etc. 0.01 (0.11) 0.00  (0.00)
m eta l, m inerals, etc. 0.04 (0 .20) 0.02  (0.00)
m e ta l goods, engineering, etc. 0.11 (0.32) 0.06 (0.01)
o th e r m an u factu rin g 0.13 (0.33) 0.06 (0.00)
construction 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.00)
d is trib u tio n , catering , etc. 0.22 (0.41) 0.33 (0.01)
tran sp o rt a n d  com m unication 0.04 (0.19) 0.05 (0.01)
B ankin g, insurance, etc. 0.15 (0.36) 0.17 (0.01)
o th e r services 0.26 (0.44) 0.28 (0.01)
Trend in activity in the past 12 months
expanding 0.41 (0.49) 0.43 (0.01)
co n trac tin g 0.20 (0.40) 0.16 (0.01)
Capital utilisation
below  fu ll cap ac ity 0.47 (0.50) 0.49 (0.01)
overloaded 0.01 (0.11) 0.02  (0.00)
1=  change of ownership in the past 3 years 0.13 (0.33) 0.10  (0 .01)
Region
London 0.07 (0.25) 0.11 (0.01)
re s t o f  S outh  E a s t 0.10 (0.30) 0.19 (0.01)
E a s t A n g lia 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.00)
S outh  W est 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.01)
W est M id lan d s 0.11 (0.31) 0.09 (0 .01)
E a s t M id lan d s 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.01)
Y o rk /H u m  bershire 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.01)
N o rth  W est 0.12 (0.32) 0.12  (0.01)
N o rth 0.10 (0.29) 0.04 (0.00)
W ales 0.09 (0.29) 0.05 (0.00)
S co tlan d 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.01)
Establishments by number of engagements
One 0.15 (0.35) 0.29 (0.01)
Two 0.13 (0.34) 0.20  (0.01)
Three 0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.01)
Four 0.20 (0.40) 0.16 (0.01)
Five 0.38 (0.48) 0.21 (0.01)
Standard erros in paretheses
1. routine, unskilled, operatives and assembly workers
2. professional and technical associates, professionals, managers and administrators 
Source: Survey of Employers Recruitment Practices, 1992
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for the sample of recruits
unweighted weighted
Mean (sd) valid obs. Mean (sd) valid obs.
The vacancy
supervisory job 0.18 (0.38) 14609 0.16 (0.01) 10980
non permanent contract3 0.21 (0.41) 14609 0.35 (0.02) 10980
Occupation
R o u tin e , unskilled 0.15 (0.35) 14609 0.15 (0.01) 10980
O peratives  an d  assem bly 0.14 (0.34) 14609 0.21 (0.01) 10980
Sales 0.11 (0.31) 14609 0.06 (0.01) 10980
P ro te c tiv e /P e rs o n a l service 0.07 (0.26) 14609 0.07 (0.01) 10980
C ra ft/S k ille d  service 0.09 (0.29) 14609 0.06 (0.01) 10980
C le ric a l an d  secre taria l 0.20 (0.40) 14609 0.21 (0.01) 10980
P rofessional a n d  tech n ica l associates 0.09 (0.28) 14609 0.10  (0.01) 10980
P rofessional 0.08 (0.27) 14609 0.10  (0.01) 10980
M an ag em en t/ad m in is tra tio n 0.08 (0.27) 14609 0.04 (0 .00) 10980
The succesful applicant
female 0.50 (0.50) 14609 0.54 (0.02) 10980
Age
1 6 - 1 8 0.08 (0.27) 14609 0.06 (0.01) 10980
1 9 - 2 4 0.25 (0.43) 14609 0.27 (0.02) 10980
2 5 - 3 4 0.34 (0.47) 14609 0.39 (0.02) 10980
3 5 - 4 4 0.21 (0.40) 14609 0.19 (0.01) 10980
4 5 - 5 4 0.10 (0.30) 14609 0.07 (0.01) 10980
5 5  o r o ver 0.03 (0.16) 14609 0.01 (0.00) 10980
Ethinc group
W h ite 0.96 (0.21) ' 14609 0.92 (0.01) 10980
B lack, etc 0.02 (0.12) 14609 0.03 (0.01) 10980
A sian 0.02 (0.15) 14609 0.05 (0.01) 10980
O th e r 0.01 (0.08) 14609 0.01 (0 .00) 10980
disable 0.02 (0.13) 14609 0.02  (0 .01) 10980
Outcome variables
Hourly pay (gross) 5.31 (3.52) 14609 5.60 (0.11) 10980
Satisfaction
n o t a t a ll sa tis fied 0.01 (0.11) 14609 0.01 (0 .00) 10980
n o t very  sa tis fied 0.02 (0.15) 14609 0.01 (0.00) 10980
fa ir ly  sa tis fied 0.26 (0.44) 14609 0.25 (0.01) 10980
very  sa tis fied 0.62 (0.49) 14609 0.47 (0.02) 10980
too e a ly  to  say 0.09 (0.29) 14609 0.26 (0.02) 10980
number of applications received2 43.75 (98.62) 1855 59.32 (9.81) 2338
The labour market
Labour market tightness3 (*100) 4.79 (1.80) 14609 4.68 (0.06) 10980
1. Temporary, casual, part-time contracts
2. This question is only asked for the most recent engagement and only when contact with the successful applicant was 
made through a formal recruitment method (i.e. newspaper advertisment, notices, agencies)
3. Ratio between unfilled vacancies and unemployment benefit claimants in the quarter in which the recruit started 
working. (Source: Nomis)
Source: Survey of Employers Recruitment Practices, 1992.
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Table 3.4: Turnover by Occupational Groups
%  o f e x is tin g  em ployees who h ave  been w orking  fo r th e  sam e organ isation  continuously over the  p a s t 1 2  m onths
Routine, Operatives and Protective & Craft & Skilled Clerical and Professional & Management &
unskilled assembly Sales Personal service service secretarial technical associates Professional administration
0% 0.59 0.57 1.34 1.48 0.95 0.49 0.82 0.83 1.49
1% - 9% 1.34 0.93 0.71 1.14 1.38 0.90 1.31 0.71 0.86
10% - 19% 0.32 0.51 0.79 0.60 0.29 0.86 2.13 1.51 0.57
20% - 39% 3.68 1.12 5.92 1.77 0.84 1.16 1.14 2.16 1.02
40% - 59% 14.45 5.02 8.93 3.31 1.83 2.55 4.09 2.62 0.71
60% - 79% 16.57 10.04 15.68 23.52 5.33 12.52 14.65 18.33 4.10
80% - 89% 17.24 16.91 22.45 28.68 11.44 24.68 23.19 20.06 10.42
90% or over 40.20 62.99 42.04 34.51 75.83 50.56 48.33 49.30 77.26
not stated 5.61 1.92 2.14 5.00 2.12 6.28 4.34 4.48 3.57
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Estimated turnover1 27.60 16.05 24.19 24.46 13.41 20.72 21.67 21.42 14.25
1. The overall %  o f employees with tenure longer than 12 months is computed by taking the m id  point in each band. Estim ated turnover is 100 minus this overall estimate. 
Source: Survey o f Em ployers Recrutim ent Practices, 1992
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Table 3.5: Correlation between intensive and extensive recruitment
Dependent variable #  of methods used cost effectiveness of first method used1
Estimation method ord. probit ord. probit ord. probit FE OLS OLS OLS FE
__________________________:__________ [1]_________ PI [3] [41 [51 [6] [7] |8]
length of recruitment (days)2 0.005***
(0.001)
- - - -0.001***
(0.000)
- - -
#  of formal screening procedures3 - 0.195***
(0.010)
- - - 0.009**
(0.005)
-0.512***
(0.017)
-
“Accuracy” of successful method4 - - -0.346***
(0.028)
-0.151***
(0.019)
- - - -0.469***
(0.016)
Labour market tightness (v/u)5 2.146 2.191 2.428 2.485** 3.209** 2.210** 1.691* 1.469
(2.676) (1.753) (1.739) (1.256) (1.241) (0.925) (0.879) (1.093)
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no
Additional controls6 yes no no no yes no no no
Establishment fixed-effects no no no yes no no no yes
Observations 3435 14520 14520 10489 3435 14520 14520 10489
Number of establishments 3435 4658 4658 3990 3435 4658 4658 3990
Log Likelihood -3423.65 -13204.21 -13443.88 -7310.47 -3192.86 -14444.68 -13418.84 -5848.95
1. Average employers’ evaluation of the cost effectiveness of recruitment methods (see text and figure 3).
2 . #  of days between the first contact is made with the successful applicant and his/her first day of work
3. Formal procedures include: use of application forms, short-listing procedures, interviews, selection procedures (medical, security checks, tests, references, trial 
periods, etc.), other procedures.
4. Average employers’ evaluation of the accuracy of recruitment methods (see text and figure 4).
5. Ratio between unfilled vacancies and unemployment benefit claimants in the month in which the recruit started working. (Source: Nomis)
6 . These include a set of dummies for the employment status of the successful candidate (employed, unemployed, inactive, student, etc.) and for the status of the 
vacancy (vacant, filled by previous worker, etc.) at the time of recruitment.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the establishment level in columns [2], [3], [6], [7] and the regional level in columns [1] and [5]).
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
"able 3.6: The determinants of screening intensity 173
•ependent variable
istimation method 
lean of dep. variable
lenght of 
recrutiment (days)1 
OLS 
19.3 
[11
#  of formal screening 
procedures2 
Ordered probit 
2.9 
[21
“Accuracy”
OLS
6.0
[3]
of successful method3
FE
6.0
[41
•ccupational category4
operatives &; assembly 0.405 0.384*** 0.013 0.040*
(0.951) (0.114) (0.016) (0.022)
sales 6.130*** 0.333*** 0.060*** 0.109***
(1.305) (0.104) (0.017) (0.024)
protective/personal services 6.894*** 0.628*** 0.022 0.039
(1.973) (0.173) (0.018) (0.026)
craft/skilled service 5.080** 0.140 -0.011 -0.013
(1.972) (0.176) (0.017) (0.023)
clerical & secretarial 7.337*** 0.569*** 0.074*** 0.069***
(1.291) (0.128) (0.014) (0.020)
prof. ass. &: techinical 15.957*** 0.438*** 0.197*** 0.204***
(1.626) (0.158) (0.019) (0.024)
professional 34.095*** 0.646*** 0.382*** 0.362***
(3.271) (0.106) (0.020) (0.025)
managemen t/adm inistration 21.927*** 0.148 0.293*** 0.297***
(4.156) (0.297) (0.021) (0.027)
ype of job
supervisory 0.380 - 0.067*** 0.078***
(1.009) (0.013) (0.016)
non-permanen t -7.577*** - 0.060*** 0.044***
(0.776) (0.011) (0.016)
.egional labour market tightness -175.870 -1.150* 0.468
,/u)5 (102.074) (0.603) (0.795)
istablishment’s size
#  o f employees 0.736*** 0.061*** 0.003** -
(0.195) (0.008) (0.001)
#  o f employees ~2 -0.008** -0.001*** -0.000 -
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
.ecruit’s characteristics6 yes no yes yes
ob’s characteristics7 yes no yes yes
istablishment’s characteristics8 yes yes yes no
stablishment’s fixed effects no no no yes
.egional dummies yes yes yes no
.dditional controls9 yes no no no
Ibservations 3435 _ 14520 . 10489
istablishments 3435 3985 4658 3990
og Likelihood -16356.77 -4783.24 -8621.87 -2458.32
#  of days between the first contact is made with the successful applicant and his/her first day of work
. Formal procedures include: use of application forms, short-listing procedures, interviews, selection procedures (medical, security checks, tests, 
iferences, trial periods, etc.), other procedures.
Average employers’ evaluation of the accuracy of recruitment methods (see text and figure 4).
The reference group is ro u tin e  &: unskilled  workers.
Ratio between unfilled vacancies and unemployment benefit claimants in the month in which the recruit started working. (Source: Nomis) 
Gender dummy, age dummies, ethnic group dummies, disable dummy, employment status at the time of recruitment (employed, unemployed, 
lactive, student, etc.).
Dummies for supervisory and non-permanent jobs, status of the vacancy (vacant, filled by previous worker, etc.) at the time of recruitment. 
Establishment’s size (linear and squared), occupational composition of the workforce, labour intensity (% of labour costs over total costs), cap: 
tilization (below full capacity, overloaded), activity trend (expanding vs. contracting), a dummy for change of ownership in the past 3 years, 
ummies for company type (limited, partnership, charity, et.), dummies for establishment type (administrative vs. production, headquarter vs. n 
sad quarter), industry dummies.
These include a set of dummies for the employment status of the successful candidate (employed, unemployed, inactive, student, etc.) and for 
,atus of the vacancy (vacant, filled by previous worker, etc.) at the time of recruitment.
obust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by region in column [1] and by establishment in column [2], [3], [4]). 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.7: The effects of extensive recruitment
Dependent variable #  of applications received1
Estimation method poisson regression
Mean of dep. Variable 43.7
_________________ [?]_________________ [31
#  of recruitment methods used
2 methods used
0.231***
(0.045)
0.165**
3 methods used
(0.070)
0.297***
4 methods used
(0.100)
1.080***
(0.165)
5 methods used - -0.005 -
6 methods used
(0.414)
0.777
Cost effectiveness of first method used2
(0.748)
-0.097
Regional labour market tightness (v/u)3 6.044 6.537
(0.186)
5.533
(9.665) (9.624) (10.287)
Type of job
supervisory -0.319* -0.352** -0.306*
(0.185) (0.178) (0.169)
non-permanen t -0.053 -0.046 -0.094
(0.136) (0.131) (0.134)
Establishment’s size
#  o f employees 0.113*** 0.107*** 0.125***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.028)
#  o f employees ~2 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) , (0.001)
Occupational dummies yes yes yes
Establishment’s characteristics4 yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes
Observations 1855 1855 1855
Individuals 1855 1855 1855
Log Likelihood -71577.71 -70618.82 -73366.60
1. The sample is restricted to vacancies filled through a “formal” recruitment method (i.e. the successful applicant is first 
contacted through newspaper advertisement, internal or external notices, recruitment agencies, both public and private).
2. Average employers’ evaluation of the cost effectiveness of recruitment methods (see text and figure 3).
3. Ratio between unfilled vacancies and unemployment benefit claimants in the month in which the recruit started working. 
(Source: Nomis)
4. Composition of the workforce (% of employees in each occupational group), labour intensity (% of labour costs over total 
costs), capital utilization (below full capacity, overloaded), activity trend (expanding vs. contracting), a dummy for change 
of ownership in the past 3 years, dummies for company type (limited, partnership, charity, et.), dummies for establishment 
type (administrative vs. production, headquarter vs. non-headquarter), industry dummies, regional dummies.
Robust standard errors (clustered by regions) in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3.8: Intensive recruitment and the quality ot tbe match
Dependent variable 
Estimation method
i / o
l=very satisfied with the recruit
, .. conditionallogitlogit logit
(log) initial wage1 
OLS OLS FE
Tenure (weeks) 
proportional hazard
Mean of dep. Variable 0.67
[1]
0.68
[2]
0.69
[3]
1.47
[41
1.50
[51
1.53
[61
20.3T
[7]
20.452
[8]
20.452
[9]
length of recruitment (days)3 -0.000
(0.001)
0.001***
(0.000)
- - 0.000
(0.002)
#  of formal screening procedures4 - 0.081***
(0.017)
- - 0.013***
(0.003)
- - 0.050*
(0.029)
-
“Accuracy” of successful method5 - - 0.591***
(0.093)
- - 0.082***
(0.008)
- - -0.405***
(0.100)
Regional labour market tightness (v/u)6 1.164 1.851 1.404 -0.562 -0.935** -1.467*** -5.458 -0.135 -33.456***
(6.191) (3.070) (5.471) (0.675) (0.422) (0.487) (14.074) (0.650) (5.566)
Occupational dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Recruit’s characteristics7 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Job’s characteristics8 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Establishment’s characteristics9 yes yes no yes yes no yes yes yes
Establishment’s fixed effects no no yes no no yes no no no
Regional dummies yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no
Additional controls10 yes no no yes no no yes no no
Duration dependence11 - - - - - - yes yes yes
Observations 2910 13168 9493 3557 14520 10489 11713 65327 65327
Establishments 2910 4529 3857 3557 4658 3990 3251 14332 14332
Log Likelihood -1714.56 -7867.12 - - - - -313.12 -1898.67 -1889.73
1. Gross and hourly.
2. Most observations (95%) are right censored, the mean is heavily underestimated.
3. #  of days between the first contact is made with the successful applicant and his/her first day of work
4. Formal procedures include: use of application forms, short-listing procedures, interviews, selection procedures (medical, security checks, tests, references, trial periods, etc.), other 
procedures.
5. Average employers’ evaluation of the accuracy of recruitment methods (see text and figure 4).
6. Ratio between unfilled vacancies and unemployment benefit claimants in the month in which the recruit started working. (Source: Nomis)
7. Gender dummy, age dummies, ethnic group dummies, disable dummy, employment status at the time of recruitment (employed, unemployed, inactive, student, etc.).
8. Dummies for supervisory and non-permanent jobs, status of the vacancy (vacant, filled by previous worker, etc.) at the time of recruitment.
9. Establishment’s size (linear and squared), occupational composition of the workforce, labour intensity (% of labour costs over total costs), capital utilization (below full capacity, 
overloaded), activity trend (expanding vs. contracting), a dummy for change of ownership in the past 3 years, dummies for company type (limited, partnership, charity, et.), 
dummies for establishment type (administrative vs. production, headquarter vs. non-headquarter), industry dummies.
10. These include a set of dummies for the employment status of the successful candidate (employed, unemployed, inactive, student, etc.) and for the status of the vacancy (vacant, 
filled by previous worker, etc.) at the time of recruitment.
11. To control for the specific design of the tenure data, duration dummies for each possible exit time (from week 1 to week 24) have been included. See text for details.
Robust standard errors (clustered by region in columns [1] and [4]) in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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A PP E N D IX  3. A: Derivation o f the comparative statics 
effects
P roposition  6 ^  >  0alj
Proof. Equation (3.9) can be rewritten as:
4E^ i ) m  =  (1 +  +  f  (3.11)
Taking the first partial differential with respect to Ej and Ij yields:
[i _ dEj =  f ( T f ) [l + r + & 0 J  1^ )5] 4
S V f ? )
which, given the properties of q(-) and £(•), implies:
dEj > 0 
dlj ~
P roposition  7 ^  =  0
Proof. The result is immediate from equation (3.8), which fully determines Ij and where 
6j does not appear. ■
P roposition  8 I f  > 0 then ^  < 0 . I f  < 0 then > 0.
Proof. Taking the first partial differential from equation (3.11) with respect to Ej and 
0j yields (knowing that ^  = 0):
dQj =  0
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and:
dEj falEMMZ)
Mi
which, given the properties of q(-) and £(•), proves the proposition.
P roposition  9 ^  > 0
Proof. Taking the first partial differential of equation (3.8) yields:
p
r +  A dlj + r +  A
dpj — 0
which, given the properties of £(•), proves the proposition.
dliP roposition  10 ^  > 0
Proof. Taking the first partial differential of equation (3.8) yields:
-  m  +  r +  A) Pr +  A dlj + f 7(■(?)(! -  P)0- +  r +  ^)
V
r 4- A
d'K j =  0
which, given the properties of £(•), proves the proposition.
